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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three chapters exploring the causes and consequences
of human capital in an international setting. The first two chapters focus on the
origins of noncognitive characteristics and their role in human capital formation. The
third chapter demonstrates the consequences of human capital for financial inclusion.
The first chapter shows that locus of control has origins in ancestral control over
subsistence and demonstrates the implications this relationship has for human capi-
tal investment. Agricultural societies di↵ered in their control over crop yields based
on the fluctuations of a crucial external input: rainfall. I exploit di↵erences across
individuals of di↵erent ethnicities residing in the same subnational regions. Descen-
dants of agricultural societies with greater rainfall risk have a more external locus of
control. Consistent with limited learning, evidence from second-generation migrants
suggests that the intergenerational transmission of ancestor’s circumstances partly
informs beliefs. Ancestral control contributes to di↵erences in schooling e↵ort among
an international sample of 15-year-olds.
The second chapter provides empirical evidence of a non-linear relationship be-
tween an adolescent’s aspirations gap and their human capital. Higher aspirations
v
at age 12 are correlated with higher human capital levels at age 19, up to a point.
This empirical result provides evidence for the theoretical prediction that aspirations
that are ahead, but not too far ahead, provide the best incentives for investment. I
provide suggestive evidence that age 12 aspirations influence age 19 human capital
levels through the child’s time investment in education, long-term orientation, and
agency, but not the level of household education expenditure.
The third chapter (with Kehinde Ajayi) studies the effects of education on the
financial outcomes of youth. We use Kenya’s introduction of Free Primary Educa-
tion (FPE) in 2003 as an exogenous shock to schooling. Our identification strategy
compares changes across cohorts and across regions with differing levels of pre-FPE
enrollment. We find that FPE is associated with increases in educational attainment
and increased use of formal financial services. We also find increases in financial ca-
pability, employment rates, and incomes. Our results provide new evidence that a
large-scale government intervention can generate significant demand-driven improve-
ments in financial outcomes.
vi
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1Chapter 1
Ancestral Roots of Locus of Control
1.1 Introduction
People who face a set of constraints with similar abilities and preferences may be
expected to take similar actions and have similar outcomes. However, this is often not
the case. One explanation is that people have different beliefs about the consequences
of their actions. This belief can diverge between two individuals facing the same set
of constraints if they start with different priors. Divergent priors about the state of
the world can occur if these beliefs are deeply rooted in an individual’s culture or
ancestral history (Galor and Moav, 2002; Bisin and Verdier, 2011; Ferna´ndez, 2011;
Nunn, 2012).
In this paper, I show that ancestral economic experiences inform a belief that is an
important driver of economic behavior. The paper provides three main contributions.
First, I establish a link between the degree of control that preindustrial societies had
over crop yields, and their descendants’ beliefs about the importance of their own
actions in shaping their outcomes. Second, I show that this link is persistent, and
that the mechanism for this persistence is the intergenerational transmission of beliefs.
Third, I present evidence that this transmission of beliefs has implications for human
capital investment.
The belief this paper focuses on is known as locus of control. Originating in
psychology, locus of control is defined as the belief about the relationship between an
individual’s actions and their outcomes. An individual has an internal locus of control
2if they believe their own actions are most important in shaping outcomes. Conversely,
an individual with an external locus of control believes that factors external to their
own actions, such as fate, luck, or the actions of others, are more important in shaping
their outcomes (Rotter, 1966).
Differences in locus of control have important economic implications. Psychol-
ogists consider locus of control as a fundamental determinant of effort (Bandura,
1989; Skinner et al., 1998). Experimental evidence shows that individuals with an
internal locus of control are more intrinsically motivated and less responsive to exter-
nal incentives (Borghans et al., 2008b). Within economics, empirical evidence links
measures of locus of control with differences in human capital and wages (Coleman
and DeLeire, 2003; Heckman et al., 2006), job search effort (Caliendo et al., 2015),
and parental investment (Cunha et al., 2010; Lekfuangfu et al., 2018). However, the
origins of differences in locus of control are not well understood.
The first contribution of this paper establishes a relationship between ancestral
control over outcomes for a society and the locus of control of the society’s descen-
dants in the World Values Survey. I compare individuals whose ancestors differ along
two dimensions: (1) the importance of agriculture for preindustrial subsistence, and
(2) the variance of inter-annual rainfall in their homeland. The interaction of these
two dimensions proxies for ancestral control over subsistence. This proxy is consistent
with a hypothesis by Diamond (1987) and Harari (2015) that agricultural societies
who faced an uncertain climate had less control over their subsistence because of
two characteristics of agriculture: (1) a reliance on less variety, and (2) settlement
in a single geographic location. Descendants of societies in the 5th and 95th per-
centile of ancestral control in my sample differ in their locus of control today by 0.2
standard deviations. To put this in context, individuals in my sample who have not
completed secondary school have a more external locus of control than those with
3only a secondary or a post-secondary degree by 0.16 and 0.29 standard deviations,
respectively.
I compare individuals of different ethnicities who have different ancestral expe-
riences but reside in the same subnational region. This comparison allows me to
effectively control for time-invariant institutional, geographic, and climatic charac-
teristics at the local level. I exploit variation in the degree of ancestral reliance
on agriculture arising from two sources. First, I match an individual’s ethnicity with
records on their ancestor’s preindustrial share of subsistence from agriculture recorded
in the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967). Second, I exploit differences in the agro-
climatic characteristics of ethnic homelands that determine the potential calories from
agriculture (Galor and O¨zak, 2015). I measure the vulnerability of crop yields in a
society’s homeland to unpredictable weather by its rainfall risk.1 The results hold
when accounting for additional geographic characteristics associated with agriculture,
trade, differences in institutions, or the length of experience with agriculture.
The relationship between ancestral control over subsistence and contemporary
locus of control operates through a distinct channel from other beliefs, preferences,
and traits. Empirical evidence shows a persistent relationship between ancestral
subsistence or climatic variability with collectivism or individualism (Talhelm et al.,
2014; Davis, 2016; Olsson and Paik, 2016), trust (Litina, 2016; Buggle and Durante,
2017), long-term orientation (Galor and O¨zak, 2016), religiosity (Ager and Ciccone,
2018; Bentzen, 2017), preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Giuliano, 2011),
the importance of tradition (Giuliano and Nunn, 2017), loss aversion (Galor and
Savitskiy, 2017), and attitudes towards gender equality (Alesina et al., 2013). I show
that ancestral control over subsistence correlates with some of these traits. However,
the magnitudes of these correlations are smaller than the link with locus of control,
1Rainfall risk is defined as the average variance in inter-annual log monthly rainfall following
Ager and Ciccone (2018).
4and accounting for these traits does not change the results.
An alternative interpretation for the link between ancestral control over subsis-
tence and contemporary locus of control is that individuals sorted into environments
based on their locus of control, and this sorting was driven by control over subsis-
tence. I exploit differences in the agro-climatic suitability for maize, a crop native to
the Americas, in the Old World to provide evidence that the environment shaping
locus of control beliefs drives my findings. Maize is a highly productive staple crop
that was widely adopted by Old World societies in the decades following Christopher
Columbus’ voyage to the Americas in 1492 (Crosby, 1972). However, the yields for
maize are more sensitive to water deprivation than native Old World staples such as
wheat, sorghum, and barley (McCann, 2001). The results show that descendants of
societies where maize doubled the potential calories from agriculture, relative to the
potential calories from the set of crops available prior to the Columbian Exchange,
have a more external locus of control by 0.25 standard deviations today. Under the
assumption that ethnic homelands in the Old World did not change due to the in-
troduction of maize, this finding provides evidence that the subsistence environment
shapes beliefs about the returns to effort.
The second contribution of this paper shows that the intergenerational transmis-
sion of beliefs is a mechanism for the link between ancestral control over crop yields
and contemporary locus of control. First, I establish that the link is persistent even
when circumstances change by using the introduction of maize as an exogenous shock
to the sensitivity of agricultural yields to weather swings. Accounting for the intro-
duction of maize reduces the magnitude of the relationship between ancestral control
over subsistence and contemporary locus of control by about one-fifth. This finding
suggests that changed circumstances do alter deeply held locus of control beliefs, but
that these changes are slow-moving.
5In order to argue that intergenerational transmission of beliefs is the primary
mechanism for the persistent, slow-moving relationship between ancestral control and
contemporary locus of control, I follow the epidemiological approach (Ferna´ndez,
2011). The epidemiological approach compares second-generation migrants who were
born in the same country but with a parent born in a different country. Second-
generation migrants are exposed to the same geography and institutions since birth,
but have ancestors who differed in their control over subsistence. Ancestral control
over subsistence derived from the country of birth of parents is associated with the
respondent’s locus of control. This result suggests that the relationship between
the parent’s ancestral subsistence experiences and their children’s locus of control
represents an intergenerationally transmitted, culturally portable belief.
The third contribution of this paper demonstrates that ancestral control has im-
plications for the math learning effort of 15-year-olds in a sample of second-generation
migrants. I create an index from a series of questions on locus of control for math-
ematics achievement and self-reported effort in learning mathematics for students in
the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Less ancestral
control over subsistence is associated with a more external locus of control over math
achievement and less self-reported effort in learning mathematics. Math locus of con-
trol is a primary mechanism for the relationship with effort in math, and the results
show that it mediates one-third of the magnitude of the relationship.
This paper contributes to several strands of the literature that seek to under-
stand the importance of noncognitive traits, culture, and the persistent effect of an-
cestral experiences on economic behavior. First, it contributes to the literature on
the importance of internal constraints on the behavior of those in poverty (Banerjee
and Mullainathan, 2010; Mani et al., 2013; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014; Dalton et al.,
2016; Wuepper and Lybbert, 2017; Lybbert and Wydick, 2018), and the literature on
6noncognitive skills, socioemotional skills, and personality traits in economics (Bowles
et al., 2001; Borghans et al., 2008a; Almlund et al., 2011; Becker et al., 2012; Kautz
et al., 2014). To date, a majority of studies on this topic have sought to understand
the implications of differences in noncognitive skills, socioemotional skills and per-
sonality traits, or whether programs that target changing these traits has an impact
on economic outcomes. This paper demonstrates that the origins of differences in
one of these traits, locus of control, is rooted in ancestral experiences. Therefore, I
show that traits that can serve as an internal constraint of poverty may not be solely
reflective of an individual’s current constraints. The exercise using the PISA sample
illustrates that this relationship has implications for economic behavior.
Second, the identification strategy of the paper exploiting differences in ancestral
experiences with subsistence relates to work that shows that ancestral experiences
influence modern economic outcomes (Alesina et al., 2013; Talhelm et al., 2014; Ga-
lor and O¨zak, 2016; Olsson and Paik, 2016; Wuepper and Drosten, 2017; BenYishay
et al., 2017; Galor and Savitskiy, 2017; Michalopoulos et al., 2018). The paper adds
to this literature by studying a dimension of culture whose origins have received lit-
tle attention in economics. The exercise exploiting the introduction of maize in the
Old World demonstrates that deep-rooted ancestral experiences can be remarkably
persistent in the face of a more proximate shock. My finding that ancestral experi-
ences are transmitted across generations contributes to the growing literature on the
persistence of culture in economics (Guiso et al., 2006; Tabellini, 2010; Ferna´ndez,
2011; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Nunn, 2012; Voigtlander and Voth, 2012; Spo-
laore and Wacziarg, 2013; Grosjean, 2014; Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Guiso et al.,
2016; Giuliano and Nunn, 2017).
Finally, the persistent relationship between ancestral control over subsistence and
locus of control of their descendants contributes to the literature on heterogeneity in
7the outcomes of agricultural societies driven by geographic or climatic characteristics
(Dell et al., 2014; Litina, 2016; Bentzen et al., 2017; Buggle, 2017). Historians and
anthropologists cite the transition to agriculture as important in fostering the develop-
ment of modern civilizations (Diamond, 1997). Within economics, Hibbs and Olsson
(2004) provide empirical cross-country evidence that an early agricultural transition
is linked with state formation, and Michalopoulos et al. (2018) show a positive link
with individual education and income in Africa. However, Diamond (1987) and Harari
(2015) argue that agriculture may have been a negative for early agriculturalists at
the individual level because it made them more vulnerable to weather swings. My
findings contribute to this literature by suggesting a new dimension of heterogeneity
within agricultural societies that has economic implications.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
Locus of control has a long history in the social sciences. In this section, I discuss
how my finding that ancestral control influences contemporary locus of control and
contemporary effort in human capital is consistent with this literature. First, I define
locus of control, and provide a brief overview of the literature that links locus of
control with economic outcomes in the fields of psychology, sociology, and economics.
Second, I discuss the literature on locus of control formation. Third, I draw on the
theories and evidence in the literature to discuss a conceptual framework of how
ancestral experiences with agriculture inform locus of control beliefs and behavior
today.
1.2.1 Locus of control: definition and its influence on behavior
Locus of control is “a generalized attitude, belief, or expectancy regarding the nature
of the causal relationship between one’s own behavior and its consequences” (Rotter,
1966, p.2). An individual with an internal locus of control will attribute outcomes to
8their own actions while an individual with an external locus of control will attribute
them to circumstances beyond their control (Rotter, 1966). Thus, individuals with
an internal locus of control believe that their outcomes are primarily determined by
their own actions, including their personal level of effort or investment, as well as
their own mistakes and failings. Conversely, individuals with an external locus of
control believe that factors such as luck, chance, fate, destiny, or the actions of others
play a larger role in determining their outcomes.
Locus of control is one of the most widely studied concepts in psychology and is
considered fundamental to understanding differences in effort and motivation (Ban-
dura, 1989; Skinner, 1996). A large body of literature correlates a more internal locus
of control with positive outcomes such as higher education and income (see Findley
and Cooper (1983), Skinner et al. (1998), Judge and Bono (2001), Eccles and Wigfield
(2002), and Ng et al. (2006) for reviews of the literature). Additionally, economists
link an internal locus of control with positive outcomes such as higher earnings, faster
earnings growth, greater job satisfaction, and quicker reemployment (see Cobb-Clark
(2015) for an excellent review from the perspective of an economist).2
Specifically, locus of control, and its link with academic and educational achieve-
ment, has a long history in the social sciences. In the landmark Coleman Report, a
comprehensive 1960s study of educational equality in the US, the sociologist James
Coleman notes that “a pupil attitude factor, which appears to have a stronger re-
2For example, economists incorporate locus of control into models of job search and show it
has implications for job search effort, unemployment duration, and reservation wages (Caliendo
et al., 2015; McGee, 2015; McGee and McGee, 2016), and the likelihood of dropping out of the
job market after a health shock (Schurer, 2017). Moreover, those with a more internal locus of
control may save more (Cobb-Clark et al., 2016), and invest in riskier assets (Salamanca et al.,
2016). Cobb-Clark et al. (2014) find that locus of control is linked with health outcomes through
the choice of diet and frequency of exercise. Development economists show that a more internal
locus of control is associated with a higher likelihood of adopting agricultural technologies (Abay
et al., 2017; Malacarne, 2018; Taffesse and Tadesse, 2017). In addition, economists study how an
internal locus of control may serve as a complement to higher aspirations (Bernard et al., 2011;
Lybbert and Wydick, 2018) in breaking free from an aspirations-based poverty trap (Dalton et al.,
2016; Genicot and Ray, 2017).
9lationship to achievement than do all the school factors together, is the extent to
which an individual feels that he has some control over his own destiny” (Coleman,
1966, p.23). He goes on to discuss its potential importance as follows: “If a child
feels that his environment is capricious, or random, or beyond his ability to alter,
then he may conclude that attempts to affect it are not worthwhile, and stop trying”
(Coleman, 1966, p.288). There is evidence that locus of control impacts education
effort, motivation, and persistence in problem solving (Ross and Broh, 2000), and
there is experimental evidence that locus of control impacts internal motivation, as
those with an internal locus of control are less responsive to rewards on cognitive
tasks (Borghans et al., 2008b). Thus, locus of control has the potential for important
implications for human capital investment through its effect on the perceived returns
to effort.
Within economics, Coleman and DeLeire (2003) include locus of control in a model
of human capital investment, in which it enters as a differential perception about the
returns to education. A 1 standard deviation difference in locus of control is linked
with a 2-7 percentage point increase in the probability of completing high school
(Cebi, 2007; Baro´n and Cobb-Clark, 2010) and this relationship is stronger for low-
socioeconomic status students (Mendolia and Walker, 2014). The relationship with
education is a primary mechanism for the link between locus of control and income
(Piatek and Pinger, 2016). However, it is unclear whether these beliefs about the
returns to effort reflect individuals’ accurate perceptions of their constraints.
1.2.2 Formation of locus of control beliefs
Initially, Rotter (1966) described locus of control as a continuously updated belief
that takes into account the feedback that individuals receive about the influence of
their actions on their outcomes. However, the feedback people receive about the
importance of their own actions versus factors outside of their control in determining
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their outcomes may be incomplete. Within this environment, individuals may fall
back on a prior about the belief of the importance of their own actions in shaping
outcomes. This prior, which can take the form of a heuristic or rule of thumb, may
be informed by ancestral experiences that have been passed down for generations
because these beliefs contributed to individual and group survival over time (Boyd and
Richerson, 1985). These heuristics, which evolve separately across cultures (Nunn,
2012), therefore reflect the experiences of the ancestors of an individual, and may
not be applicable to current circumstances. Thus, locus of control beliefs are also
potentially informed by culture, or could be passed down through generations.
There is evidence that locus of control beliefs are primarily determined prior to
and during adolescence (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013; Elkins et al., 2017). Hence,
there may be a relatively short window for individuals to form locus of control beliefs.
Moreover, there is evidence that parental actions shape locus of control (Anger, 2011;
Elkins and Schurer, 2018; Lekfuangfu et al., 2018) primarily through the parent’s
perceptions about the returns to their own investment in their children.3 This suggests
that ancestral experiences may be important in informing locus of control beliefs.
Therefore, there are two sources for the formation of locus of control: (1) rational
perceptions based on actual constraints, updated through personal experiences in
a process of Bayesian learning; and (2) intergenerational transmission from one’s
parents. The analysis in this paper provides evidence that the origins of (2) can be
traced back to the actual constraints experienced by an individual’s ancestors, which
are then propagated through generations. Thus, this reflects rational beliefs on the
part of individuals and their ancestors, but within a framework of limited learning.
That is, experiences with the returns to effort of one’s ancestors form a prior to fill
in the gaps in information about the returns to effort obtained through one’s own
3This is consistent with evidence from Cunha et al. (2010) about the importance of noncognitive
maternal skills, made up of locus of control and self-esteem, in the technology of skill formation.
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experiences.
1.2.3 Agriculture and control over subsistence
I use agricultural experiences to proxy for ancestral experiences with the returns to
effort because agriculture was the major economic activity for most societies prior to
the industrial revolution. From the outset, early agriculturalists faced many obstacles.
This included a more volatile life expectancy (Shennan et al., 2013; Timpson et al.,
2014) and longer hours worked for a worse caloric return (Bowles, 2011), all for an
output that is susceptible to sudden environmental swings (Harlan, 1992). These
early challenges are cited as part of the reason why agriculture is called both “the
worst mistake in the history of the human race” (Diamond, 1987) and “history’s
biggest fraud” (Harari, 2015). While Diamond and Harari provide multiple pieces of
evidence for their assertions, both cite weather risk among their arguments for two
reasons: (1) agriculture led to a situation in which subsistence was at the mercy of
the whims of the weather due to a reliance on less variety and (2) a lack of geographic
mobility.
First, agricultural societies depended on less variety of food for subsistence, es-
pecially compared to hunters and gatherers. If one species of plant or animal failed,
then hunter-gatherers could simply forage or hunt more of another species. However,
sedentary agriculturalists generally relied on just two to three staple crops (Olsson
and Hibbs, 2005). Thus, agriculturalists risked starvation if just a single crop failed,
which could happen due to drought, flood, or a plague, all of which could arise with-
out warning and were factors outside of their control. Additionally, less variety meant
that early agriculturalists’ diets were deficient in vitamins and minerals, meaning they
were less healthy and thus more vulnerable to disease and starvation.
Second, agricultural societies were more likely to subsist in a single, settled area.
This again left them more vulnerable to unpredictable weather shocks as all of their
12
potential subsistence was tied to a single geographic area, and they were less able
to get up and move when faced with a shock. This contrasts with hunter-gatherers
who were familiar with the available game and plants for subsistence over a wide
geographic area, and often moved in anticipation of inhospitable weather. Moreover,
the closer quarters in permanent settlements made agriculturalists more vulnerable
to infectious disease.
These assertions are supported by numerous examples of famines in agricultural
societies brought on by extreme rainfall events. These events include the biblical
seven-year famine of Genesis brought on by drought, the collapse of the Maya civi-
lization around 1000AD (Evans et al., 2018), the Great European Famine of the 14th
century brought on by torrential flooding, as well as the more contemporary exam-
ples of the potato famine in Ireland and the dust bowl of the Great Plains in the
US. Even in the past 100 years, most famines in poor economies are associated with
extreme weather on the harvest (Gra´da, 2007). Taken together, these factors support
the hypothesis that agriculturalists in environments with uncertain rainfall had less
control over their subsistence.
1.3 Agriculture, Rainfall Risk and Locus of Control
This section provides evidence that ancestral control over subsistence is linked with
contemporary locus of control beliefs. I exploit differences in the ancestral experiences
with subsistence of individuals residing in the same subnational region today. I do this
by linking individuals to ethnographic records on the importance of agriculture for
subsistence, as well as to the agro-climatic suitability for agriculture and inter-annual
variability of precipitation in their ancestral homelands. I provide evidence that the
interaction between a greater importance of agriculture of an individual’s ancestors
for subsistence and more variable inter-annual rainfall is negatively associated with
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locus of control. This relationship is robust to the inclusion of a host of geographic
characteristics, does not appear to be driven by population movements, and is distinct
from other culturally persistent traits.
1.3.1 Identification strategy and data
I exploit ancestral differences in the control that societies had over their agricultural
yields of individuals who today reside in the same subnational region. The empirical
specification is an ordinary least squares regression of the form
LoCiert = β1Ae × Ve + β2Ae + β3Ve + φ′Ge + γ′Diert + wt + δr + εiert (1.1)
in which LoCiert is the locus of control for individual i of ethnicity e living in sub-
national region r interviewed in survey wave t. Ae is the preindustrial importance
of agriculture for subsistence for ethnicity e, and Ve is the inter-annual precipitation
variability in e’s homeland. Ge are observable geographic characteristics of ethnicity
e’s homeland, and Diert are exogenous individual demographic characteristics (gen-
der and a fourth-order polynomial in age). wt represents survey wave fixed effects
to account for differences in the structure and timing of a survey that takes place in
multiple waves, and δr is a subnational region of residence fixed effect. The estimation
clusters standard errors by ethnicity. The interaction term, Ae × Ve, represents the
ancestral control over subsistence.
I use the World Values Survey (WVS) to construct my primary sample. The WVS
is a nationally representative survey measuring the beliefs and values of individuals
around the world. The survey has been conducted in six waves from 1981 through
2014 in 100 countries with a total of over 340,000 observations representative of 90%
of the world’s population. To measure an individual’s locus of control, I use responses
to the following question that was asked in each wave of the survey: “Some people feel
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they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel
that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale
where 1 means ‘no choice at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal of choice’ to indicate how
much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns
out.” I use a respondent’s self-reported ethnicity and language spoken at home to
match individuals with societies in the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967).4 Figure
1·1 depicts the average locus of control for members of different ethnicities I match at
the population centroid of their ancestral homeland as recorded in the Ethnographic
Atlas.
I rely on an updated version of the Ethnographic Atlas compiled by Kirby et al.
(2016) to identify the preindustrial importance of agriculture in a society (Ae). The
importance of agriculture is recorded on a 0-9 scale in which each 1 unit increase
corresponds with a 10% increase in the share of a society’s subsistence coming from
agriculture relative to hunting, gathering, fishing, and animal husbandry. The average
for the 1,307 societies in the Ethnographic Atlas on this scale is 4.46. For societies
that match with individuals in my primary sample, this average is 6.14.5
Inter-annual precipitation variability (Ve) is constructed following Ager and Ci-
ccone (2018)’s definition of rainfall risk. Rainfall risk is the variance of the annual
average log monthly rainfall. I use monthly gridded terrestrial precipitation from
1900-1999 (Matsuura and Willmott, 2015) to calculate these measures.6 I calculate
4I rely on the respondent’s self-reported ethnicity for 76% of matches. For language spoken at
home, I match with an ethnicity only if: (1) the language is unique to a single ethnicity, (2) it is
not the official language of the country of residence, and (3) it does not conflict with the reported
ethnicity when the reported ethnicity is coarse (e.g., white, black).
5The average share of subsistence from other sources on this 0-9 scale is 1.01 for gathering, 1.43
for hunting, 1.54 for fishing, and 1.56 for animal husbandry for all societies. Of those in my sample,
the averages are 0.21 for gathering, 0.44 for hunting, 0.75 for fishing, and 2.45 for animal husbandry.
6Ideally, I would use historical values, but reliable year-to-year records of precipitation for the
entire globe prior to 1900 do not exist. The closest is coarser data that is available for Europe only
from 1500-1900. I rely on a strong correlation between the rainfall risk from 1900-1999 and the pre-
industrial era. Based on other studies, this seems plausible. For example, Buggle and Durante (2017)
find that the variability in precipitation in 1500-1750 and 1901-2000 has a correlation coefficient of
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the rainfall risk separately for each month in each grid cell, then average across all
months to get the average monthly rainfall risk for each grid cell.7 Then, I define a
society’s rainfall risk as the average across all grid cells within a homeland.
The specification controls for a host of geographic and climatic characteristics (Ge)
that could potentially confound the relationship between the importance of agricul-
ture, rainfall risk, and locus of control. These geographic variables fall into two
categories. The first category includes geographic variables that are associated with
the suitability for agriculture. These include the continent of the homeland, average
temperature, precipitation, length of the growing season, share of land suitable for
agriculture, average elevation, absolute latitude, ruggedness of the terrain, and sta-
bility of malaria transmission. I control for these to show that it is not a specific
characteristic of the suitability for agriculture that is driving my results. Second, I
include additional geographic variables that are associated with trade.8 This second
set of geographic variables includes the following: a dummy for whether the ancestral
homeland is landlocked, distance to the coast from the ancestral population centroid
of their homeland, the presence of a navigable river in their homeland, the presence of
a harbor along the coast of their homeland, and the size of their homeland. I control
for these to hold constant the ability of individuals in their homeland to deal with
negative rainfall shocks by trading with other societies or within their own homeland.
Individual level demographic controls (Diert) include gender to allow for a differ-
ence in average locus of control between men and women and a fourth order polyno-
mial in age to account for systematic differences in locus of control through the life
cycle.9 Survey wave fixed effects (wt) are included to account for differences in the
0.85.
7Rain is an important input into crop yields even during non-growing seasons. For example,
enough rain is needed to regenerate nutrients in the soil. However, too much rain could wash away
the nutrient-rich topsoil.
8Ruggedness of the terrain and stability of malaria transmission are also associated with the
ability to trade (Henderson et al., 2018).
9Evidence from panel data suggests that locus of control increases in adolescence, remains rela-
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structure of the survey in different waves.10
The specification employs subnational region of residence fixed effects (δr) in or-
der to hold local institutional, geographic, and climatic time-invariant characteristics
constant.11 This strategy allows for the comparison of individuals with different an-
cestral experiences that currently reside in the same geographic region and are subject
to the same local conditions. This is important because it has been established that
climatic variability and ancestral subsistence plays a significant role in shaping insti-
tutions (Haber, 2012; Bentzen et al., 2017), and local institutions may play a role in
shaping locus of control.
Figure 1·2 illustrates the variation I exploit with the example of Zambia, a country
in south-central Africa. Within Zambia, I observe individuals who belong to 8 differ-
ent ethnic groups. Panel A maps the ethnic homelands, prior to colonization, of those
ethnic groups projected onto the current boundary of Zambia.12 Panel B projects the
contemporary province boundaries (the subnational unit of observation in the WVS
for Zambia). I compare individuals who today reside in the same subnational regions
(provinces, in the case of Zambia), but differ in their ancestral experiences, proxied by
the ethnographic and geographic characteristics of their homelands. Panel C shows
that across these 8 ethnic groups, the homelands differed in their share of subsistence
from agriculture from 40% to 70%. Panel D shows that the level of rainfall risk ranged
from 0.8 to 1.6, or about 1.3 S.D.
tively stable during adulthood, and decreases in old age (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013).
10I do not control for other individual characteristics in my base specifications, such as education
and income, as these are potentially endogenous to ancestral control.
11The number of subnational regions in a country ranges from 2-50, with a median of 10, within
the WVS.
12These homeland locations are from Murdock (1959). I use this source to identify the location of
ethnic homelands of all African ethnicities. For the rest of the world, I use various sources following
Fenske (2013) (see data appendix for details).
17
1.3.2 Determinants of the reliance on agriculture
A concern with the empirical specification presented in equation 1.1 is that a society’s
preindustrial reliance on agriculture is an endogenous choice. Thus, it is vulnerable to
reverse-causality if pre-existing differences in locus of control led societies to choose
how reliant to be on agriculture. Therefore, I supplement this measure with the plau-
sibly exogenous agro-climatic potential for agriculture in an ethnic group’s homeland
that is orthogonal to human actions. This measure comes from the Caloric Suitability
Index (Galor and O¨zak, 2015, 2016) that contains data on the potential calories from
agriculture, measured in calories per hectare per year, across the globe. The Caloric
Suitability Index provides an estimate of the potential calories from crop yields based
on the agro-climatic potential yield in tons per hectare per year, calculated by the
Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ) project of the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation (FAO) (Ramankutty et al., 2002). I focus on the caloric potential under a
rain-fed, low input technology for the set of crops available prior to 1500 in order to
capture the agricultural suitability under conditions that are orthogonal to human
intervention.13
The measure of potential calories due to exogenous agro-climatic conditions of
a society’s homeland is highly correlated with that society’s reliance on agriculture
for subsistence recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas.14 Figure 1·3 panel A depicts
this relationship, with continent fixed effects partialled out, for 1,062 societies in
the Ethnographic Atlas.15 This correlation demonstrates that a primary driver of a
society’s decision to rely on agriculture is the exogenous potential caloric productivity
of the land determined by agro-climatic conditions.
13I focus on this index instead of the original FAO-GAEZ potential yields because the potential
yield in calories is a measure better suited to capture the importance of agriculture to a society in
the preindustrial era than the potential yield in weight (Galor and O¨zak, 2015).
14The correlation coefficient is ρ = 0.42.
15Panel A of Figure A·1 shows that this is very similar to the relationship for the 152 societies
that I match with individuals in the sample.
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An additional concern is that societies may consider the level of rainfall risk when
selecting into agriculture. Figure 1·3 panel B depicts the relationship between rain-
fall risk and the share of subsistence from agriculture, with continent and average
precipitation partialled out, for the societies in the Ethnographic Atlas. The results
suggest that, conditional on average precipitation in their homeland, societies were
not selecting into the degree of reliance on agriculture based on the level of rainfall
risk they faced.16 Overall, this suggests that the main driver of the degree of reliance
on agriculture was the exogenous potential caloric productivity of the land.
1.3.3 Ancestral agriculture, rainfall risk, and locus of control
I examine the relationship between ancestral agriculture, rainfall risk, and contem-
porary locus of control. Table 1.1 estimates equation 1.1, controlling for average
precipitation in all columns. Column 1 does not include any additional controls, and
column 2 includes individual controls, the year of the primary ethnographic record in
the Ethnographic Atlas, and survey wave fixed effects. Column 3 controls for country
fixed effects, and column 4 controls for subnational fixed effects. Column 5 intro-
duces the geographic controls associated with engaging in agriculture, and column
6 geographic controls associated with trade. In each column, the results show that
the interaction between the preindustrial share of subsistence from agriculture and
the rainfall risk of their homeland is negatively associated with locus of control. The
results suggest that for every additional 1 S.D. increase in the level of rainfall risk, the
difference in the locus of control between a society with a 10% reliance on agriculture
and one with a 90% reliance is 0.43 S.D. Figure 1·4 presents the partial correlation
plot showing the relationship between ancestral control and locus of control, for the
regression presented in column 6.
16Panel B of Figure A·1 shows that this is also the case for the societies that I match with
individuals in the sample.
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Table 2 supplements the above findings with results exploiting differences in the
agro-climatic potential for calories from agriculture of a society’s homeland, instead
of drawing on the share of ancestral subsistence form agriculture. I use the potential
calories from potential yields under a low-input rainfed technology that is exogenous
to human interventions. The specifications in Table 1.2 are analogous to Table 1.1,
but they interact the agro-climatic potential for calories from agriculture with rainfall
risk instead of the share of ancestral subsistence from agriculture. Once country fixed
effects are included in column 3, the results all point in the same direction as in Table
1.1: unpredictable rainfall interacted with the potential for agriculture is negatively
associated with locus of control. This provides complementary evidence that the more
important agriculture is to the preindustrial subsistence of a society, combined with
more variable inter-annual rainfall, the less control the society has over subsistence.
The magnitudes suggest that for two societies with a 1 SD difference in their average
caloric potential for agriculture, a 1 SD increase in the rainfall risk increases the
difference in locus of control between the descendants of the two societies by 0.08 SD.
1.3.4 Robustness checks
Thus far, the results suggest a strong relationship between ancestral control over sub-
sistence and contemporary locus of control. In this subsection, I first consider the
sensitivity of my core results to alternative measures of inter-annual rainfall variation.
Second, I show that potential omitted variables, such as other geographic or ethno-
graphic characteristics, are not driving the result. Third, I provide evidence that the
results are not biased by differential likelihood of individuals in the sample residing
outside their ethnic homeland.
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Alternative measures of precipitation variability
Table A.4 presents results using two alternative methods of calculating the instability
of inter-annual rainfall patterns. First, in columns 1-3, I use the coefficient of variation
of rainfall, defined as the inter-annual standard deviation divided by mean rainfall.
An advantage of this measure is that it is scale-invariant. The second alternative, pre-
sented in columns 4-6, is a precipitation predictability index. This measure, adapted
from Colwell (1974), takes on a value of 0 to 1 in which 0 is completely unpredictable
and 1 is completely predictable. An advantage of this measure is that it takes into
account both the inter- and intra-annual predictability of precipitation patterns. For
both of these alternative measures of the instability of precipitation patterns, the
results are consistent with the results using the preferred measure of rainfall risk.17
Additional geographic and ethnographic characteristics
An additional concern is that the results are picking up differences in institutions.
For example, more autocratic societies or societies with more development political
hierarchies may lead to a perception of less control. Irrigation suitability has been
associated with autocracy (Bentzen et al., 2017), the potential advantage of cereals
relative to roots and tubers is associated with differences in state hierarchies (Mayshar
et al., 2018), and nonlinear precipitation and temperature is associated with state
formation (Haber, 2012). Columns 2-4 of Table A.6 control for each of these in turn,
and the results are unchanged.
Societies that adopted agriculture sooner developed earlier (Diamond, 1997), and
are more collectivist (Olsson and Paik, 2016). Columns 5 and 6 of Table A.6 control
for two geographic characteristics that have been associated with the timing of the
adoption of agriculture: distance to a Neolithic site and a quadratic of the standard
17Reduced form results using the interaction of these measures with the caloric potential of agri-
culture are presented in Table A.5.
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deviation of temperature. Column 5 controls for the distance to the closest of the
seven independent sites of the invention of agriculture during the Neolithic era.18
Column 6 controls for the standard deviation of temperature and its square, since this
is found to be associated with the adoption of agriculture by Ashraf and Michalopoulos
(2015). The results are unchanged. In addition, Table A.6 includes Oster (2016) δ
values that represent the degree of selection on unobservables, relative to observables,
that would be needed to bias the result to zero. These values are all well outside the
range of 0 to 1, which suggests that it is unlikely that there are additional omitted
variables that would bias the result to zero.19
Next, I check to see if the result is robust to controlling for other ethnographic
characteristics recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas. These could potentially be en-
dogenous to the reliance on agriculture. However, if controlling for other ethnographic
characteristics leaves the results unchanged, then this suggests that these other char-
acteristics are not driving the result.20 Results are presented in Table A.8. Column
2 controls for the settlement patterns of the society, that is the level of nomadicity of
the society, as agricultural societies are typically less mobile. The concern is that the
results are driven solely by less mobile societies that are more vulnerable to rainfall
risk. Locus of control could be picking up preindustrial differences in the number
of political hierarchies beyond the local level, which is associated with contemporary
development in Africa (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). Column 3 controls
for this variable. Column 4 controls for the closeness of kinship ties (Enke, 2018),
18These sites are from Matranga (2017), and I use the distance as a proxy for the time since the
adoption of agriculture following Olsson and Paik (2016), who find that the distance to the fertile
crescent is associated with individualism in Europe.
19Table A.7 repeats this exercise for the interaction of rainfall risk with the caloric potential of
the ethnic homeland and the results are largely the same.
20I do not repeat this exercise for the results interacting caloric potential with the rainfall risk. This
is because the ethnographic characteristics are clear post-treatment variables, in which treatment
is the geography and climate of the homeland. Thus, they are clearly “bad controls” (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009), and controlling for them could introduce unpredictable biases (Acharya et al., 2016).
Therefore, I explore them as potential mechanisms for the reduced form results in the appendix.
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as this is associated with cooperation and trust. This shows that I am not simply
picking up close family ties, and individuals feeling as if their outcomes are deter-
mined by their families (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010). Column 5 controls for whether
the society allowed polygyny, which can impact investment incentives (Tertilt, 2005).
Column 6 controls for bride price, that is if there is an exchange between families
at the time of marriage, as this may be related to the social structure of a society
(Anderson, 2007). The result remains largely unchanged when controlling for each of
these ethnographic characteristics.
Table A.9 provides results using alternative specifications. To show that the re-
sults are not picking up the effect of a contemporary reliance on farming, columns 1
and 2 restrict the sample to exclude individuals who work in agriculture or reside in
households in which the household head works in agriculture. Next, I relax the strict
cardinality assumption I’ve made on the dependent variable. First, columns 3 and
4 partially relax it in which they present results that define the dependent variable
as answering from 6-10 to the question on locus of control. I call these individuals
“internals,” of which about two-thirds of the sample would qualify. Columns 5 and 6
relax the cardinality assumption completely and estimates an ordered probit specifi-
cation since the measure of locus of control is ordinal but not cardinal. The results
for each of these are consistent with my preferred specification.
Movers
My preferred specification includes subnational district fixed effects in order to hold
constant local time-invariant geographic and institutional characteristics. However,
30% of the sample lives in a subnational region outside their ethnic homeland, includ-
ing 7% that lives in a country that does not contain their ethnic homeland. I do not
observe whether these individuals moved in their own lifetime, or if they are descen-
dants of individuals who moved. This endogenous selection into place of residence
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could bias the results if ancestral control led to differential selection into subnational
districts.
Table A.10 shows that ancestral control over subsistence, using the share of sub-
sistence from agriculture, does not predict living outside of the ethnic homeland.
However, when using the caloric potential for agriculture as a proxy for its impor-
tance, it shows that descendants of societies with less ancestral control were more
likely to live in a country that did not contain their homeland. Table A.11 removes
the 7% of the sample that resides outside of a country containing their homeland,
and estimates a specification that employs country fixed effects but not subnational
district fixed effects. The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table
1.2. As an additional check, Table A.12 presents results for my preferred specification
controlling for being a mover, and the results are largely unchanged. Overall, this
analysis provides evidence that differential population movements are not biasing the
results.
1.3.5 Other culturally persistent traits
In this subsection, I explore the connection between the results and other persistent
cultural traits that could be related to locus of control, or have been shown to be
persistently associated with ancestral agriculture or the variability of the ancestral
climate. Specifically, locus of control is sometimes associated with preferences for
redistribution, individualism, religiosity, and risk preferences. In particular, individ-
ualism or collectivism is a culturally persistent trait that is associated with ancestral
experiences with climatic variability (Davis, 2016), as well as agricultural experiences
(Talhelm et al., 2014; Olsson and Paik, 2016; Buggle, 2017). In addition, generalized
trust has been associated with the suitability for agriculture (Litina, 2016), and cli-
matic variability (Buggle and Durante, 2017). Finally, the importance of tradition
(Giuliano and Nunn, 2017) and degree of loss aversion (Galor and Savitskiy, 2017)
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have been linked with measures of ancestral climatic instability, while long-term ori-
entation (Galor and O¨zak, 2016) and gender attitudes (Alesina et al., 2013) have been
linked with the ancestral agriculture experience.
Panel (a) of Figure 1·5 presents results for each of these additional cultural traits
as the dependent variable. Each row shows the coefficient from an estimation of
equation 1.1, with 95% confidence intervals, for different cultural traits as the outcome
variable.21 Each outcome variable is standardized. Locus of control, in the first row,
repeats the results found in column 6 of Table 1.1. Less ancestral control is positively
associated with collectivism, the importance of tradition, and long term orientation,
and is negatively associated with the importance of risk and adventure, trust, and
equal gender attitudes. However, the magnitude of the relationship between ancestral
control and each of these traits is smaller than the magnitude of the relationship with
locus of control. Moreover, results presented in Panel (b) show that controlling for
these additional traits in my preferred specification does not change the core result.
Overall, these results suggest that the relationship between ancestral control over
subsistence and locus of control is distinct from other persistent cultural traits.22
1.4 Introduction of Maize in the Old World
This paper shows that ancestral control of subsistence is associated with a more ex-
ternal locus of control of their descendants today. However, it is unclear whether
this relationship is driven primarily by the environment shaping locus of control or
by individuals with an internal locus of control sorting into different regions. This
section exploits a change in the vulnerability of agricultural yields to unpredictable
21Panel A of Table A.13 presents these regression results.
22Table A.14 performs the same exercise, but uses the caloric potential for agriculture rather than
the share of subsistence from agriculture. Preferences for redistribution is the only trait positively
associated with ancestral subsistence control. Controlling for these other traits, presented in Panel
C, does not meaningfully alter the size of the coefficient on ancestral control over subsistence when
compared with Panel B.
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weather due to the introduction of maize after the Columbian Exchange. This pro-
vides evidence that the environment shapes locus of control.
I exploit the change to the set of suitable crops in ancestral homelands after the
Columbian Exchange (Crosby, 1972; Galor and O¨zak, 2016). The Columbian Ex-
change refers to the wide exchange of crops, animals, culture, people, technology, and
ideas between the Americas and the Old World following the arrival of Christopher
Columbus in the Americas in 1492 (Nunn and Qian, 2010). Specifically, I exploit the
change in the agro-climatic potential for calories from agriculture due to the intro-
duction of maize in the Old World. I focus on maize for three reasons. First, it is a
crop that is native to the Americas, meaning that it was not cultivated by societies in
Africa, Asia, Europe and Oceania prior to 1500. Second, it is a high-potential calorie
crop that is widely suitable and was rapidly adopted in the Old World (Crosby, 1972;
McCann, 2005). Third, relative to other Old World staple crops (e.g. sorghum, mil-
let, barley, wheat), its yield is more susceptible to drought and sunlight deprivation,
and rots easily when stored in tropical climates (McCann, 2001).
This final point suggests that maize yields are more susceptible to unpredictable
weather patterns outside of human control. Thus, if a society has the incentive to
move into growing maize because maize is more productive on average than the set of
crops that were suitable prior to the Columbian Exchange, this could induce a change
in perceptions of control that reflect the society’s changed circumstances. I show that
descendants of societies with a greater incentive to grow maize have a more external
locus of control.
26
1.4.1 Identification strategy and data
I investigate whether societies that had a greater incentive to adopt maize have a
more external locus of control today by estimating
LoCiert = β1∆Me + β2PCe + φ
′Ge + γ′Diert + δr + wt + εiect. (1.2)
This specification exploits differences in the increase in potential calories from maize
(∆Me) over and above the caloric potential of crops available prior to 1500 (PCe),
both under a low-input rainfed technology.23 I define
∆Me = max
(
Caloric Potential Maizee−PCe
PCe
, 0
)
. Thus, this measure captures the potential
caloric rate of return to growing maize, relative to the set of Old World crops grown
prior to 1500. The identifying assumptions underlying this analysis are: (1) societies
did not have pre-existing differences of locus of control that correlated with the po-
tential for maize prior to 1500; and (2) the location of homelands did not change
systematically based on the potential for maize. I again rely on the Caloric Suitabil-
ity Index to obtain the potential calories of different crops, under a low-input rainfed
technology. In the sample of Old World societies, 31 receive no boost from maize,
43 received a positive boost of less than 10%, 51 received a 10-50% boost, and 27
received a boost of greater than 50%.
If β1 < 0, this is consistent with my main hypothesis, that ancestral reliance on
a source of subsistence whose output was more sensitive to weather factors outside
of their control negatively impacts contemporary locus of control. If the results fail
to reject that β1 = 0, then I cannot rule out that the persistent effect of ancestral
control over subsistence on contemporary locus of control is due solely to preindustrial
23This specification exploiting the change in crop characteristics due to the Columbian Exchange
is similar in spirit to Galor and O¨zak (2016) and Mayshar et al. (2018). I identify the set of crops
available prior to the Columbian Exchange in each continent from Table A2 of the online appendix
for Galor and O¨zak (2016).
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sorting.
1.4.2 Potential caloric return to maize over pre-1500 crops
Table 1.3 presents results estimating equation 1.2 on the set of Old World societies
in my sample. The main variable of interest, ∆Me, is represented by the potential
caloric rate of return to investing in maize, relative to all pre-1500 crops. Column
1 does not include any controls, column 2 includes individual controls and survey
wave fixed effects, and column 3 controls for the population density in 1500AD to
account for differences in the pre-Columbian Exchange level of economic development.
Column 4 introduces country fixed effects, column 5 subnational region fixed effects,
column 6 the geographic controls associated with engaging in agriculture, and column
7 geographic controls associated with trade.
The results show that a greater incentive to grow maize is associated with a more
external locus of control. My preferred specification in column 7 shows that descen-
dants of societies where maize had the potential to double the number of calories from
agriculture, relative to societies where maize did not have the potential to increase
the number of calories, have a more external locus of control by 0.25 S.D. This result
provides evidence that an individual’s ancestral agricultural environment shapes their
perceptions of control. While it is still possible that sorting explains part of the story,
if control over subsistence played no role in shaping perceptions of control, then the
exogenous change to the set of suitable crops brought on by the Columbian Exchange
should not have a relationship with contemporary locus of control. This analysis also
suggests that the prior results that associate ancestral control and locus of control
can be interpreted as the environment shaping these beliefs, rather than the other
way around.
Table A.15 presents results for the additional calories from maize (∆ caloric po-
tential) rather than the caloric rate of return. This measure is an alternative way of
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capturing the incentive to grow maize. The results lead to the same conclusion: a
larger incentive to grow maize is associated with a more external locus of control.
One major advantage of agriculture is the ability to smooth consumption through
the storability of a surplus. In particular, cereals are most likely to do this, as opposed
to tree crops that rot easily in storage, or roots and tubers that can be harvested at
any time. Therefore, Table A.16 shows that even when compared directly with the
suitability for other cereals, maize is still associated with a more external locus of
control. This provides additional support for the mechanism of unpredictable weather
holding constant the seasonality and storability of the yield.
I show that the results are robust to controlling for the potential caloric rate
of return of all other crops that became available after the Columbian Exchange.
Column 2 of Table A.17 shows that the point estimate for the potential caloric rate
of return of all other crops is positive, while the negative coefficient on the potential
caloric rate of return for maize more than doubles in magnitude. Finally, columns
3-9 of Table A.17 control for the additional geographic characteristics discussed in
Section 1.3.4 to address concerns about differences in institutions and the length of
experience with agriculture.
1.5 Maize and the Persistence of Ancestral Control
The introduction of maize also provides an exogenous change to the degree of con-
trol that societies had over their subsistence during the preindustrial era. I exploit
this change to investigate whether it weakens the relationship with ancestral control
proxied by the interaction of rainfall risk with the pre-1500 potential for calories from
agriculture. I find that the introduction of maize weakens this relationship. This
suggests that the influence of deeper experiences with agriculture on locus of control
are attenuated, but still remain, even in the face of changed circumstances.
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Table 1.4 presents results that include both the interaction of rainfall risk with the
importance of agriculture and the potential caloric rate of return to growing maize.
Column 1 reproduces the result from column 6 of Table 1.1, but only for the set of Old
World societies, and also includes controls for the pre-1500 caloric potential of their
homeland and the population density in the year 1500 (both of which are included in
the maize regression). Column 2 presents results for the caloric rate of return from
maize, analagous to column 7 of Table 1.3, but additionally controls for rainfall risk.
Column 3 includes both the caloric rate of return from maize and the interaction of
the share of subsistence from agriculture and rainfall risk in a horserace regression.
The results in column 3 show that the coefficient on the ancestral control of
agriculture changes very little from column 1 to column 3, and a Wald test confirms
that the difference is not statistically significant. The coefficient on the caloric rate
of return to maize is reduced by 41%, but the result of a Wald test indicates that
the difference is also not statistically significant. This suggests that the importance
of agriculture for a society is remarkably persistent even when a shock changes the
degree of control.
However, it is possible that the importance of agriculture is endogenous to the
caloric rate of return to maize. For example, maize replaced cattle grazing as the pri-
mary economic activity in the Balkans during the eighteenth and nineteenth century
because of maize’s productive advantage in supporting a larger population (Crosby,
1972, p180). Therefore, I turn to the reduced form results using the pre-1500 caloric
potential of homelands as a proxy for the ancestral importance of agriculture propa-
gated over centuries. Column 4 reports the results using the pre-1500 caloric potential
in millions of kilocalories per hectare per day as a proxy for the importance of agri-
culture prior to the Columbian exchange, column 5 estimates the potential caloric
rate of return to growing maize, and column 6 includes both.
30
The magnitude of the coefficient on the pre-1500 caloric potential for agriculture
and the interaction with rainfall risk is attenuated by 20% from column 4 to column
6. The coefficient on the caloric rate of return from maize is attenuated by 27% from
column 5 to column 6. Wald tests for both indicate that this attenuation is statis-
tically significant. This provides evidence that while the introduction of maize may
have attenuated the relationship between the ancestral control over subsistence and
contemporary locus of control associated with characteristics before the Columbian
Exchange, the relationship is still remarkably persistent.
Overall, the results suggest that the relationship between contemporary locus of
control and generations of experiences with agriculture is partly attenuated by a shock
to the control over subsistence yields due to the introduction of maize that occurred
over the last 500 years. This provides evidence that a more proximate shock can
reduce the relationship between one’s ancestors’ experiences and one’s perception of
control today, but not completely, suggesting that changes are slow moving to reflect
current circumstances.
1.6 Exploration of Potential Mechanisms
In this section, I provide evidence that rules out some potential mechanisms for the
relationship between ancestral control and contemporary locus of control. Then, I
provide evidence in support of a preferred mechanism: the intergenerational trans-
mission of beliefs. First, I show that individual outcomes, such as income and edu-
cation, and society-level economic development, are not primary mechanisms for the
persistent relationship between ancestral control and contemporary locus of control.
Second, I document the persistence of the relationship between ancestral control over
agricultural yields and locus of control in a sample of second-generation migrants.
This second finding suggests that the intergenerational transmission of beliefs is a
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key mechanism behind its persistence.
1.6.1 Potential intermediate outcomes
I first investigate whether individual outcomes that have been associated with dif-
ferences in locus of control are potential mechanisms for the association between
ancestral agriculture and locus of control. I begin by investigating whether ancestral
control is associated with other outcomes at the individual (Table A.18) and societal
(Table A.19) level. The results are mixed, with some evidence that ancestral control
is correlated with education, income, employment and savings behavior, as well as
contemporary development at the society level. Therefore, it is possible that differ-
ences in these outcomes are what is leading to differences in locus of control, rather
than directly from ancestral control.
I investigate whether there is evidence that these differences in individual and
society differences are potential channels. I first test whether the main results change
when including these potential outcomes as additional control variables in the re-
gression.24 Table 1.5 presents results controlling for education level, income decile,
employment, saving, living outside of their homeland, population density in 1500, and
GDP per capita in 1990. Even when including these potentially endogenous controls,
there is still a statistically significant association between ancestral control over sub-
sistence and locus of control. Notably, the relationship is attenuated by about 16%
when controlling for education in column 2, and 40% in column 3 when controlling
for income decile. This suggests that education and income could be part of the link
between ancestral control over subsistence and locus of control.25
24This method is far from perfect, as all of these outcomes are “bad controls” (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009), and these additional controls are prone to omitted variable bias, reverse causality,
and measurement error that could render the results meaningless. Therefore, I take these results as
merely suggestive.
25Table A.20 presents results for the reduced form specification, which also investigates additional
characteristics in the Ethnographic Atlas. This finds that the reduced form relationship is primarily
mediated by the share of subsistence from agriculture, as well as the settlement patterns of the
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1.6.2 Evidence of cultural transmission from second-generation migrants
in Europe
I turn now to providing evidence that the intergenerational transmission of beliefs is
a primary mechanism for the persistence of the relationship between ancestral control
over subsistence yields and contemporary locus of control. I do this in an analysis of
second-generation immigrants. This compares individuals whose parents had differ-
ent ancestral experiences, but the respondents faced the same external environment,
including climate, geography, and institutions, during their own lifetimes.
This approach allows for the isolation of the portable, culturally transmitted re-
lationship between ancestral control and locus of control from the institutions, ge-
ography, and climate of the ancestral homeland. A caveat is that the children of
immigrants are not a random sample of the populations of their parent’s home coun-
try. Thus, the results are an average association for the sample they consider: children
of individuals who left their home country.
For the analysis of second-generation migrants, I use the European Values Study
(EVS), a companion survey to the WVS. The EVS asks many of the same questions
as the WVS including the question on locus of control. The EVS does not ask about
the ethnicity of the respondent, but in the 2005-2010 wave it does ask for the country
of birth for both the respondent and the respondent’s parents.26 Therefore, I use
the EVS to explore the relationship between ancestral control of subsistence and
contemporary locus of control of individuals who were born and reside outside of
their ancestral homeland. I define their ancestral homeland as the country of birth
of their parents. The sample for this analysis consists of 3,653 respondents who were
born and interviewed in 44 different European countries with both or a single parent
society. The appendix discusses results from a method devised by Acharya et al. (2016) that helps
overcome intermediate variable bias and has the same qualitative results for both specifications.
26The WVS does not ask about country of birth or parent country of birth.
33
born in 106 different countries.27
I restrict the sample to respondents who were born in the country they are inter-
viewed in and had both parents born in the same different country, or had a single
parent born in a different country. I estimate the following equation similar to equa-
tion 1.1:
LoCipc = β1Ap × Vp + β2Ap + β3Vp + φ′Gp + γ′Dipc + δc + εipc. (1.3)
in which LoCipc is the locus of control for individual i, whose parent was born in
country p, born and living in country c. Ap is the ancestral importance of agriculture
for subsistence of individuals who today reside in country p, and Vp is the inter-annual
precipitation variability in country p. Gp are observable geographic characteristics of
country p, and Dipc are exogenous individual demographic characteristics (age quartic
and gender). δc is a country of birth and residence fixed effect. Standard errors are
clustered by parent country of birth, which is the level that the variable of interest,
Ap × Vp, varies. The interaction term, Ap × Vp, represents the ancestral control over
subsistence for the parent country of birth.
I measure the importance of agriculture for a country’s ancestors in two ways.
First, I use the ancestral share of subsistence from agriculture using a dataset com-
piled by Giuliano and Nunn (2018) that aggregates characteristics from the Ethno-
graphic Atlas up to the country level. This data set uses the contemporary spoken
languages in a country to adjust for historical population movements. Second, I use
the caloric potential of agriculture under the set of crops available prior to 1500 from
the Caloric Suitability Index for the parent country of birth. I adjust this value for
ancestral movements using the post-1500 migration matrix compiled by Putterman
and Weil (2010). Therefore, I obtain a weighted average based on the countries of
27I do not include those who had parents born in two different countries abroad.
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the ancestors of the current residents, not the caloric suitability of their country of
birth. I additionally adjust all other geographic and climatic characteristics for the
parent country of birth in the same way.
Table 1.6 presents results estimating equation 1.3 for the sample of second-generation
migrants in the EVS. The first three columns use the share of ancestral subsistence
from agriculture, relative to hunting, gathering, fishing and animal husbandry, to
proxy for the importance of agriculture for a country’s ancestors. Column 1 controls
for a fourth order polynomial of age, gender, an indicator for whether one parent was
native born, parent continent of birth, ancestry adjusted, the average year ethnici-
ties are sampled, and country fixed effects. Column 2 adds controls for geographic
characteristics associated with agriculture, and column 3 controls for geographic char-
acteristics associated with trade. The results suggest a negative association between
the level of ancestral control based on the parent country of birth and the locus of
control of their children who are born in a different country.
Columns 4-6 of Table 1.6 repeats the specifications in columns 1-3, but uses the
pre-1500 caloric potential of the parent country of birth, adjusted for post-1500 pop-
ulation movements, to proxy for the importance of agriculture. The results are con-
sistent with those in columns 1-3. Moreover, the magnitudes in columns 1-3 and
4-6 are similar to those in columns 3-6 of Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, suggesting that
the cultural transmission of beliefs is a primary mechanism for the persistence of the
relationship between the ancestral control over subsistence yields and locus of control
today.28
28The appendix presents robustness checks for these results that includes additional geographic
controls.
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1.7 Implications for Human Capital Investment
I have established a persistent relationship between ancestral control over subsistence
yields and contemporary locus of control. A large literature in the social sciences
links locus of control with effort and investment. I demonstrate in this section that
ancestral control also impacts effort and that locus of control is a key mechanism for
this finding.
I investigate the link between ancestral control and contemporary effort within a
sample of 15-year-old students who participate in the 2012 Programme for Interna-
tional Student Assessment (PISA), a nationally representative study of 15-year-olds’
achievement in math, science and reading administered in OECD (Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development) and partner countries.29 In conjunction
with a test to assess the level of their math, reading, and science skills, students are
administered a survey about themselves, their homes and their school and learning
experiences, with a focus on a specific subject (OECD, 2014). I use the 2012 PISA,
which has a focus on mathematics, and has questions related to math-specific locus
of control, as well as effort put into mathematics learning.
Students are asked to what extent they agree with a series of statements per-
taining to their control over learning mathematics. This includes statements about
whether they felt they could control their success (e.g., “whether or not I do well
in mathematics is completely up to me”), or if their success is due to the actions of
others (e.g., “if I had different teachers, I would try harder in mathematics”), or bad
luck (e.g., “I have done badly on mathematics quizzes” “because I made bad guesses”
or “I am just unlucky”). In total, there are 11 questions that correspond to the
student’s perception of control over their mathematics learning and achievement. In
addition, there is a battery of questions used to ascertain the effort that the student
29The PISA test is designed to provide information that is comparable across countries about the
outcomes of students as well as to evaluate education systems more broadly worldwide.
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puts into learning math. This includes whether they agree with statements such as “I
work hard on my mathematics homework” and “I keep studying until I understand
the material.” There are a total of eight questions on math learning effort. For both
math locus of control and math learning effort, I combine responses into a single
index using principal component analysis. Full text of all questions used are included
in the data appendix.
I match students with their ancestral control over subsistence by focusing on
second-generation migrants to again isolate the culturally portable, intergenerational
transmission of beliefs.30 This match results in a sample of 8,076 students who reside
in 26 different countries with a parent or parents born in 68 different countries.
Table 1.7 presents results estimating equation 1.3 on this sample. The dependent
variable in columns 1-3 is the principal component of the questions pertaining to
math locus of control, and in columns 4-6 the principal component for the questions
pertaining to math learning effort. Columns 1 and 4 include controls for country
fixed effects, age (in months), gender, survey fixed effects, an indicator for whether
one parent was native born, and controls for the continent of the parent country of
birth. Columns 2 and 5 control for geographic characteristics of the parent country
of birth associated with agriculture. Columns 3 and 6 add controls for geographic
characteristics associated with trade. I adjust all geographic controls for post-1500
population movements.31 The results indicate a negative association between the
ancestral control over subsistence of the student’s parents and math locus of control
in columns 1-3, and a similar relationship with math learning effort in columns 4-6.
This provides evidence of the persistence of the relationship between ancestral control
over subsistence and locus of control in an additional setting. Moreover, these findings
30Students are not asked to report a specific ethnicity that could be matched with the Ethnographic
Atlas.
31Table A.21 presents reduced form results using the pre-1500 caloric potential of the parent
country of birth for the importance of agriculture.
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suggest that ancestral locus of control may play a role in the level of human capital
investment, proxied by math learning effort.
It is possible that ancestral control of subsistence has a relationship with both
math locus of control and math learning effort independent of each other. Table 1.8
investigates whether this is the case, along with other potential channels. Column 1
repeats the specification from column 6 in Table 1.7 for the subsample that has non-
missing values for all potential mechanisms. Columns 2-7 repeat this specification
while controlling for each candidate mechanism. This method is suggestive, as it is
vulnerable to reverse-causality and omitted variable concerns.32 One key assumption
is that math locus of control is determined prior to math learning effort, and is not
then endogenously updated due to this effort.33
Table 1.8 shows that the magnitude of the relationship between ancestral control
over subsistence and math learning effort is attenuated by 34% when controlling for
math locus of control in column 2, 21% when controlling for parent education in col-
umn 3, and 12% when controlling for the average socioeconomic status of the parent’s
occupation. Wald tests for equivalence of these attenuated magnitudes with the base-
line magnitude in column 1 show that these differences are statistically significant.
There is no change when controlling for household wealth, log of 1500 population den-
sity (ancestry adjusted) of the parent’s home country, or the 2000 GDP per capita of
the parent’s home country in columns 5-7.
This suggests that part of the mechanism for the relationship between ancestral
control over subsistence and math learning effort is parental education and occupation
status. However, a more important mechanism is the relationship with locus of control
32The Appendix presents results applying a method devised by Acharya et al. (2016) that accounts
for omitted variable bias due to intermediate variables, and the results are similar to those discussed
here.
33Empirical evidence suggests that locus of control beliefs are primarily determined prior to and
during adolescence (Cobb-Clark and Schurer, 2013).
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for learning mathematics. This provides suggestive evidence that ancestral control
over subsistence has a persistent relationship with math learning effort, and about a
third of this relationship is operating through locus of control.
1.8 Conclusion
How do people form beliefs about the returns to effort? In this paper, I study how the
economic experiences of a society’s ancestors inform the locus of control beliefs of the
society’s descendants. I exploit differences in the control that preindustrial societies
had over their subsistence. I proxy for control by the importance of agriculture
for a society’s preindustrial subsistence and the level of rainfall risk in the society’s
ancestral homeland.
The paper shows that descendants of societies that relied more on agriculture and
that faced a greater rainfall risk have a more external locus of control in three settings.
First, I compare individuals of different ethnicities residing in the same subnational
region. Second, I exploit differences in the parental homeland of second-generation
migrants to provide evidence that the relationship derives from a culturally portable
belief. Third, I demonstrate its importance for human capital investment in a sample
of 15 year old students from the PISA. I show that ancestral control has a persistent
effect on learning effort and locus of control for math achievement, and that this belief
mediates a third of the relationship with math learning effort.
My findings highlight the important role of cultural factors in informing beliefs
about the returns to effort in an uncertain world. I use the introduction of maize
in the Old World to demonstrate that locus of control beliefs that are informed by
historical experiences with agriculture are remarkably persistent. This result suggests
that people make economic decisions based on beliefs that are not solely reflective
of their current circumstances. More broadly, my results show that psychological
39
characteristics that contribute to the internal constraints of poverty (Banerjee and
Mullainathan, 2010; Mani et al., 2013; Haushofer and Fehr, 2014) may have deep,
cultural roots and do not accurately reflect current external constraints.
This research could have important implications for policies to address poverty.
Recent work highlights the success of multi-faceted development programs that ex-
ploit complementaries in different types of interventions (Banerjee et al., 2015). Often,
these multi-faceted programs include a behavioral or psychological component along-
side traditional poverty-alleviation devices. Therefore, understanding the extent to
which individual behavior reflects factors outside the current state of the world could
be informative for designing interventions that leverage the complementarities of re-
laxing both the internal and external constraints of poverty.
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1.9 Figures
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(a) Ethnic Homelands of Zam-
bians
(b) Ethnic Homelands of
Zambians and Contemporary
Provinces
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(c) Preindustrial Share of Subsis-
tence from Agriculture
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(d) Rainfall Risk
Figure 1·2: Example Using Zambian Ethnic Homelands and Subna-
tional Districts
Notes: Panels A and B: Black outline is for border of present-day Zambia. Green polygons indicate
location of ethnic homelands of Zambians in the WVS, taken from Murdock (1959). Panel B adds
in locations of provinces, outlined in red. Panel C displays the share of subsistence from agriculture
for each ethnicity in the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967). Panel D displays the level of rainfall
risk.
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Figure 1·3: Bin Scatter Plot of Caloric Potential for Agriculture and
Rainfall Risk on Share of Subsistence from Agriculture of Ethnographic
Atlas Societies
Notes: Each figure presents a bin scatter plot with 100 bins. Total sample size is 1,026 ethnicities.
Share of subsistence from agriculture taken from the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967) and is
relative to hunting, gathering, fishing, and animal husbandry. Caloric potential in millions of kilo-
calories per hectare per day. Both panels have continent fixed effects partialled out. Panel (b)
additionally partials out average precipitation.
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Figure 1·4: Partial Correlation Bin Scatter Plot
Notes: Presents a partial correlation bin scatter plot with each point representing the average
residual locus of control and residual rainfall risk × share of subsistence from agriculture for a
district-ethnicity. Size of markers corresponds to number of observations in that district-ethnicity.
Scatter plot excludes district-ethnicity groups with less than 10 observations (2.8% of the sample).
Slope from an OLS regression for all observations of equation 1.1 associated with column 6 of Table
1.1. Residual of district fixed effects, gender, a quartic of age, survey wave fixed effects, the year
the ethnicity was sampled, and geographic controls of the ethnic homeland that include: absolute
latitude, average monthly temperature and precipitation, length of growing season, elevation, share of
land suitable for agriculture, ruggedness of land, malaria transmission index, continent of homeland,
distant to coast, indicator for homeland being landlocked, presence of a major river, presence of a
harbor within 25km of the homeland, and log of the size of the homeland.
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Chapter 2
Occupation Aspirations, Education
Investment, and Cognitive Outcomes:
Evidence from Indian Adolescents
2.1 Introduction
In many parts of the world there is evidence of high available rates of return without
rapid consumption growth, a finding that cannot be explained by standard neoclas-
sical models (Kremer et al., 2019). Are there constraints on the poor beyond those
directly imposed by their low income and wealth levels? Increasingly, empirical evi-
dence suggests that the condition of poverty could become self-perpetuating due to
increased stress (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014), higher discount rates (Laajaj, 2017), or
reduced cognitive capacity (Mani et al., 2013). Recent theoretical work complements
this literature by discussing how aspirations can lead to a persistent poverty trap
(Dalton et al., 2016) that has implications for growth and inequality (Genicot and
Ray, 2017).
In this paper, I test for the presence of an aspirations-based poverty trap empiri-
cally using a longitudinal data set that surveys 951 children in India at ages 8, 12, 15
and 19. I present evidence that the relationship between the child’s aspirations gap at
age 12 and age 19 education outcomes follows an inverse-U shape, providing support
for theory that aspirations that are ahead, but not too far ahead, serve as the best
incentives for investment. I construct the aspirations gap as the difference between a
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child’s aspired level and the initial status of their household. I define their aspiration
level as the average wage, from Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) wage data,
associated with their aspired occupation and education level. I define their initial
status as the average wage of the primary economic earner within their household.
Thus, their aspirations gap captures the distance between the wage that children as-
pire to have as adults, and the wage that their parents currently have. A weakness of
my approach is that I do not have exogenous variation in existing aspiration levels,
however the result is robust to the inclusion of a number of age 8 child, parent, and
household observables and community fixed effects.
These results are in line with the theory of an aspirations-based poverty trap that
draws on Appadurai (2004) who argues that the poor lack the “capacity to aspire.”
That is, since they cannot aspire to a higher state, they will not achieve a higher state,
which thus constrains their ability to break free from poverty. Ray (2006) expands
on this idea and develops a simple model where aspirations that are ahead, but not
too far ahead, provide the best incentives for investment. Aspirations that are too
close do not provide enough of an incentive for the individual to push themselves to
achieve their maximum potential, as it does not take much effort to close the gap,
resulting in aspirational fatalism. Alternatively, it is possible to have too large of an
aspirations gap, where an aspiration is so far ahead of an individual’s initial status
that it seems, or is, impossible to reach with any amount of effort. Thus, the optimal
strategy with a very large gap is to put forth little effort, resulting in aspirational
frustration.
In order to understand the mechanisms behind the link between aspirations and
human capital, I investigate the correlation between the aspirations gap at age 12
and household education investment, the child’s time investment in education, and
attitudes and beliefs of the child. I find that children with large aspiration gaps have
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lower levels of household expenditure on education, but I do not find evidence that
this explains the incidence of aspiration frustration. However, children with large
aspiration gaps are less forward looking, less optimistic about their future standing
in life, and less likely to agree with the statement “If I try hard, I can improve my
situation in life.” Moreover, children with very large aspiration gaps spend less time on
explicit human capital investment measured by the number of hours either in school
or studying and instead are more likely to spend time in leisure. Controlling for the
behaviors, attitudes, and beliefs of the child attenuates the penalty for aspiration
fatalism by 50%-65% and aspiration frustration by 36-56%, providing evidence that
aspiration failure is due to not only lower levels of time investment in education but
also behavioral factors such as myopia and lower agency.
These findings complement those of Serneels and Dercon (2014) who find an as-
sociation between higher maternal education aspirations and higher age 15 education
levels, math and general learning test scores using the same Young Lives sample in
India. Moreover, they are consistent with Janzen et al. (2017) who construct an aspi-
rations gap and find evidence of aspiration fatalism and frustration resulting in lower
levels of investment in a sample of rural women in Nepal.
This paper primarily contributes to the empirical literature on the role that aspi-
rations play in the economic outcomes of children and adolescents. Existing studies
have shown that the randomized exposure of reserved female leadership positions in
India (Beaman et al., 2012), variation in the exposure to health care professionals in
Mexico (Chiapa et al., 2012), identity priming (Mukherjee, 2015), viewing a docu-
mentary (Bernard et al., 2014), and enrollment in a child sponsorship program (Ross
et al., 2017) can alter aspirations. These changes in aspirations are then linked to
education outcomes.
There are three main contributions of this study to the existing literature on the
58
role that aspirations play in the human capital investment decisions of adolescents:
(1) It is the first to construct an aspirations gap for adolescents that is the difference
between the aspirations level, defined as the wages associated with the occupation
and education aspirations, and their initial status, defined as the wages associated
with the primary economic earner within the child’s household. By constructing this
gap I am able to more closely align the empirical analysis with existing theories. (2)
It provides new empirical evidence of aspiration failure in the form of an inverse-U
shaped relationship between a child’s aspirations gap and human capital investment
levels in young adulthood. (3) It shows evidence that time investment in education by
the child as well as their behaviors and attitudes are important mechanisms behind
the incidence of aspiration failure while household-level investments in the child’s
education are not.
2.2 Conceptual Framework of Aspirations and Behavior
Genicot and Ray (2017), building on the earlier essay by Ray (2006), discuss how
higher goals can both inspire and frustrate. That is, the aspirations that provide the
largest incentives are those that are ahead, but not too far ahead, from an individual’s
initial status. This is because individuals derive utility not only from wealth, but also
from how far they are from achieving their aspired level. Aspirations that are very
close to an individual’s initial status do not provide much of an incentive to invest as
reaching the aspiration does not require much investment. In the empirical analysis, I
refer to this reason for low levels of investment as aspirational fatalism. Alternatively,
aspirations that are very far from an individual’s initial status may not be reachable
even with maximal effort or investment by an individual, or the cost of such effort
and investment may not bring them close enough to make it worth the benefit of
falling short of the aspired level. I refer to this reason for lower levels of investment
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as aspirational frustration.
Lybbert and Wydick (2018) provide additional intuition on how aspiration fatal-
ism and frustration occur by discussing aspirations as one of three elements of hope.
They discuss how aspirations need to be complemented by pathways, that is a viable
way to achieve the aspiration, as well as agency, that is the belief that with enough
hard work the aspiration can be achieved. The implication is that high aspirations
on their own are not enough to break free from an aspirations-based poverty trap but
must be complemented with the release of both internal and external constraints.
These ideas guide the empirical analysis I present below. I start from the idea
that how far aspirations are ahead of your initial status is what drives investment
and effort. This idea, captured by Ray (2006)’s “aspirations gap”, will be the main
variable of interest in my analysis. Departing from most of the empirical literature
(Serneels and Dercon (2014) and Janzen et al. (2017) are two exceptions), I allow
this relationship to be non-linear in order to determine if aspirations can be “too
far ahead.” I then investigate if it is the aspirations of the parents that influence
human capital investment, as in an overlapping generations model (Genicot and Ray,
2017), or if it is the child’s aspirations for themselves that drives their human capital
investment, as own investment in adolescence may be more important than parental
investments for human capital (Del Boca et al., 2017). Finally, in an exploration
of mechanisms, I investigate if household expenditure on the child’s education, the
child’s own investment in the form of time spent on schooling, or the child’s beliefs
and attitudes about their future and abilities to achieve their aspiration can explain
the incidence of aspiration failure.
60
2.3 Description of the Data
I use the Young Lives survey (Boyden, 2016) to explore the relationship between
aspirations and human capital investments. The Young Lives data set is a longitudinal
survey of children, their caregivers, and their communities in Ethiopia, India, Peru,
and Vietnam. This analysis consists of the cohort in India that were surveyed initially
at age 7 or 8 in 2002 and again at ages 12, 15 and 19.1 1,008 children were surveyed
in round 1 in the Indian states of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh. The sample had
low attrition with 951 surveyed in all 3 subsequent rounds.
My main variables of interest concern the questions asked about aspirations.
Round 2 of the survey asked children the following two questions: (1) “What do
you want to be when you grow up?” and (2) “Imagine you had no constraints and
could stay at school as long as you liked, what level of formal education would you like
to complete?” Additionally, the survey asked caregivers: (1) “What job would you
most like (child) to do in the future?” and (2) “Ideally, what level of formal education
would you like (child) to complete?”
My primary outcomes of interest include education levels and three cognitive mea-
sures from round 4 of the survey. These cognitive outcomes include a test of mathe-
matics, English, and Telugu, the official language of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
Performance on these exams is summarized in table 2.1. In addition, the survey mea-
sured other psychological concepts related to aspirations such as the child’s attitudes
and beliefs as well as the child’s time use and household expenditure on education.
Appendix B.1 provides more detail and summary statistics of all variables used in
the analysis.
1I focus only on India in order to supplement this survey with data on wage earnings from
National Sample Surveys (NSS) that I use to quantify aspirations.
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2.4 Quantifying the Aspirations Gap
In order to test the predictions of the theoretical literature, I quantify aspiration
levels and construct an aspirations gap defined as the difference between the average
earnings of those working currently in the child’s aspired occupation and the average
earnings associated with those in the same industry and education of those in their
household. Thus this attempts to capture how far the child has to go in order to
achieve their aspiration. Earnings data are taken from the 62nd round of the National
Sample Survey (NSS), Schedule 10 on Employment and Unemployment, a nationally
representative survey of employment in India conducted by the Indian government’s
Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
76% of children aspire to some post-secondary education at age 12, compared with
61% of their caregivers. Occupation aspirations at age 12 (presented in Table B.3)
show that the most popular occupational aspirations for children are teachers (39%),
doctors (18%) and engineers (9%). Meanwhile, caregivers also had a strong preference
for teacher (37%), then full-time parent/housewife (14%), engineer (10%), and doctor
(9%). Males would like to be engineers or policeman more than females, who are more
likely to want to be teachers, nurses, or housewives. Overall, children have higher
aspirations for themselves than their caregivers, particularly for girls where 26% of
caregivers wish for their daughters to be full-time parents or housewives, compared
with 13% of children themselves.
One of the strengths of this data set is that it asks for the child’s aspiration for
themselves and their caregiver’s aspirations for them. Overall, 66% of of children
and caregivers had the same response for the education aspiration and 46% of gave
the same occupation aspiration. Only 31% gave the same response for both the
occupation and education aspiration.
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2.4.1 Initial Status
In round 1, Young Lives recorded the National Industrial Classification (NIC) code
for the primary economic activities/occupations of household members. This 2-digit
code maps directly to the NSS wage data. I assign each household member who was
designated as performing one of the household’s primary economic activities to a bin
based on their gender, education level, rural status and 2-digit NIC code. I assign
a wage to each household member equivalent to the average wage within these same
bin in the NSS data. I define a child’s initial status as the daily wage for the primary
economic earner within the household that had the same gender. Table 2.1 shows
that the average initial status defined in this way was 58 Indian Rupees.
2.4.2 Aspiration Level
I use a combination of the occupational and educational aspiration at age 12 to quan-
tify the child’s aspiration level.2 For the purposes of the analysis, I drop those who
listed their occupational aspiration as other, university student, or traditional occu-
pation.3 I manually assign three-digit National Classification of Occupation (NCO)
codes that correspond with their occupation aspiration and that of their caregiver.
I then assign each child to a bin based on the occupation aspiration and that of
their caregiver, if they aspired, or their caregiver aspired for them, to achieve post-
secondary education, urban/rural status, and gender. I match the average wage as-
sociated with these same characteristics and NCO codes within the NSS wage data.
If the aspirational occupation is a full-time parent/housewife, I assign a wage of zero.
Table 2.1 shows that on average the aspired daily wage was 240 for the child and
was 197 Rupees for caregivers, both significantly higher than the average wage for
2If they were not currently enrolled in school in round 2 of the survey they were not asked about
their educational aspiration. For these individuals, I use only their occupation aspiration.
3This represents 2.8% of the sample for the child occupation aspiration and 7.9% for the caregiver
occupation aspiration.
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occupations within their household, represented by the initial status variable.
2.4.3 Aspirations Gap
Finally, I calculate the aspiration gap as the difference between the aspiration level
and their initial status at round 1 of the survey. Intuitively, this can be thought of
as capturing the distance needed to bridge the difference between the wages of their
parents, and the wages of their aspired status as adults. This also assumes that they
view their parent’s earnings as their reference point. Table 2.1 shows that the average
gap was 184 for the child and 140 for caregivers.
This provides a quantifiable, objective measure of the distance that the adolescent
must travel in order to achieve their aspiration. This allows me to test the hypoth-
esis of an inverted-U shape relationship between the size of the aspirations gap and
investment. It also provides a great deal of variation in the aspirations gap that will
allow me to explore possible non-linearities in the relationship between this distance
and human capital investment.
This measure of aspirations is an alternative to what has been used previously in
the literature on the relationship between adolescent aspirations and human capital.
A limitation of previous studies is that they have focused on education aspirations
which is more coarse than the measure I construct or coded occupation aspirations
as a binary outcome (e.g., skilled or non-skilled). One exception is Pasquier-Doumer
and Risso Brandon (2015) who assign occupation aspirations a score based on a linear
combination of the average education and income of those in the population with that
occupation. However, to explore non-linearities they group these scores into only four
coarse categories and do not consider the parent’s occupations in order to construct
a gap. These coarser measures made it difficult to provide evidence of the possible
non-linearities between aspirations and investment hypothesized in the theoretical
literature.
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Additionally, the literature has primarily focused on aspiration levels as opposed
to gaps. This ignores the ideas originally conceptualized by Ray (2006) and formalized
in Genicot and Ray (2017) that it is not the absolute aspiration that incentives
investment, but the distance one has to travel in order to achieve their aspiration.
The construction of this gap aligns the empirical work more closely with existing
economic theory, consistent with recent empirical work on the relationship between
aspirations and investment (Janzen et al., 2017).
2.5 Econometric Strategy
I estimate the following equation to test if aspiration gaps and human capital invest-
ment levels have an inverse-U shaped relationship:
Yi,t = αj + β1Gi,t−2 + β2G2i,t−2 + ΘXi,t−3 + εi (2.1)
where αj is a fixed effect for community j, Gi,t−2 and G2i,t−2 represent the child or
caregiver aspirations gap and square of the gap for individual i. Xi,t−3 is a vector of
individual and household level controls.4 εij is an error term clustered at the Mandal
level, the level of sampling in the data, of which there are 20. Yi,t represents an age
19 outcome, such as highest grade completed or a cognitive measure. The t subscripts
indicate which of the four rounds of the survey the variable is taken from, where t
indicates round 4, t− 2 round 2, and t− 3 round 1.
I identify the effect of aspiration gaps conditional on observable baseline individual
and household controls from round 1 of the survey and unobservable community-level
4These controls include individual characteristics (gender, birth order, age in months, caste, being
the eldest son and religion), baseline round 1 education outcomes (grade level, school enrollment,
private school enrollment, and literacy), baseline round 1 parental and household characteristics
(wealth index, number of household members, household head age, gender, and education, caregiver
education, and dummies for the primary economic activity of the household), and indicators for the
response of the child to “What do you want to be when you grow up?” in round 1 of the survey.
Thus, this ensure that it is aspirations at age 12, not age 8, that is driving the results.
65
characteristics. However, the aspirations gap could be endogenous. This could arise
because parents adapt their aspirations to school performance, perceived ability of
their child, or to the broader economic opportunities around them. Therefore, I
control for a large number of observable factors, including a proxy for ability with the
Raven’s test. Also, by including community fixed effects I am comparing differences in
education outcomes of individuals within the same community, who would be subject
to similar labor market opportunities. As a robustness check for the presence of
omitted variable bias, I implement a method devised by Oster (2016) in Appendix B.3.
However, I do not claim that I can identify a causal relationship between aspiration
gaps and outcomes.
If the results demonstrate that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0, this is not enough to verify that
an inverse U-shaped correlation exists between aspiration gaps and outcomes (Lind
and Mehlum, 2010). Therefore, I also present Sasabuchi (1980) p-values that provide
a test for the null hypothesis that the first derivative of the quadratic fit is the same
sign at the minimum and maximum of the interval of the argument. A rejection of
the null provides support for an inverse-U shaped relationship. Additionally, Lind
and Mehlum (2010) extend Fieller (1954)’s work to calculate confidence intervals
around the turning point of an inverse-U shaped function. If this confidence interval
lies within the interval of the argument, than this provides further support of an
inverse-U shaped relationship.
I test if a quadratic fit is the appropriate parametric fit. I present results following
Hardle and Mammen (1993) (HM) who devise a test statistic for if a parametric
function of degree 2 (or of any order) is appropriate. The null for their test is that
the nonparametric and specified polynomial fit are not different, thus a rejection of
the null signifies that a higher order polynomial is required. A failure to reject the
null provides further evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship.
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2.6 Empirical Results
In this section I present the main results estimating equation 2.1 on round 4 outcomes
when the adolescents in my sample were around 19 years of age. I estimate the results
separately for the caregiver and child aspirations gap before including them both in
a “horserace” regression in order to determine if one dominates. I then investigate
possible mechanisms for the inverse-U correlation found. For easier interpretation
of the coefficients, the aspirations gap is converted to 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees
and the three cognitive measures are converted to z-scores. All specifications include
community fixed effects for 99 villages/communities and a rich set of control variables
taken from round 1 of the survey. Standard errors are clustered by 20 Mandals.5
2.6.1 Age 12 Aspiration Gaps and Human Capital
The main results of this paper estimate the relationship between aspirations gaps at
age 12 and the highest grade level achieved and performance on a math, English,
and Telugu exam at age 19. Table 2.2 and Figure 2·1 present results estimating
equation 2.1 for the caregiver aspirations gap and Table 2.3 and Figure 2·2 for the
child aspirations gap.
The results indicate a statistically significant U-shaped correlation between the
size of the caregiver and child aspirations gap at age 12 and all four age 19 human
capital outcomes, with suggestive evidence of aspiration frustration for the level of
schooling achieved for both gaps, and as well as the three cognitive measures for the
child aspirations gap. That is, as the age 12 aspirations gap increases so do the age
19 human capital levels, up to a point, ranging from an aspirations gap of 335 to 407.
For all outcomes, there is strong evidence of aspiration fatalism, that is low as-
520 groups with which to cluster may be too few, even though the number of observations within
each cluster is well balanced (Cameron and Miller, 2015). Thus, I also calculate wild bootstrap
clustered p-values according to Cameron et al. (2008).
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pirations resulting in lower human capital levels. In order to quantify the impact
of aspirational fatalism, I calculate the difference between the predicted value at the
turning point of the quadratic fit and that of the 1st percentile aspirations gap in
my sample. This indicates that a small aspirations gap at age 12 is correlated with
2.8-2.9 fewer years of education and scoring lower on the three cognitive measures by
0.63 to 0.90 standard deviations.
Above the inflection point, human capital levels no longer increase, and in fact
may decrease. The results suggest that this is the case for highest grade level achieved
for the caregiver aspirations gap and for math and Telugu performance for the child
aspirations gap. Aspiration frustration, which I calculate as the difference between the
predicted value at the turning point of the quadratic fit and that of the 99th percentile
aspirations gap in my sample, is correlated with 0.5 fewer years of education, scoring
lower on the math test by 0.17 standard deviations and lower on the Telugu test
by 0.15 standard deviations. Overall, these results are consistent with the idea that
aspirations that are ahead, but not too far ahead, provide the greatest incentives for
effort.
2.6.2 Child or Caregiver Aspirations: Who Determines Human Capital?
The results above indicate that both the child and the caregiver’s aspiration gaps are
correlated with the education and cognitive outcomes of the adolescents in my sample,
and that this relationship follows an inverse-U shape. Table 2.4 presents results of
a “horserace” regression that estimates equation 2.1 but includes both the child and
the caregiver’s aspiration gaps. I can then compare the magnitude of the coefficients
in this table with those in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 in order to determine if one appears to
influence the education and cognitive outcomes more. The caveat with this method
is that it is merely suggestive, as child and caregiver aspirations are correlated, and
thus the results should be interpreted with caution.
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In column 1, the coefficients for both are reduced by about a third. In columns 2,
3 and 4 the magnitude of the coefficients on the child’s gap are larger than those of
the caregiver gap and statistically significant. For the caregiver gap, the coefficient
on the linear term is significant, but the quadratic term no longer is. However, a
joint test of the hypothesis that the coefficients on the linear gap are equal and the
coefficients on the quadratic gap are equal fails to reject this null. Therefore, despite
the qualitative differences, quantitatively there is not enough statistical precision to
conclude that the magnitudes are different.
Overall, these results indicate that both the child and caregiver influence all four
outcomes, but when it comes to the cognitive measures of performance on a math,
English, and Telugu exam it is the child’s own gap that appears to qualitatively matter
more. One possible interpretation is that the child and caregiver jointly determine
school enrollment, but how much is learned while in school is up to the child. However,
this conclusion is merely suggestive, as I cannot reject that the coefficient magnitudes
are equivalent.
2.6.3 Household and Child Education Investment
What is occurring between age 12 and age 19 that could be resulting in the rela-
tionship between aspirations and human capital? Aspiration frustration and fatalism
could lead to the household investing less in the child’s education or the child spend-
ing less time on explicit human capital investment. The panel nature of the data
allows me to explore how age 12 aspiration gaps are correlated with how much the
household spends on the child’s education and how the child spends the hours in their
day at age 12 and 15.
Table 2.5 shows the correlation between the size of the aspirations gap and the log
of expenditure on the child’s education, including tuition, fees, uniforms, books and
transportation, at age 12 and age 15. Again, I show that a larger gap is correlated
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with more education investment in the child by the household up to a point. The
results indicate that the size of the gap at this point is between 372 and 384, within
the range of values of this point for human capital levels at age 19.
Next, I investigate the level of investment by the child in their own human cap-
ital through their time use at age 12 and 15. In the survey, the children indicate
how they spend their time in a typical weekday separated into five categories: ed-
ucation (in school or studying elsewhere), work (outside the home or for the family
farm/business), chores (domestic tasks and caring for household members), leisure,
and sleep. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the correlation between the size of the aspira-
tions gap and time use at age 12 and Tables 2.8 and 2.9 at age 15. Overall, the
results suggest that children with a larger gap spend more time on their education,
either studying or in a classroom and above this point there is either no difference
or a decrease in time spent on education. The results show that at age 12 they are
substituting their time towards chores, work, or sleep. However, at age 15 they are
substituting out of education and into work and leisure only. This suggests that while
at age 12 they may be substituting out of education and into activities that could
be forming human capital that is not picked up by the age 19 cognitive measures, by
age 15 they are substituting partially into an activity (leisure) that is not increasing
other forms of human capital.
2.6.4 Child Attitudes and Beliefs
The survey asked several questions in round 2 and 3 about another possible mech-
anism: the child’s feelings and attitudes both about their present state and their
future state. These concepts of self-efficacy and long-term planning horizons both
impact outcomes and aspirations (Dercon and Singh, 2013; Laajaj, 2017; Wuepper
and Lybbert, 2017). Thus, I investigate these measures as potential mechanisms for
the relationship between aspirations and human capital.
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In round 2 of the survey, the child was asked if they liked to make future plans,
if they thought that if they worked hard they could achieve their goals, and where
they expected to be on a 9 step ladder four years in the future. In round 3 they
were again asked the same first two questions, but instead of asking about their
place on a ladder in the future, they were asked if their community provided them
with the resources to gain the skills they needed for their desired future employment.
How responses to these questions are correlated with the size of the aspirations gap
is reported in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. The results indicate that both the child and
caregiver aspirations gap is correlated, in an inverse-U shaped way, with expected
future well-being in round 2 and on whether or not trying hard would lead to success
in round 3. Additionally, the child’s gap is correlated with liking to make future plans
at age 12, and the caregiver’s gap with the child liking to make plans at age 15 and
perceiving opportunities to develop job skills.
2.6.5 Analysis of Mechanisms
The results show that in addition to human capital levels at age 19, the size of the
aspirations gap is correlated with the level of education investment by the household
in the child, the child’s time use, and the child’s attitude and beliefs about their
future. In order to determine if lower levels of education investment or the child’s
time use explains the incidence of aspiration frustration and fatalism, I include these
as additional controls in my main specification. For brevity I present only the impact
on the penalty for aspiration frustration and fatalism in Table 2.12. Recall that both
the child and caregiver aspirations gap drive the result on grade level, but the child
primarily drove the result on the three cognitive measures. Therefore, I will focus on
these measures. Column 1 displays the result of the caregiver gap on highest grade
level, and column 2 for the child gap on highest grade level. Columns 3-5 display the
results on the three cognitive measures for the child’s aspirations gap. Panel A shows
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the frustration and fatalism penalties from the baseline results in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Panel B displays the main results additionally controlling for a cubic polynomial
of household education expenditure on the child at age 12 and 15. Compared with the
baseline results in panel A, the penalty for aspiration frustration and fatalism barely
change. Panel C additionally controls for age 12 and 15 time use. Aspiration frustra-
tion is attenuated by 50-28% and fatalism 61-47%. Panel D controls for responses to
the different measures of the child’s attitudes and beliefs that were correlated with
the size of the aspirations gap. As a consequence of this, it attenuates the penalty for
aspiration frustration by 29-16% and fatalism 19-13%. Panel E controls for both time
use and the child’s behaviors and attitudes about their ability to affect their future
and attenuates aspiration frustration by 56-36% and fatalism by 65-50%. Overall,
this provides evidence that aspiration failure can be explained by the child spending
their time in activities other than education, and to a lesser extent due to lower levels
of agency and forward-looking behavior.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I explore the role of aspiration gaps in human capital investment by
utilizing a longitudinal study by Young Lives that follows a cohort of children from
age 8 into young adulthood in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
I use responses to questions from the survey administered at age 12 to construct an
aspirations gap. The results support that child and caregiver age 12 aspiration gaps
are correlated with age 19 education and cognitive outcomes up to a point, providing
evidence of aspiration fatalism. Additionally, I present evidence suggesting that, for
the poorest in my sample, large aspiration gaps may induce aspiration frustration.
This is the first study, to my knowledge, that explicitly tests the influence of aspiration
gaps, as opposed to aspiration levels, on education outcomes such as scores on a math
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and language exam, and highest grade level achieved. These results provide empirical
support for theories of aspiration failure (Ray, 2006; Dalton et al., 2016; Genicot and
Ray, 2017)
Consistent with previous findings that a child’s own investment in adolescence
may be more important than parental investments (Del Boca et al., 2017), I find
evidence that channels for aspiration failure are the child’s time use and not the level
of education expenditure by the household. Additionally, a secondary mechanism
is how forward-looking the child is, consistent with recent evidence that the poor
shorten their planning time horizon (Laajaj, 2017). These results are consistent with
the finding that the child’s own aspirations at age 12, as opposed to that of their
caregiver for them, are more important for their human capital levels at age 19.
These results demonstrate both the power that aspirations have to improve ed-
ucation and cognitive outcomes and the limits of raising solely aspirations (Lybbert
and Wydick, 2018). If external barriers still exist, there will be limits to the success
of such interventions. Multi-faceted programs (Banerjee et al., 2015, for example)
that complement behavioral interventions with a reduction in the costs of pursuing
high aspirations, information on how to achieve them, as well as encouragement, will
have the most success in helping the poor escape poverty.
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2.8 Figures
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Figure 2·1: Quadratic and Nonparametric Regression Fits of Care-
giver Aspirations Gap
Notes: Horizontal axis is in 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees. Vertical axis is Robinson’s double residual
that purges the dependent variable of the portion explained by the controls and community fixed
effects. Controls include round 1 (age 8) gender, birth order, Ravens test Z-score, caste, religion,
an indicator for eldest son or first born, height and weight for age z-scores, household size, house-
hold head gender, wealth index, caregiver and household head education, the household’s primary
economic activity, private school enrollment, grade level, child literacy, the child’s aspiration and
village/community fixed effects. The thick vertical dash-dot lines is at the turning point for the
quadratic fit. The thin vertical dash-dot lines represents the 90% Fieller confidence intervals for this
turning point. Bin means represent the mean value of the outcome variable for the mean value of
the gap for 50 quantiles of the aspirations gap. Sasabuchi p-values are for the null hypothesis that
the aspirations gap is monotone over the interval. HM test p-values are from a Hardle and Mammen
(1993) test with 1000 bootstrap replications with the null hypothesis that the nonparametric and
quadratic fits are not different. Trims two observations with a gap < −170.
75
6
7
8
9
10
11
R
ob
in
so
n'
s 
D
ou
bl
e 
R
es
id
ua
l
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
 Aspirations Gap (100 INRs)
 Quadratic  Quad. 90% CI  Bin Mean
Sasabuchi p-value: 0.000; HM Test p-value: 0.011
(a) Highest Grade Achieved
-1
.2
5
-1
-.7
5
-.5
-.2
5
0
.2
5
R
ob
in
so
n'
s 
D
ou
bl
e 
R
es
id
ua
l
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
 Aspirations Gap (100 INRs)
 Quadratic  Quad. 90% CI  Bin Mean
Sasabuchi p-value: 0.005; HM Test p-value: 0.436
(b) Math Z-Score
-1
.2
5
-1
-.7
5
-.5
-.2
5
0
.2
5
R
ob
in
so
n'
s 
D
ou
bl
e 
R
es
id
ua
l
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
 Aspirations Gap (100 INRs)
 Quadratic  Quad. 90% CI  Bin Mean
Sasabuchi p-value: 0.000; HM Test p-value: 0.049
(c) English Z-Score
-1
-.7
5
-.5
-.2
5
0
.2
5
.5
R
ob
in
so
n'
s 
D
ou
bl
e 
R
es
id
ua
l
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5
 Aspirations Gap (100 INRs)
 Quadratic  Quad. 90% CI  Bin Mean
Sasabuchi p-value: 0.002; HM Test p-value: 0.831
(d) Telugu Z-Score
Figure 2·2: Quadratic and Nonparametric Regression Fits of Child
Aspirations Gap
Notes: See Figure 2·1 notes.
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2.9 Tables
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Standard
Mean Median Deviation Minimum Maximum Obs.
Panel A: Aspirations
Initial Status 58.1 46.4 56.0 0.0 428.6 951
Child Aspiration Level 240.7 214.3 188.8 0.0 566.7 925
Child Aspiration Gap 184.1 160.9 185.5 -382.1 566.7 925
Caregiver Aspiration Level 197.3 142.9 175.3 0.0 566.7 876
Caregiver Aspiration Gap 140.0 89.3 170.2 -382.1 566.7 876
Panel B: Round 4 Education & Cognitive Outcomes
Child’s highest grade completed 10.39 11.0 2.52 0 13 943
Raw score in Math Test 14.03 15.0 7.25 0 29 898
Raw score in English test 15.09 16.0 4.47 0 22 885
Raw score in Language Test 14.35 15.0 4.50 0 24 901
Notes: Math, English, and Telugu scores in Round 4 out of a possible score of 30, 22, and 24,
respectively. Aspiration levels, gaps, and initial status are in 2006 Indian Rupees. Gap is the
difference between the aspiration level and the initial status in round 1.
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Table 2.2: Caregiver Aspiration Gaps and Age 19 Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Highest Math English Telugu
Variable Grade Level Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
Caregiver Asp. Gap 0.980*** 0.222*** 0.256*** 0.226***
(0.125) (0.057) (0.067) (0.059)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
Caregiver Asp. Gap2 -0.143*** -0.027** -0.035** -0.031**
(0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
[0.000] [0.007] [0.005] [0.021]
Observations 860 818 809 825
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.383 0.370 0.314
Dep. Var. Mean 10.427 0.019 -0.010 0.003
Turning Point 3.426 4.072 3.647 3.678
Fieller 90% CI [2.98,4.01] [3.08,12.48] [2.93,6.39] [2.78,8.60]
Sasabuchi p 0.000 0.180 0.071 0.116
Aspiration Frustration 0.534 0.045 0.103 0.087
Aspiration Fatalism 2.788 0.671 0.713 0.633
HM Test p 0.096 0.933 0.042 0.969
Notes: Reports coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by 20 Mandals presented in
parentheses from an OLS specification. Wild-bootstrap clustered p-values with 1000 replications
presented in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The aspiration gaps and turning
point are in 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees. All specifications include controls from round 1 (age
8) that includes gender, birth order, Ravens test Z-score, caste, religion, an indicator for if the
child is the eldest son, height and weight for age z-scores, household size, household head age and
gender, wealth index, caregiver and household head education, the household’s primary economic
activity, private school enrollment, grade level, child literacy, indicators for the child’s aspiration,
and village/community level fixed effects. Fieller 90% confidence intervals are for the turning point
implied by the coefficients on the linear and quadratic aspirations gap term. Sasabuchi p-values are
for the null hypothesis that the aspirations gap is monotone over the interval. HM test p-values are
from a Hardle and Mammen (1993) test with 399 bootstrap replications with the null hypothesis
that the nonparametric and quadratic fits are not different. Aspiration frustration is the difference
in the predicted value at the turning point and at the 99th percentile gap. Aspiration fatalism is
the difference in the predicted value at the turning point and the 1st percentile gap.
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Table 2.3: Child Aspiration Gaps and Age 19 Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Highest Math English Telugu
Variable Grade Level Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
Child Asp. Gap 1.160*** 0.301*** 0.354*** 0.285***
(0.222) (0.061) (0.068) (0.065)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Child Asp. Gap2 -0.173*** -0.045*** -0.052*** -0.041***
(0.038) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Observations 908 868 857 870
Adjusted R2 0.394 0.388 0.370 0.296
Dep. Var. Mean 10.471 0.019 0.012 0.016
Turning Point 3.354 3.376 3.433 3.442
Fieller 90% CI [3.11,3.75] [2.91,4.56] [3.10,4.12] [2.97,4.37]
Sasabuchi p 0.001 0.016 0.004 0.010
Aspiration Frustration 0.694 0.175 0.191 0.152
Aspiration Fatalism 2.932 0.765 0.898 0.717
HM Test p 0.037 0.436 0.049 0.831
Notes: See Table 2.2 notes
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Table 2.4: Both Aspiration Gaps and Age 19 Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Highest Math English Telugu
Variable Grade Level Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
Caregiver Asp. Gap 0.630*** 0.149** 0.148* 0.139*
(0.136) (0.065) (0.075) (0.068)
[0.000] [0.006] [0.024] [0.030]
Caregiver Asp. Gap2 -0.092*** -0.018 -0.021 -0.020
(0.029) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
[0.000] [0.052] [0.087] [0.154]
Child Asp. Gap 0.766*** 0.211** 0.302*** 0.207**
(0.264) (0.075) (0.077) (0.081)
[0.000] [0.015] [0.000] [0.015]
Child Asp. Gap2 -0.109** -0.030* -0.043** -0.028*
(0.048) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
[0.002] [0.094] [0.012] [0.041]
Observations 844 805 797 810
Adjusted R2 0.414 0.394 0.390 0.312
Dep. Var. Mean 10.461 0.031 -0.001 0.018
Gap Coef. Equal p 0.678 0.845 0.270 0.715
Notes: Reports coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by 20 Mandals presented in
parentheses from an OLS specification. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The aspiration
gaps are measured at round two and are in 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees. All specifications include
controls from round 1 (age 8) that includes gender, birth order, Ravens test Z-score, caste, religion,
an indicator for if the child is the eldest son, height and weight for age z-scores, household size,
household head age and gender, wealth index, caregiver and household head education, the house-
hold’s primary economic activity, private school enrollment, grade level, child literacy, indicators
for the child’s aspiration, and village/community level fixed effects.
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Table 2.5: Child Aspiration Gaps and Education Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aspirations Gap for Caregiver Child
Dep Var.: ln (Education Exp.) in Round 2 Round 3 Round 2 Round 3
Aspirations Gap 0.477** 0.764*** 0.597*** 0.873***
(0.167) (0.197) (0.168) (0.236)
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Aspirations Gap2 -0.062* -0.103** -0.080** -0.115**
(0.032) (0.039) (0.028) (0.041)
[0.011] [0.003] [0.008] [0.001]
Observations 816 864 863 913
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.308 0.290 0.321
Dep. Var. Mean 6.097 5.997 6.172 6.038
Turning Point 3.838 3.723 3.737 3.814
Fieller % CI [3.02,14.06] [3.03,6.43] [3.33,5.07] [3.24,5.72]
Sasabuchi p 0.142 0.073 0.031 0.052
HM Test p 0.262 0.125 0.003 0.044
Aspiration Frustration 0.143 0.274 0.210 0.273
Aspiration Fatalism 1.460 2.304 1.632 2.425
Notes: See Table 2.2 notes
Table 2.6: Caregiver Aspiration Gaps and Age 12 Time Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Work Chores Leisure Sleep
Caregiver Asp. Gap 1.076*** -0.641*** -0.258*** -0.067 -0.100
(0.297) (0.205) (0.089) (0.142) (0.116)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.455] [0.118]
Caregiver Asp. Gap2 -0.158*** 0.106** 0.036** 0.003 0.011
(0.055) (0.037) (0.017) (0.026) (0.019)
[0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.754] [0.280]
Observations 865 864 864 864 864
Adjusted R2 0.307 0.162 0.260 0.189 0.224
Dep. Var. Mean 8.441 0.654 1.135 4.130 9.630
Turning Point 3.402 3.012 3.556 13.339 4.585
Fieller 90% CI [2.96,4.69] [2.41,4.12] [2.91,7.52] [.,.] [.,.]
Sasabuchi p 0.024 0.015 0.082 0.408 0.416
HM Test p 0.165 0.231 0.021 0.320 0.374
Aspiration Frustration 0.604 -0.585 -0.118 -0.161 -0.007
Aspiration Fatalism 3.045 -1.663 -0.752 -0.540 -0.351
Notes: See Table 2.2 notes
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Table 2.7: Child Aspiration Gaps and Age 12 Time Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Work Chores Leisure Sleep
Child Asp. Gap 1.504*** -0.837*** -0.199 -0.194 -0.261**
(0.384) (0.222) (0.129) (0.165) (0.120)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.009] [0.269] [0.015]
Child Asp. Gap2 -0.221*** 0.121*** 0.027 0.028 0.044*
(0.067) (0.037) (0.023) (0.029) (0.021)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.026] [0.434] [0.050]
Observations 914 913 913 913 913
Adjusted R2 0.319 0.166 0.259 0.209 0.217
Dep. Var. Mean 8.469 0.611 1.131 4.168 9.610
Turning Point 3.403 3.469 3.740 3.496 2.985
Fieller 90% CI [3.16,4.08] [3.17,4.16] [.,.] [.,.] [2.44,4.12]
Sasabuchi p 0.009 0.008 0.232 0.252 0.032
HM Test p 0.004 0.020 0.043 0.255 0.566
Aspiration Frustration 0.843 -0.430 -0.069 -0.096 -0.246
Aspiration Fatalism 3.842 -2.169 -0.544 -0.505 -0.607
Notes: See Table 2.2 notes
Table 2.8: Caregiver Aspiration Gaps and Age 15 Time Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Work Chores Leisure Sleep
Caregiver Asp. Gap 1.714*** -0.782** -0.292** -0.515*** -0.125
(0.342) (0.293) (0.126) (0.157) (0.074)
[0.000] [0.002] [0.021] [0.001] [0.085]
Caregiver Asp. Gap2 -0.243*** 0.104* 0.042* 0.082** 0.015
(0.065) (0.053) (0.024) (0.032) (0.016)
[0.002] [0.019] [0.044] [0.027] [0.360]
Observations 866 866 866 866 866
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.204 0.348 0.154 0.148
Dep. Var. Mean 8.475 1.492 1.734 4.043 8.256
Turning Point 3.528 3.740 3.480 3.148 4.269
Fieller 90% CI [3.05,4.59] [3.08,11.38] [2.71,76.35] [2.68,4.96] [.,.]
Sasabuchi p 0.013 0.114 0.125 0.036 0.365
HM Test p 0.048 0.007 0.438 0.059 0.242
Aspiration Frustration 0.813 -0.273 -0.148 -0.399 -0.017
Aspiration Fatalism 4.976 -2.365 -0.840 -1.379 -0.417
Notes: See Table 2.2 notes
82
Table 2.9: Child Aspiration Gaps and Age 15 Time Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Educ. Work Chores Leisure Sleep
Child Asp. Gap 1.779*** -0.907*** -0.163* -0.560** -0.149*
(0.361) (0.301) (0.084) (0.211) (0.077)
[0.000] [0.001] [0.024] [0.014] [0.096]
Child Asp. Gap2 -0.240*** 0.110* 0.015 0.096** 0.020
(0.067) (0.053) (0.017) (0.040) (0.014)
[0.000] [0.003] [0.085] [0.049] [0.271]
Observations 915 915 915 915 915
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.211 0.336 0.146 0.149
Dep. Var. Mean 8.531 1.463 1.707 4.033 8.267
Turning Point 3.700 4.117 5.522 2.931 3.735
Fieller 90% CI [3.28,4.75] [3.42,11.03] [.,.] [2.61,3.94] [.,.]
Sasabuchi p 0.016 0.144 0.486 0.023 0.200
HM Test p 0.029 0.008 0.006 0.170 0.446
Aspiration Frustration 0.660 -0.169 0.000 -0.562 -0.053
Aspiration Fatalism 4.830 -2.664 -0.597 -1.285 -0.408
Notes: See Table 2.2 notes
Table 2.10: Caregiver Aspiration Gaps and Child’s Attitudes and
Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 12 Age 15
Future Belief in Future Future Belief in Opp. for
Plans Hard Work Well-Being Plans Hard Work Job Skills
Caregiver Asp. Gap 0.099 0.030 0.340** 0.176** 0.142*** 0.108*
(0.057) (0.031) (0.104) (0.075) (0.049) (0.051)
[0.083] [0.218] [0.012] [0.000] [0.004] [0.033]
Caregiver Asp. Gap2 -0.013 -0.004 -0.063 -0.030** -0.017* -0.021**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.028) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010)
[0.178] [0.314] [0.105] [0.001] [0.050] [0.024]
Observations 850 860 775 858 865 863
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.012 0.250 0.103 0.085 0.073
Dep. Var. Mean 3.545 3.872 5.066 3.959 4.385 4.131
Turning Point 3.913 4.111 2.682 2.935 4.106 2.510
Fieller % CI [.,.] [.,.] [2.01,6.41] [2.19,5.36] [3.07,33.70] [1.31,3.99]
Sasabuchi p 0.269 0.380 0.060 0.046 0.203 0.028
HM Test p 0.228 0.547 0.880 0.857 0.181 0.333
Aspiration Frustration 0.026 0.006 0.453 0.176 0.027 0.174
Aspiration Fatalism 0.309 0.097 0.821 0.447 0.460 0.245
Notes: See Table 2.2 notes
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Table 2.11: Child Aspiration Gaps and Child’s Attitudes and Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 12 Age 15
Future Belief in Future Future Belief in Opp. for
Plans Hard Work Well-Being Plans Hard Work Job Skills
Child Asp. Gap 0.263*** 0.040 0.330*** 0.106 0.166*** 0.099
(0.059) (0.028) (0.092) (0.082) (0.051) (0.060)
[0.000] [0.102] [0.004] [0.049] [0.005] [0.161]
Child Asp. Gap2 -0.043*** -0.006 -0.049** -0.016 -0.023** -0.016
(0.010) (0.005) (0.019) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011)
[0.001] [0.221] [0.044] [0.151] [0.044] [0.290]
Observations 900 911 818 907 914 912
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.047 0.263 0.097 0.096 0.078
Dep. Var. Mean 3.546 3.869 5.062 3.963 4.395 4.143
Turning Point 3.029 3.615 3.368 3.315 3.601 3.143
Fieller % CI [2.68,3.42] [.,.] [2.49,6.13] [.,.] [2.89,6.66] [.,.]
Sasabuchi p 0.000 0.226 0.062 0.188 0.074 0.137
HM Test p 0.010 0.305 0.967 0.515 0.152 0.156
Aspiration Frustration 0.236 0.017 0.194 0.067 0.071 0.077
Aspiration Fatalism 0.653 0.107 0.921 0.266 0.441 0.238
Notes: See Table 2.2 notes
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Table 2.12: Aspiration Failure and Age 19 Outcomes: Exploration of
Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Aspirations Gap Caregiver Child
Dependent Math English Telugu
Variable Highest Grade Level Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
Panel A: Baseline Results
Aspiration Frustration 0.529 0.699 0.175 0.186 0.150
Aspiration Fatalism 2.783 2.927 0.765 0.903 0.719
Adjusted R2 0.399 0.394 0.387 0.370 0.295
Panel B: Controlling for Household Education Expenditure
Aspiration Frustration 0.517 0.739 0.169 0.186 0.117
Aspiration Fatalism 2.434 2.480 0.646 0.755 0.563
F-Stat Joint Sig. 6.46 8.77 9.20 6.34 3.25
Adjusted R2 0.403 0.393 0.406 0.389 0.297
Panel C: Controlling for Child’s Time Use
Aspiration Frustration 0.134 0.355 0.067 0.090 0.055
Aspiration Fatalism 0.734 0.758 0.272 0.370 0.216
F-Stat Joint Sig. 146.15 215.55 25.71 13.44 8.18
Adjusted R2 0.756 0.749 0.488 0.525 0.404
Panel D: Controlling for Child Beliefs and Attitudes
Aspiration Frustration 0.291 0.474 0.122 0.131 0.112
Aspiration Fatalism 1.900 2.062 0.585 0.665 0.585
F-Stat Joint Sig. 39.85 77.59 123.98 72.38 37.29
Adjusted R2 0.480 0.469 0.408 0.409 0.319
Panel E: Controlling for Child Beliefs, Attitudes and Time Use
Aspiration Frustration 0.073 0.283 0.044 0.074 0.073
Aspiration Fatalism 0.571 0.593 0.225 0.302 0.248
F-Stat Joint Sig. 23.89 175.37 9.22 56.49 95.74
Adjusted R2 0.766 0.756 0.487 0.527 0.413
Notes:: Aspiration frustration is the difference in the predicted value of the turning point and
at the 99th percentile gap. Aspiration fatalism is the difference in the predicted value at the
turning point and the 1st percentile gap. Results are calculated from a quadratic fit from the
OLS specification in column 2.1. F-stat of joint significance are results of a Wald test for the joint
significance of the possible mechanisms.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Education on Financial
Outcomes: Evidence from Kenya
Coauthored with Kehinde F. Ajayi (The World Bank)
3.1 Introduction
An estimated 1.7 billion adults worldwide do not have a bank account (Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 2018). Most of this unbanked population lives in a developing economy,
where the average rate of financial inclusion is 63 percent compared to 94 percent in
high-income economies. Young adults are especially at risk of having poor financial
outcomes (Agarwal et al., 2009; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014; Demirguc-Kunt et al.,
2018). With population distributions in developing economies predominantly skewed
towards the young, early improvements in financial behaviors could have tremen-
dous long-term impacts.1 Yet we know little about what factors affect the financial
behavior of youth.
This paper examines the effects of education on the financial outcomes of young
adults, using exogenous variation in schooling caused by Kenya’s introduction of Free
Primary Education (FPE) in 2003. Beginning in January that year, the government
abolished all fees in public primary schools, leading to a large increase in primary
enrollment. To identify causal effects, we combine detailed survey data for a repre-
1Documented effects of financial inclusion include poverty reduction (Burgess and Pande, 2005),
female empowerment (Ashraf et al., 2010), enterprise growth (Dupas and Robinson, 2013), and
household consumption smoothing (Jack and Suri, 2014).
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sentative sample of Kenyan adults in 2015 with geographical and cohort variation in
intensity of exposure to the FPE policy. Our preferred difference-in-differences speci-
fication focuses on 16-18 years olds (aged 4-6 in 2003) and 28-30 year olds (aged 16-18
in 2003). Comparing these younger and older cohorts in subregions with higher and
lower pre-policy levels of primary enrollment suggests that FPE increased educational
attainment. Moving from the lowest intensity subregion to the highest intensity sub-
region in our sample implies an increase of 3.2 years in schooling after the introduction
of FPE.
Financial outcomes tend to improve as education levels rise. In Kenya for example,
87 percent of adults with a primary school education have ever used a bank account
versus only 57 percent of adults who have not completed primary.2 Although this
positive correlation suggests that increases in schooling could improve financial well-
being, unobserved factors such as individual ability or family resources could also
explain this relationship. We therefore cannot make useful policy recommendations
without estimating the causal effects of education and analyzing the key underlying
mechanisms. Does education improve financial outcomes? If so, how?
Given the richness of the data we analyze, we can explore the impacts of FPE on a
comprehensive set of financial outcomes and investigate potential causal mechanisms.
Using the same difference-in-differences strategy, we find that FPE is associated with
increases in formal financial inclusion, particularly through a measure that incorpo-
rates both traditional and mobile banking. We also find increases in familiarity with
financial terms and some evidence of improved ability to respond to financial shocks,
although we find no associated changes in effective numeracy (the ability to solve
finance-related math problems), the likelihood of saving, or retirement planning.
Beyond analyzing financial indicators, we also examine labor market outcomes as
a potential channel through which education impacts formal financial inclusion. We
2Authors’ calculations using the 2015 Kenya FinAccess Survey.
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find a significant positive association between FPE and both income and employment.
Controlling for income substantially attenuates our estimated effects on financial out-
comes, suggesting that increased income may partly account for the increased use of
formal financial services. On the other hand, the increase in formal financial inclusion
persists when we control for access to financial services, implying that these effects are
unlikely to be driven by supply-side factors. Our results are robust to controls for mi-
gration, local unemployment rates, access to telecommunications infrastructure, and
alternative measures of treatment intensity. Additionally, a falsification test using
older cohorts supports the validity of our identification approach.
This paper makes three main contributions. First, we estimate causal effects of
education on formal financial inclusion as well as on several measures of financial
capability and economic self-sufficiency to investigate likely causal mechanisms. We
use the term “financial capability” in line with the Center for Financial Inclusion’s
definition as “the combination of knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviors needed
to make sound financial decisions that support one’s well-being” (Center for Finan-
cial Inclusion at Accion, 2013, p.3). Unlike existing studies that typically focus on
financial market participation and the use of credit, we use rich survey data that
allow us to directly measure cognitive skills, financial literacy, and a broad set of
financial behaviors to provide a deeper understanding of the key channels driving
our main results. Second, we estimate effects for youth in a developing economy,
in contrast to previous work on this topic that has primarily focused on the United
States and other high-income settings. Thus, our results may be informative for
many other countries expanding access to primary education and seeking to improve
the financial outcomes of young people in low-income contexts. Third, we provide
new evidence on the demand-side determinants of formal financial inclusion using a
nationwide government-led intervention. Aside from small-scale randomized control
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trials, most of the literature in developing countries has focused on the impacts of
supply-side shocks such as proximity to banks (Burgess and Pande, 2005) or mobile
money agents (Jack and Suri, 2014).
We build on a small set of studies estimating the causal effects of education on
financial outcomes. Cole et al. (2014) use state-level variation in compulsory schooling
laws across the U.S. to identify the effects of an additional year of education. They
find positive effects on financial market participation, financial income, and credit
management in adulthood. Using a calibration exercise and estimates of the wage
returns to education, they argue that the effects on financial outcomes are too large
to be explained by changes in labor earnings alone and instead likely reflect changes
in saving or investment behavior as well. Due to data limitations, however, they
are unable to measure cognitive skills, financial literacy, or decision-making ability
directly.
Relatedly, Bernheim et al. (2001) and Cole et al. (2016) use a similar set of policy
reforms to estimate effects of high school curriculum changes and find mixed evidence
on the effects of personal finance courses but strong positive effects of math courses.
Using more recent variation in state-level graduation requirements and focusing on
young adults, Brown et al. (2016) find that both math and financial education improve
debt-related outcomes while exposure to economics courses increases the likelihood
of experiencing repayment difficulties. Once again, none of the authors are able to
observe direct measures of financial capability. Moreover, while these studies focus on
changes at the high school level, our estimates result from changes at a much lower
level of educational attainment. FPE primarily induced individuals receiving little
or no formal education to complete some primary schooling, which is the relevant
margin for policymakers in many developing economies.
Research on education and financial outcomes in developing economies has pri-
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marily focused on the effects of financial literacy programs. In related work from
two randomized evaluations of school-based interventions targeted at youth, Berry
et al. (2018) find limited effects of a financial literacy program for primary and mid-
dle school students in Ghana and Bruhn et al. (2016) find that a financial education
program for high school students in Brazil increased financial knowledge and saving
but also increased the use of expensive debt. These findings are consistent with a
broader body of evidence highlighting the challenges of increasing financial literacy
(for comprehensive summaries, see Xu and Zia, 2012; Hastings et al., 2013; Fernandes
et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2015). Given that financial training programs for adults
have been equally ineffective (e.g., Cole et al., 2011; Bruhn et al., 2014), our finding
of a positive effect of primary schooling is especially promising.
Finally, we contribute to a growing literature on the diverse effects of free primary
education. Adopted by over 20 countries in the last 20 years, FPE is a wide-reaching
policy tool with several potential private and social benefits. Previous studies using
a similar identification strategy have found that FPE expanded access to education
in Kenya without substantially reducing the academic performance of previously en-
rolled students (Lucas and Mbiti, 2012). Studies of Nigeria’s 1976 Universal Primary
Education policy find that it reduced female fertility (Osili and Long, 2008) and in-
creased political engagement (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017) but had relatively small
effects on incomes (Oyelere, 2010). To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing
evidence on the effects of FPE on financial outcomes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 The 2003 FPE Program
Kenya’s education system comprises eight years of primary school, four years of sec-
ondary school, and four years of university. Children must be at least 6 years old
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before enrolling in the first year of primary. According to the 1999 Kenyan Census,
91 percent of 15-25 year olds had attended some primary school, but only 68 percent
had completed primary. As Figure 3·1 illustrates, there was significant geographic
variation in primary school attendance prior to 2003. Those in and around the capital
city Nairobi had nearly universal primary attendance, while less than half of those in
the northeast region of the country had ever attended primary.
Between 1991 and 2003, the Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER) in primary school
remained relatively constant at 90 percent. Public schools charged an average of
US$16 per year in 1997 although this varied widely, with some schools charging as
much as US$350 per year (World Bank, 2004).
Kenya eliminated school fees for all public primary schools in the country shortly
after the election of a new government in December 2002. Beginning with the new
school year in January 2003, the nationwide policy mandated public schools to admit
all children seeking admission and prevented schools from charging any fees or levies.
Primary enrollment increased by 18 percent (900,000 students) within the first year
of FPE (World Bank, 2009), resulting in a GER of around 104 percent, well above
the average of 79 percent across sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2004). Schools
received a capitation grant of US$14 per student, jointly financed by the Kenyan
government and external donors.
Despite the massive increases in school enrollment resulting from FPE, Lucas and
Mbiti (2012) find that the program had a limited negative impact on the academic
performance of students who would otherwise have attended primary. Additionally,
Bold et al. (2015) find that wealthy households were especially likely to increase their
demand for private schools after the introduction of FPE. These results suggest some
households that would initially have sent their children to public schools switched
to private schools instead. Taken together, we view the program as achieving a
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significant expansion in access to primary education without considerable changes in
quality.
3.2.2 Financial Inclusion in Kenya
Compared to other countries at the same level of economic development, Kenya has
remarkably high levels of formal financial inclusion. The most recent cross-country
statistics available from the 2017 Global Findex surveys indicate that 82 percent of
Kenyan adults aged 15 and over have a formal account, substantially higher than the
58 percent average for lower middle income economies but still below the 94 percent
average for high-income economies (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). A large part of
Kenya’s financial advantage comes from mobile banking – 73 percent of adults have
a mobile financial account, greatly exceeding the 4 percent worldwide average.
Kenya’s mobile money revolution began when Safaricom (the leading telecom-
munications company) launched M-PESA as a basic money transfer service in March
2007. This technology later expanded with the launch of M-Shwari in November 2012
as a basic savings and loan product. Users can now earn interest on their savings
account and have instant access to short-term micro credit loans.3 Access to mobile
money generates significant benefits including improving risk sharing by facilitating
transfers across social networks and lowering prices (Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Jack and
Suri, 2014; Mbiti and Weil, 2015; Suri and Jack, 2016).
Beneath Kenya’s high levels of formal inclusion, there are still multiple indicators
of financial fragility. Although the share of adults who reported having saved or
set aside money in the past 12 months is similar in Kenya (70 percent) and high-
income economies (71 percent), the adoption of formal saving is substantially lower
(27 percent versus 55 percent) and so is the likelihood of saving for old age (15
3See http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa and http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-
pesa/do-more-with-m-pesa/m-shwari for more details (accessed on May 30, 2018).
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percent versus 44 percent). Additionally, there are persistent disparities in access to
formal financial services. Women, younger adults, and those with lower incomes are
substantially less likely to have a formal account. Inequalities exist even with respect
to access to mobile money: M-PESA users are more educated, urbanized, wealthier,
and more likely to have a traditional bank account than are non-users (Mbiti and
Weil, 2015).
While the minimum age to open an independent bank account in Kenya is 18,
most banks offer joint account options that enable minors to open an account with
an adult co-signer. Hence, 34 percent of 16-18 year olds report ever having a formal
financial account.4
Overall, Kenya’s financial landscape is precocious but there is a broad scope for
improvement in financial security especially for individuals in marginalized groups.
The expansion of access to primary schooling therefore provides an ideal opportunity
to study the causal effects of education on the financial outcomes of youth.5
3.3 Empirical Methodology
3.3.1 Reduced-Form Estimates
Although Kenya abolished fees for all public schools in the country simultaneously, the
effective impact of FPE varied based on the number of children potentially induced
to attend primary school in a given location. The program had a higher intensity in
places where a lower share of school-age children were attending primary school before
the reform. Similarly, older people who were already past the typical school-going
age would be less likely to benefit from free primary schooling than younger people in
the same location. Age and location of birth therefore both determine the intensity
4Authors’ calculations using data from the 2015 FinAccess survey.
5Recent studies on alternative interventions to increase formal financial inclusion in Kenya include
Dupas and Robinson (2013); Dupas et al. (ming); Schaner (2018).
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of an individual’s exposure to the FPE program.6
This cohort and location-based variation inspire the following reduced-form spec-
ification:
Yirc = β0 +
∑
a
(da × Intensityr) β1a +X ′ircΠ + δr + δc + εirc (3.1)
where Yirc is an outcome of interest for individual i in subregion r born in cohort c.
Intensityr is the intensity of the FPE program in subregion r (defined as the share
of 15-25 year olds born in subregion r that did not attend primary school, based
on the 1999 Census).7 da is an indicator for being age a in 2003. X irc is a vector
of individual characteristics including gender in our main specification. δr is a fixed
effect for each of the 13 subregions and δc is a fixed effect for each birth year. This
specification allows us to flexibly estimate the impact of the FPE program separately
by age.
To estimate the full effect of exposure to FPE, our preferred specification restricts
our sample to six cohorts of interest. Our treatment cohorts consist of individuals
aged 4-6 years old when FPE went into effect in 2003, and thus 16-18 years of age
at the time our survey data were collected in 2015. Since children can begin primary
school if they are at least 6 at the start of the school year, everyone in these cohorts
would have had the opportunity to pursue all eight years of primary school under the
FPE program. Our counterfactual age cohorts consist of those who would have been
16-18 in 2003 and thus 28-30 in 2015. Since primary school in Kenya is 8 years long,
individuals in these age cohorts would have largely completed primary school by the
time the program went into effect. Indeed, only 11 percent of 16-18 year olds were
6Duflo (2001) uses a similar strategy to estimate the effect of Indonesia’s 1973 school construction
program on educational attainment and earnings.
7We use subregions as our geographic area for this measure because the sample in the financial
access survey we analyze is representative at this level.
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enrolled in primary school in the 1999 Kenyan census.8
As with our first specification, our preferred estimates exploit geographical vari-
ation in treatment intensity based on pre-FPE levels of primary school enrollment.
Additionally, we compare two cohorts – the affected cohort that would have been 4-6
years old in 2003 and thus would have had their entire primary education for free; and
the unaffected cohort who were 16-18 at the time of the reform and generally too old
to take advantage of the FPE program. We use the following difference-in-differences
specification to identify the impact of free primary education on our outcomes of
interest:
Yirc = β0 + (FPEc × Intensityr) β1 +X ′ircΠ + δr + δc + εirc (3.2)
where FPEc is a dummy variable equal to one if age cohort c was exposed to the
reform (aged 4-6 in 2003) and equal to zero if not (aged 16-18 in 2003). δr is a fixed
effect for each of the 13 subregions and δc is a fixed effect for each of the six age
cohorts. We cluster standard errors at the subregion level. Since having only thirteen
clusters may lead to over-rejection of the null hypothesis, we follow Cameron et al.
(2008) and also present wild bootstrap clustered p-values. Note that we still have
within-cluster variation since our subregion-level measures of exposure to FPE vary
by age or cohort.
Our estimation strategy uses children who would have attended primary school
in the absence of FPE as a control group for those induced to attend primary after
the reform. This approach assumes that FPE had no effect on children initially
going to enroll in school since they would have attended primary school anyway. In
8There were reports of older students entering primary school due to FPE, but this would only
work against our finding significant effects. We do not use 14 and 15 year olds in our counterfactual
age cohort since 48 percent of 14 year olds and 33 percent of 15 year olds were still enrolled in
primary school in the 1999 census. Thus, a substantial portion of youth in these age cohorts would
have benefited from FPE.
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reality, children could have been affected by changes in household investments once
parents no longer have to pay for public primary schools. We are unable to observe
what these households did with the money freed up by FPE but it seems likely that
any additional expenditures would tend to improve children’s outcomes, leading to
a downward bias toward finding zero impacts. If that is the case, then our results
would be a lower bound estimate of the effects of FPE.
3.3.2 Instrumental Variables Estimates
While the above reduced-form specification provides an estimate of the impact of free
primary education on our main outcomes, we are also interested in the implications of
education per se, not merely the effect of the FPE program. Ideally, we would estimate
the following ordinary least squares (OLS) equation to characterize the causal effects
of education on our outcomes of interest:
Yirc = α0 + α1Educationirc +X
′
ircΛ + δr + δc + irc (3.3)
where Educationirc is the years of education completed by individual i in subregion
r born in cohort c.
Education is potentially endogenous to our outcome variables, primarily because
individual education levels are unlikely to be random, even conditional on observables
and age and subregion fixed effects. We therefore implement a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) estimation strategy using intensity of exposure to the FPE program as an
instrument for the years of education completed by those in our sample. In particular,
we instrument for education using the following first-stage equation:
Educationirc = γ0 + (FPEc × Intensityr) γ1 +X ′ircΓ + δr + δc + uirc (3.4)
where FPEc × Intensityr is the excluded instrument.
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Under the standard assumptions for a valid instrumental variable (IV), this ap-
proach yields the average effect of a year of education. We discuss the validity of the
IV assumptions when we present our results and robustness checks below.
3.4 Data
Our main source of data is the 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey conducted
from August through October 2015 by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), the Kenya
National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) and Financial Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD
Kenya). This survey measures access to and demand for financial services for a
nationally representative sample of 8,665 individuals aged 16 and above. We include
the survey weights in all of our analysis and the sample is representative down to the
level of 13 subregional clusters.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for our restricted sample of 1,619 individ-
uals aged 16-18 and 28-30. We do not observe years of education in the data, only
education level ranging from none to university degree. The younger cohort has
higher educational attainment at all levels except secondary completion – 97 percent
attended at least some primary school, 74 percent completed primary, 57 percent at-
tended at least some secondary, and 7 percent completed secondary school (compared
to 90, 67, 42, and 34 percent of 28-30 year olds). To facilitate the interpretation of
our results, we impute years of education such that none is 0 years, some primary
is equivalent to 4 years, completing primary is 8 years, some secondary is 10 years,
and completing secondary or more is 12 years. Since our treated, younger cohort is
16-18 years of age, we set the maximum number of years of education to 12 for all
of those in our sample.9 By this measure, the average respondent in our sample has
close to 8 years of education. The survey does not ask about current school enroll-
9As a robustness check, we also estimate specifications that use the completion of a given educa-
tion level as our measure of schooling.
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ment. To proxy for this, we use data from the nationally representative 2014 Kenya
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). According to the DHS, 77 percent for 16-18
year olds were enrolled in school.
We take advantage of the detailed survey questions to construct unique indica-
tors for three dimensions of financial well-being: formal financial inclusion, financial
capability, and economic self-sufficiency. Table 3.2 summarizes our outcomes. We
measure formal financial inclusion using a series of questions about the use of specific
bank products, both currently and at any point in the past. The survey explicitly
distinguishes between traditional and mobile banking. When including the most com-
mon forms of mobile money (M-Shwari and M-PESA), 34 percent of the young cohort
had ever banked and 9 percent currently had a bank product (85 and 47 percent for
the older cohort). 32 percent of young people had ever banked with mobile money
and 28 percent had exclusively banked through mobile money. The rates of formal
financial inclusion are much lower when excluding M-Shwari and M-PESA as bank
products, only 6 percent of young adults had ever used a traditional bank product.
We also specifically observe whether individuals have a formal saving, loan/credit,
or insurance product. Rates are consistently lower for respondents in the younger
cohort.
To measure financial capability, we start with financial literacy using a set of
questions that ask how many of the following nine financial terms respondents have
heard of: savings account, interest, shares, collateral, guarantor, investment, inflation,
pension, and mortgage. On average, younger respondents in our sample had heard
of 3.9 and older respondents had heard of 5.3 of these items. Although this measure
is a subjective assessment of financial literacy, it generates meaningful variation with
responses that span the full range from 0 to 9.
To complement this subjective measure, we also use two questions on effective
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numeracy: (1) “You are in a group and win a promotion or competition for KSh
100,000. With 5 of you in the group, how much do each of you get?” and (2) “You
take a loan of KSh 10,000 with an interest rate of 10 percent a year. How much
interest would you have to pay at the end of the year?”. Respondents could give an
explicit answer or say “I don’t know”. We adopt the survey-provided scale and assign
respondents a value of high (3), medium (2), or low (1), where high is answering
both questions correctly, medium is answering one correctly, and low is answering
both either incorrectly or with “I don’t know”. The average numeracy is 2.0 in our
sample, with 63 percent of respondents correctly answering the first question and 35
percent correctly answering the second one. The younger cohort performs marginally
better.
Our two measures of financial literacy differ from the standard Big Three questions
used in the literature, which assess conceptual understanding of compound interest,
inflation, and risk diversification (Hastings et al., 2013; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014).
Nonetheless, our alternative measures have crucial advantages. The effective numer-
acy questions were open ended rather than multiple choice, allowing us to distinguish
between a correct calculation and a lucky guess. Additionally, despite being sub-
stantially less complicated than the Big Three questions, our measures yield far from
uniformly correct responses and therefore have discriminatory power that a more com-
plex measure may have missed given the low levels of basic numeracy in our setting.
Finally, familiarity with financial concepts and effective numeracy are both desirable
factors that one could reasonably expect to boost financial capability.
Beyond focusing on financial literacy, we examine financial capability more broadly
by looking at other measures reflecting attitudes and behaviors that could promote
financial well-being. We first analyze whether respondents are using any saving prod-
uct (either formal or informal) as a measure of overall saving. 61 percent of 16-18 year
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olds and 78 percent of 28-30 year olds have some form of savings. We also analyze
participation in informal saving groups to assess the possibility that participation in
the formal financial sector displaces participation in informal groups. 36 percent of
respondents regularly contributed to an informal savings group. The survey also asks
about individuals’ ability to get money in case of an emergency and to store money
in a safe storage place.10
To measure longer-term well-being, we use a question about retirement planning:
“How do you intend to make ends meet in your old age?” We define forward-looking
individuals as those who intend to draw on savings, a pension, provident fund, retire-
ment savings plan, or income from their investments. We define non-forward looking
individuals as those who “have no plans” or “don’t know”. We also identify those
who intend to rely on a social safety net namely children, other family members, or
a government fund for the old. Despite the relatively young age of respondents in
the younger cohort, 50 percent have a forward-looking retirement plan and this is not
statistically different for the older cohort.
To understand the mechanisms linking education and financial outcomes, we ex-
amine economic self-sufficiency drawing on survey questions about employment and
income. Despite a high share of school enrollment, 47 percent of 16-18 year olds re-
ported earning any income on their own (compared to 92 percent of 28-30 year olds).
Average reported monthly incomes (including zeros) were KSh 2,502 (US$24) and
KSh 15,542 (US$148) respectively. Casual employment and farming are the main
sources of earnings for youth.
We summarize these multiple outcomes using a set of indices based on Kling et al.
(2007). To begin, we subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation of the
10Specifically, the survey asked: “If you needed KSh 2,500 (for rural respondents) or KSh 6,000
(urban) within three days in case of an emergency would you be able to get it?” and “If you received
KSh 500 (rural) or KSh 5,000 (urban) do you have a safe place you can save this money?”. A third
of respondents could get money in an emergency and 87 percent had a safe place to save money.
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“control” group for each outcome (the non-FPE cohort in subregions with below-
median intensity – i.e., 28-30 year olds in Central, Nairobi, Lower Eastern, Nyanza,
and Western subregions, which had the highest pre-FPE enrollment rates of 96-99
percent). We then take an equally weighted mean of the resulting z-scores.
Although we separately report estimates for the full set of available outcomes, our
summary indices focus on outcomes occurring for at least 5 percent of the younger
cohort to account for the fact that we may not be able to observe differences in
low-probability outcomes at young ages, biasing us towards a mechanical result of
significant difference-in-differences estimates even when there are no real effects. We
discuss here the specific components of our summary indices and the respective means
for respondents in the younger cohort. Our formal financial inclusion index comprises
indicators for ever having banked (33.8 percent), currently being banked (9.3 percent),
and ever having a formal savings account (12.1 percent), all including mobile banking.
Our financial capability index comprises financial literacy (average score of 3.9 out
of 9), effective numeracy (2.1 out of 3), having any savings, formal or informal (60.7
percent), being a member of an informal savings group (14.8 percent), being able
to access funds in an emergency (24.6 percent), having a safe place to store money
(80.4 percent), and having forward looking retirement (49.8 percent). Our economic
self-sufficiency index comprises an indicator for earning any income (47 percent),
income earned (KSh 2,502), and an indicator for relying on another source (usually
employment) besides family, friends or a spouse as a primary source of income (42.2
percent of young people do).11
Our second data source is the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Interna-
11We explored alternative sets of indices to capture financial inclusion and financial capability. In
particular, using any saving products, belonging to an informal saving group, having a safe place to
save, and being able to access money in an emergency could arguably fall under inclusion instead of
capability. The results and implications of this alternative formulation are similar so we focus our
discussion in the paper on estimates using the definitions presented here.
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tional 5 percent sample of the 1999 Kenyan census conducted by KNBS (Minnesota
Population Center, 2015). As outlined in the preceding section, our identification
strategy exploits geographical variation in treatment intensity (Intensityr), based on
pre-FPE educational attainment. By subregion of birth, we calculate the proportion
of 15 to 25 year olds who had never attended primary school. The pre-FPE propor-
tion of youth that had never attended primary is an intuitive measure of intensity
because it focuses on the marginal compliers.
Figure 3·1 illustrates the geographic variation in Intensityr. The average individual
in our sample lived in a subregion where 10 percent of 15 to 25 year olds in 1999 had
never attended primary school. This ranged from 1.3 percent in the Central subregion
to 75 percent in the Northeastern subregion. We also use the 1999 census to calculate
unemployment rates by subregion as a proxy for existing economic conditions before
the FPE reform.
Combining individual-level data from the 2015 survey with our subregion-level
FPE treatment intensity measure from the 1999 census allows us to adopt a difference-
in-differences estimation strategy under the key identifying assumption that differ-
ences in financial outcomes across cohorts would not have been systematically cor-
related with FPE intensity in the absence of the program. This assumption is not
testable but we use data for 40-42 year olds (28-30 in 2003) to conduct a falsifica-
tion exercise with a placebo reform for older cohorts not exposed to FPE, to provide
supportive evidence.
3.5 Results
We begin by documenting that FPE increased education levels. We then analyze
effects on formal financial inclusion, financial capability, and economic self-sufficiency
before analyzing mechanisms. Finally, we present two-stage least squares estimates
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of the effect of education on financial outcomes, with FPE intensity as an instrument
for education.
3.5.1 Impact of FPE on Educational Attainment
Figure 3·2 presents a visual illustration of the effect of FPE on educational attain-
ment. We plot coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for the vector of
(da × Intensityr) interaction terms in our flexible specification that allows the impact
of the program to vary by age (equation 3.1). The largest impacts of the program on
years of education appear to be for those in the youngest cohorts. Consistent with
our identification assumption, we find insignificant differences in education levels for
older adults who would have been above the typical primary school age by the time
FPE began in 2003.
Table 3.3 presents results from estimating the impact of free primary education
on the years of education completed. Column 1 includes only the FPEc indicator,
Intensityr, and the (FPEc × Intensityr) interaction. Column 2 includes cohort fixed
effects and an indicator for females.12 Column 3 additionally includes subregion fixed
effects, reflecting our specification outlined in equation 3.2.13 Overall, the results
indicate that greater exposure to the FPE program increased the highest education
level achieved, where moving from the lowest to highest intensity subregion increased
education by about 3.2 years.14 We additionally estimated the impact of free primary
education on the highest education level achieved and find that the largest effects of
FPE were on the likelihood of completing some primary (see Appendix Table C.1).
These reduced-form results establish a strong first stage – free primary education
increased the average education levels of those exposed in subregions that had lower
12We exclude FPEc as it is collinear with the cohort fixed effects.
13We exclude Intensityr as it is collinear with the subregion fixed effects.
14The difference in intensity for the highest and lowest subregion in the pooled sample was 0.756−
0.013 = 0.743
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primary attendance prior to the program’s implementation.
3.5.2 Impact of FPE on Financial and Economic Outcomes
Figure 3·3 presents a visual illustration of the age-specific effects of FPE on formal
financial inclusion, financial capability, and economic self-sufficiency. These estimates
indicate significant improvements in formal financial inclusion for individuals in the
youngest cohorts. The age-specific patterns for financial capability and economic
self-sufficiency are less clear. There are large and significant coefficients both among
younger and older cohorts for financial capability. While the coefficients for economic
self-sufficiency are largest for cohorts aged 5 to 8 in 2003, the coefficient for 4 year
olds is a precise zero.
To quantify the effects of full exposure to FPE, Table 3.4 reports the corresponding
reduced-form coefficients from estimating equation 3.2. Our preferred specification
indicates that moving from a pre-FPE primary nonenrollment rate of 0 to 100 per-
cent increases formal financial inclusion by 0.76 standard deviations of the control
group mean (column 3), increases financial capability by 0.32 standard deviations
(column 6), and increases economic self-sufficiency by 1.1 standard deviations (col-
umn 9). Scaling these effects based on the variation observed in our sample implies
that going from the highest to the lowest intensity subregion in our sample increased
formal financial inclusion, financial capability, and economic self-sufficiency by 0.57,
0.23, and 0.82 standard deviations respectively. All of these estimates are statisti-
cally significant using both clustered standard errors and wild bootstrapped standard
errors.
We briefly discuss estimated effects on individual outcomes below. The appendix
provides supplementary estimates and a more detailed discussion (see Appendix Fig-
ures C·3 to C·5 for age-specific estimates and Appendix Tables C.2 to C.7 for addi-
tional results).
104
Formal Financial Inclusion Decomposing the formal financial inclusion index,
reduced-form estimates for specific outcomes in Panel A of Table 3.5 indicate that
those in the highest intensity subregions were 26 percentage points more likely to
have ever banked than those in the lowest intensity subregions when including the
use of mobile banking. This estimate is statistically significant using both sets of
standard errors. We find similar effects on the likelihood of ever having a formal
saving account, but smaller and marginally significant effects on the likelihood of
currently having any formal account.
Investigating the effects of FPE on formal financial inclusion using data on a
larger set of bank products, we find significant increases in the likelihood of currently
having a formal savings product as well as currently and ever using a formal loan or
credit product. The coefficient for insurance products indicates an increase in their
use but is not statistically significant. Consistently, the strongest effects on banking
use, in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, are found when we include
both traditional and mobile banking.
Financial Capability In addition to these effects on formal financial inclusion, we
find moderate impacts on financial capability. Our estimates in panel B of Table 3.5
imply that individuals in the highest intensity subregions were familiar with 1.5 more
financial terms than those in the lowest intensity subregions. There is no statistically
significant impact on effective numeracy, although the coefficient is positive. There
are also no significant changes in the likelihood of having any savings product (formal
or informal).
Financial inclusion and financial literacy are informative intermediate outcomes
to consider but we are ultimately interested in improvements in more fundamental
factors such as saving levels and consumption smoothing. Although we cannot ob-
serve these outcomes directly, we find supportive evidence of improvements in these
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dimensions. Individuals exposed to FPE are more likely to participate in an informal
savings group (suggesting that formal financial inclusion does not crowd out informal
participation). They are also more likely to report being able to get money in case of
an emergency and we find suggestive evidence that FPE may have improved individ-
uals’ ability to respond to financial shocks. Nonetheless, they are no more likely to
say they have a safe place to save money. We also find no differences in retirement
planning.
Economic Self-Sufficiency Beyond evaluating financial outcomes, we explore the
returns to education in terms of income and employment in panel C of Table 3.5.
Column 1 reports income effects on the extensive margin. Moving from the lowest to
highest intensity subregion resulted in a 30 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of earning any income. To examine impacts on the intensive margin, we begin by using
the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of monthly income (Burbidge et al., 1988)
and the log of (1 + monthly income), retaining the full sample including those who
did not earn any income. We find very large increases in income, with a coefficient
of 4.87 for the inverse sine transformation of earnings (3.62 going from the lowest
to the highest intensity subregion).15 We also investigate the impact of FPE on
respondents’ primary source of money and find FPE is associated with a decreased
reliance on family, friends, or a spouse as a primary source of money. Our reduced-
form estimates indicate that moving from the lowest to highest intensity subregion
is associated with being 27 percentage points less likely to rely on family, friends, or
a spouse as a primary source of money, compared with a sample mean of 58 percent
for the younger cohort.
15By comparison, Duflo et al. (2017) find that winning a secondary school scholarship in Ghana
increased the inverse hyperbolic sine of earnings at age 25 by 0.308. They also find a much smaller
(10 percent) increase in the likelihood of earning any income, compared to our 30 percentage point
increase on a mean of 47 percent for the younger cohort.
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As an alternative outcome, we use the log of monthly income as the dependent
variable and drop all of the zeros from our sample. The magnitude of the impact on
income earners is still very large. We also find an increased reliance on employment-
generated income. Altogether, we find large impacts on labor market outcomes.
3.5.3 Heterogeneity by Gender
Having estimated the overall effects of Free Primary Education, we now turn to
consider gender-specific effects. FPE treatment intensity (measured by primary at-
tendance from the 1999 census) displays significant heterogeneity across subregions
but also by gender within subregions. For example, in the Coastal subregion 12.9%
of males 15-25 had never attended primary school, while this was 31.3% for females.
The average female in our sample resides in a subregion where 12 percent of females
aged 15-25 in 1999 had never attended primary school, the comparable statistic is 8
percent for males. This raises the possibility that heterogeneity in baseline primary
attendance levels by gender could generate heterogeneity in the impact of FPE by
gender.
To test for this possibility, we repeat our reduced-form analysis but introduce
an additional interaction between FPE, intensity, and female to our baseline speci-
fication. Appendix Table C.8 presents summary statistics by gender and Appendix
Table C.9 presents our regression results, where panel A uses the average intensity
from the pooled sample and panel B uses gender-specific intensities. Females have sig-
nificantly lower levels of formal financial inclusion, financial capability, and economic
self-sufficiency. There is some evidence that FPE is associated with larger increases
in formal financial inclusion for females, but we do not see significant differences
for years of education, financial capability, or economic self-sufficiency (including the
likelihood of earning any income).
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3.5.4 Analysis of Mechanisms
So far, we have presented evidence that free primary education increased formal
financial inclusion and had moderate impacts on financial capability. However, it also
led to higher income and lower reliance on family, friends, and spouses for money.
It therefore seems plausible that the link between higher formal financial inclusion,
financial capability, and education partially operates through increased income and
changes in employment outcomes. We examine this possibility and other potential
causal mechanisms below.
Our approach is to examine changes in our main estimates after controlling for
potential mechanisms. Checking whether our results are sensitive to the inclusion of
additional controls is not a definitive test of the role of alternative mechanisms because
changes in our coefficients of interest could simply imply that these controls are
correlated with omitted variables and not necessarily prove that we have identified key
mediators. Measurement error and reverse causality also present possible challenges
to this interpretation. We therefore emphasize that these results are purely suggestive.
Table 3.6 displays our main results with controls for different factors that could
be channels through which increased formal financial inclusion, financial capability,
or economic self-sufficiency could be occurring. Column 1 repeats our baseline results
from columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table 3.4 for comparison. Column 2 additionally controls
for marital status and religion, and finds that this does not change our results.16
Column 3 controls for a cubic polynomial of monthly income. This attenuates formal
financial inclusion by nearly half, and financial capability by about two-thirds such
that both point estimates are no longer statistically different from zero. Column 4
controls for whether the primary source of money was farming, employment, self-
employment, casual employment, family/friends/spouse, or other sources. This also
16Consistent with this finding, reduced-form results presented in Appendix Table C.10 indicate
that FPE did not significantly impact religion or the probability of being married.
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attenuates the magnitude of the coefficients on financial inclusion and capability, but
not by as much as when we control for income.17
We interpret these results as providing suggestive evidence that increased income
may be one of the mechanisms contributing to our observed effects on financial out-
comes. Nonetheless, our estimated coefficients do not completely decrease to zero
once we include income-related controls, which suggests that income is not entirely
driving our results. 18
We similarly examine the potential role of supply-side changes. Individuals ex-
posed to FPE report being closer to banking products (see Appendix Table C.12).
This raises the possibility that the intensity of FPE was simply correlated with an
expansion of financial services. Columns 5-7 report results controlling for the dis-
tance reported to each of the nearest bank branch, bank agent, and M-PESA agent
and column 8 for the distance to all three. Controlling for these factors does not
meaningfully change the magnitude of our estimated effects on formal financial in-
clusion, but appreciably increases the precision of our estimates. Thus, changes in
formal financial inclusion do not appear to result from changes in access to financial
services. In contrast, this same exercise attenuates the estimated effects on financial
capability by 24 to 64 percent, suggesting that proximity to financial products could
partly explain improvements in our proxies for financial decision-making.
As another way to more explicitly account for increased access to financial ser-
vices (primarily due to the introduction of mobile money), Column 9 controls for the
average change in distance to the nearest banking service at the province level be-
17Results for columns 3 and 4 are not reported for economic self-sufficiency as the dependent
variable since income and employment are part of this index and thus would then be on both sides
of the equation.
18For comparison, we also estimated a set of regressions with income-related outcomes and formal
financial inclusion as the key dependent variables while including our financial capability index as
an additional control. Although financial capability is significantly correlated with economic self-
sufficiency, income, and formal financial inclusion, the estimated effects of FPE remain large and
statistically significant (see Appendix Table C.11).
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tween 2009 and 2015 interacted with an indicator for being in the FPE cohort. This
change is recorded as the difference in the average ordinal distance between 2009 and
2015, where 2015 includes distance to both traditional and mobile banking services.19
The results change very little when compared with column 1, providing additional
evidence that geographic variation in the growth of financial services is not driving
the results. Controlling for distance to banking products also does not meaningfully
change the results for economic self-sufficiency.
Finally, we explore the possibility of complementarity between FPE and the avail-
ability of mobile banking by estimating a specification that interacts FPE intensity
with proximity to a mobile money agent. We do not find a statistically significant
effect of the interaction term, although our estimated coefficients are rather large so
we cannot definitively rule out the possibility that being closer to a mobile money
agent increases the impacts of FPE (Appendix Table C.13). Additionally, as a general
point of concern, supply-side factors could be driven by demand to begin with so we
reiterate the importance of treating these results with caution given the possibility of
reverse causality.
Overall, these results provide suggestive evidence that employment outcomes may
be one channel through which free primary education increased formal financial in-
clusion and financial capability. Conversely, supply-side changes in access to financial
services do not appear to explain the increase in formal financial inclusion.
3.5.5 Instrumental Variables Estimates
We have presented evidence that free primary education in Kenya led to higher lev-
els of formal financial inclusion, financial capability, and economic self-sufficiency.
Nonetheless, these results do not allow us to make inferences about the relationship
19This exercise uses responses from the 2009 FinAccess survey that asks how long it would take
to get to the nearest bank. We use province-level averages since the 2009 FinAcess survey is repre-
sentative at the province rather than the subregion level.
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between educational attainment and our main outcomes of interest. In order to di-
rectly quantify the implications of education, we impose some additional assumptions
and present results from a two-stage least squares estimation. Since we cannot defini-
tively rule out violations of these additional assumptions, we interpret this final part
of our analysis as a complementary descriptive exercise to scale the magnitude of our
impacts relative to existing estimates for alternative policies.
Beyond the necessary criteria for our difference-in-differences strategy, the IV ap-
proach requires relevance of the instrument and satisfaction of an exclusion restriction.
Our original results on the impact of FPE on years of education in Table 3.3 represent
the first-stage in our two-stage estimation. In our preferred specification in column
3, the F-stat for the excluded instrument (FPE × Intensity) is 14.7. This establishes
that the instrument is relevant and sufficiently strong.
Under our framework, the final IV assumption implies that the intensity of free
primary education must be correlated with our outcomes of interest only through the
level of education attained by those in our sample. The most obvious violation for
this assumption would be if FPE affected the quality as well as the level of educa-
tion received. As discussed earlier, Lucas and Mbiti (2012) find limited changes in
educational quality after the introduction of FPE. Their analysis focuses on short-
term impacts however, and we cannot rule out the possibility that education quality
declined in the long run or that lower ability students entered the education system.
Both these factors would lead to a downward bias, causing us to underestimate the
direct effects of education on financial outcomes. Additionally, our estimates reflect
any general equilibrium effects of FPE, which could be positive or negative.
Table 3.7 presents our first set of results estimating the naive OLS equation 3.3 in
column 1 and then the second stage of a two-stage least squares (2SLS) in column 2.
In each case, we report the coefficient on years of education, censored at 12 years. Our
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2SLS estimates of the effects of education on formal financial inclusion are larger than
the OLS estimates, with coefficients of 0.175 and 0.095 respectively. The financial
capability estimates are comparable (0.072 for OLS and 0.073 for 2SLS). The 2SLS
estimates of effects on economic self-sufficiency of 0.253 are considerably larger than
the OLS estimates, which are close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Examining specific outcomes, we find that higher education levels are particularly
correlated with increased access to banking services, higher financial literacy, and
improved ability to get money in an emergency. Our 2SLS estimates indicate that
each additional year of education is associated with being 8.1 percentage points more
likely to have ever banked, 5.7 percentage points more likely to be currently banked,
being familiar with 0.47 more financial terms, and 6.8 percentage points more likely
to get money in an emergency. These are all larger in magnitude then the associated
OLS coefficients. (Appendix Tables C.2 and C.3 report these supplementary results.)
Regarding income, 2SLS estimates indicate a 9.3 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of earning any income for each additional year of education in addition
to a large increased income, a 3.4 percentage point increase in being employed, a
7.1 percentage point increase in being self-employed, and an 8.3 percentage point
decrease in relying on family, friends, and/or spouse as the primary source of money.
(See Appendix Tables C.6 and C.7.)
The corresponding OLS estimates largely indicate that the raw correlation be-
tween years of education and earning income is zero or slightly negative. These
estimates could be biased if, for example, those with higher education come from
richer families, and those from richer families are more reliant on their family as their
primary source of income, particularly when they are younger.
Our 2SLS estimates allow us to benchmark the effects of FPE relative to alterna-
tive policies. Is FPE a cost-effective strategy to increase formal financial inclusion?
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The Kenyan government provided schools a capitation grant of $14 (Ksh 1,020) per
student per year (World Bank, 2009). We estimate that completing one additional
year of education implies an 8.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of ever
having a formal account. A back of the envelope calculation therefore puts the cost
of opening one additional bank account at $14/0.081 = $173. Alternatively, the cost
of inducing one additional person to currently have a formal account is $14/0.057 =
$246.
Three common alternative interventions to promote banking are financial literacy
training, bank account subsidies, and behavioral approaches such as commitments,
reminders, labels, and peer pressure (Dupas et al., 2018, summarize results from 16
recent studies). Most studies do not provide enough information to construct a cost-
effectiveness estimate. In a notable exception, Dupas and Robinson (2013) evaluate
a randomized intervention for rural market vendors and bicycle taxi drivers in Kenya
and find that offering a $7.83 subsidy to open a formal bank account generates a 41
percentage point increase in the likelihood of being an active account user (making
two deposits within the first six months), implying a cost of $19 per active account.
Focusing on a more general population but in a different context, Cole et al. (2011)
present estimates from a randomized evaluation for a sample of unbanked households
in Indonesia. They estimate that offering subsidies costs $145 per savings account
opened and financial literacy training costs $340. By comparison, FPE falls between
these two alternatives. This suggests that FPE is a competitive policy tool even
under a conservative valuation that isolates the benefit of FPE on the formal financial
inclusion margin, independently of all the other returns to education.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
The validity of our preceding analysis depends on several crucial assumptions and
we address the main confounding factors in the discussion below. Each row of Table
3.8 reports an alternative set of estimates from a different robustness check. The
dependent variable for each estimate in column 1 is years of education, the formal
financial inclusion index in column 2, the financial capability index in column 3, and
the economic self-sufficiency index in column 4. For comparison, the first row repeats
the baseline results from our preferred specification for education in column 3 of Table
3.3 and for the indices in columns 3, 6 and 9 of Table 3.4.
One potential concern is that other contemporaneous government programs could
have targeted subregions with lower economic performance, which also had low pri-
mary school attendance levels. We proxy for this possibility by controlling for the
age 15-25 pre-FPE unemployment rate in each subregion from the 1999 census, in-
teracted with each age cohort. Our results are robust to these inclusions and our
estimates do not significantly change.20 We also look specifically at the potential
confounding effects of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) program that was
introduced in 2003. The program disburses funds to constituencies for grass-roots
development projects. We might overstate the effects of FPE if the CDF allocations
systematically overlapped with FPE intensities. To address this possibility, we con-
trol for subregion-level poverty rates using the same 1997 Welfare Monitoring Survey
that was used to determine CDF allocations, and interact these rates with our FPE
cohort dummy. The estimated effect of FPE on formal financial inclusion becomes
noisier, however the magnitude of the coefficient is not meaningfully different from
our baseline specification. The coefficient on financial capability becomes smaller
and statistically insignificant, and the effect on economic self-sufficiency does not
20We have also looked at unemployment rates for other age ranges. There is a strong correlation
in unemployment rates and our results are similar to those reported in Table 3.8.
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substantially change. This suggests that the moderate changes we observe in finan-
cial capability could be due to other contemporaneous programs but that changes in
formal financial inclusion and income are plausibly due to FPE, reinforcing the pos-
sibility that FPE may have impacted financial behavior through an income channel
without a substantial intermediate impact on knowledge, skills, or attitudes.
We also check the robustness of our treatment intensity measure. In our main
results we use a subregion-level intensity measure based on average pre-FPE enroll-
ment rates. However, there was variation in intensity for males and females within
each subregion. We present alternative estimates using the respective gender-specific
intensities for males and females in the sample. These results are in line with our
baseline results. An argument could be made that FPE potentially impacted the
likelihood of completing primary education, not merely the likelihood of attending
primary. We check whether our results change if we redefine intensity as the pre-FPE
share of those in each subregion aged 15-25 that never completed primary school,
instead of the share that never attended primary school. The results using completed
primary as the intensity are of similar magnitude to our baseline results but are less
precisely estimated with the exception of financial capability, which is reduced by
about 30 percent and is not statistically significant. As a final alternative intensity
measure, we use the average potential years of additional primary education. To
calculate this intensity, we take the average years of primary education that 15-25
year olds had completed within each subregion. Then, we subtract this number from
8 to get a measure of the average number of additional years of primary education
the program could induce. The results also indicate a statistically significant associ-
ation between this measure of FPE intensity and formal financial inclusion, financial
capability, and economic self-sufficiency.
In 2008, the Kenyan government instituted a free secondary education (FSE)
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program that abolished tuition fees for public secondary day schools and increased
the capacity of public secondary schools. Those in our FPE sample are aged 9-11 when
this policy went into effect, and thus could have benefited from this program as well.
In order to disentangle the two effects, we control for FSE intensity interacted with
our FPE indicator. We use a similar intensity measure as Brudevold-Newman (2016)
(who evaluates the impact of the FSE program using a similar empirical strategy as
ours) and define FSE intensity as the share of primary school completers aged 20-30
in the 2009 Census who did not attend at least some secondary school.21 Our results
are robust to controlling for FSE intensity interacted with the FPE indicator.
A limitation of our data is that we do not observe if the individuals in our sample
are currently enrolled in school, which is particularly relevant since our treated cohort
is secondary school aged. We use the 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys to
calculate the share of 16-18 year olds currently attending school by province. While we
cannot control for whether an individual is currently attending school, we can control
for this measure as a proxy for the probability of school attendance. Controlling for
this proxy for the likelihood of still being enrolled in school does not meaningfully
affect the results for formal financial inclusion, capability, or economic self-sufficiency.
Another limitation is that we only observe where individuals in our sample were
residing at the time they were surveyed, not where they were born. In the 1999
Census, 87.3 percent of 16-18 year olds and 73.5 percent of 28-30 year olds still lived
in their subregion of birth. To address the potential for endogenous migration, we
exclude Nairobi and Mombasa since these are the two largest cities in Kenya and
attract a large number of migrants from the rest of the country.22 Alternatively, we
21Ideally we would use a survey from right before FSE went into effect, but we do not know of
any nationally representative survey from 2004-2007. We use those aged 20-30 as these individuals
would have been 19-29 when the program went into effect and likely were too old to benefit from
free secondary education. Brudevold-Newman (2016) uses a slightly different definition and sample,
instead using the share of primary school completers that did not complete at least some secondary
school born in 1989 and 1990 from the 2014 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey.
2220 percent of residents in Nairobi and Mombasa had moved in the last 12 months compared
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exclude the 8 percent of respondents who moved in the last 12 months. The results
from both of these robustness checks are in line with our main results.
Given that we find stronger effects of FPE on formal financial inclusion when
we include mobile banking, access to mobile telecommunications networks may be
driving our results. To explore this possibility, we control for mobile phone ownership
and internet usage. Again, this does little to change our results.
An alternative to the wild bootstrap cluster that is robust to the possibility of
over-rejection of the null in the presence of few clusters is the two step method devised
by Donald and Lang (2007). We also present results from using this method and they
are in line with the baseline results.23 Notably, the effects on all three indices are
statistically significant.
Finally, we construct a placebo FPE treatment using an older cohort. Effectively,
we let those aged 28-30 in our sample (16-18 in 2003) be “treated” by FPE and
compare them with a control older cohort aged 40-42 in our sample (28-30 in 2003).
This check shows an impact on all three indicies that is indistinguishable from zero.
Overall, the results from our placebo experiment provide supportive evidence that
we are not simply picking up any prior differential trends in our main outcomes of
interest.
to 6 percent in the rest of the sample. The two subregions account for 15 percent of the sample.
Moreover, from the 1999 Census, these were the subregions that had the lowest share of residents
that were also born there. For example, only 36 percent of those aged 16-18 and 13 percent aged
28-30 residing in Nairobi were born there, and this was 50 and 23 percent for Mombasa. For all
other subregions this ranged from 79 to 99 percent for 16-18 year olds and 61 to 98 percent for 28-30
year olds.
23The sample size is only 26 as this method collapses the individual data down to the means
within each subregion for the FPE and non-FPE cohorts. The coefficients differ from our baseline
estimates because this approach weights each subregion equally.
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3.7 Conclusions
This paper provides new evidence on the causal effects of education on the financial
outcomes of young adults using a wide-reaching policy in a developing economy. We
find positive impacts on formal financial inclusion, financial capability, and economic
self-sufficiency. Our results are robust to controlling for supply-side changes in fi-
nancial access, establishing the potential for a large-scale government intervention to
generate significant demand-driven improvements in financial outcomes.
How much did FPE contribute to the formal financial inclusion of youth? Our
reduced-form coefficient from Panel A in Table 3.5 indicates that full exposure to FPE
is associated with a 35 percentage point increase in the likelihood of ever having a
bank account (reflecting the change in formal financial inclusion implied by comparing
places with 0 to 100 percent baseline primary non-enrollment). We multiply this
coefficient by the actual treatment intensity in each subregion to get the share of 16-
18 year olds in each subregion induced into ever banking by FPE. We then take the
16-18 year old population-weighted average of this value across subregions to calculate
the aggregate effect of FPE for the entire country. This calculation implies that FPE
increased formal financial inclusion among 16-18 year olds by 3.4 percentage points.
Overall, 33.8 percent of 16-18 year olds in our sample had ever banked. The effect
of FPE therefore represents a 10 percent increase in the formal financial inclusion of
youth in this age group.
We conclude with two caveats. First, our estimates exclusively identify the effects
of education for a sample of youth (primarily 16-18 year olds). Given the recentness
of Kenya’s adoption of FPE in 2003, we cannot yet observe longer-run outcomes
for the main beneficiaries. Perhaps additional improvements in financial capability
accrue over time. We hope to explore this possibility in future work. Second, we
focus on Kenya, where rates of formal financial inclusion are high relative to other
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countries at similar levels of economic development, largely due to the prevalence
of mobile banking. The effects of education could be rather different in a more
traditional banking environment. Indeed, only 6.2 percent of 16 to 18 year olds in
our sample had ever banked in a traditional bank while 33.8 percent had ever banked
once we include mobile banking. Ultimately, our results suggest that digital financial
services could be a crucial complement to education in efforts to improve the financial
outcomes of youth.
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3.8 Figures
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Figure 3·1: Share of 15-25 Year Olds that Never Attended Primary
School (1999 Census)
Notes: Lightest color are subregions with the lowest share of primary school non-enrollment prior
to Free Primary Education and darkest color are those with the highest. Data source: 1999 Kenya
Census.
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Figure 3·2: Coefficients on Interactions of Age and FPE Intensity for
Years of Education
Notes: Dependent variable is imputed years of education censored at 12 years, where 0=None,
4=Some primary, 8=Completed primary, 10=Some secondary, 12=Completed secondary. Figure
plots coefficients on an interaction of age and Free Primary Education (FPE) intensity, with the
cohort aged 28 in 2003 as the excluded group. 95 percent confidence intervals presented based on
standard errors clustered at the subregion level. Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household
survey.
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Figure 3·3: Coefficients on Interactions of Age and FPE Intensity for
Summary Indices
Notes: Dependent variable is a) formal financial inclusion summary index (comprised of ever having
banked, currently being banked, and ever having a formal savings account, all including mobile
banking), b) financial capability summary index (comprised of financial literacy, effective numeracy,
having any savings (formal or informal), forward looking retirement, being a member of an informal
savings group, able to access funds in an emergency, and having a safe place to store money), and c)
economic self-sufficiency summary index (comprised of an indicator for earning any income, income
earned, and an indicator for relying on another source besides family, friends or a spouse as a primary
source of income). Figure plots coefficients on an interaction of age and Free Primary Education
(FPE) intensity, with the cohort aged 28 in 2003 as the excluded group. 95 percent confidence
intervals presented based on standard errors clustered at the subregion level. Data source: 2015
Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: Demographic Summary Statistics
Cohort FPE (16-18) Older (28-30)
Mean SD Mean SD
Education level 3.348 1.006 3.526 1.703
Some primary 0.974 0.158 0.895 0.307
Completed primary 0.735 0.442 0.673 0.470
Some secondary 0.566 0.496 0.422 0.494
Completed secondary 0.070 0.255 0.338 0.473
Years of education (censored) 8.108 2.928 7.789 4.001
Age 17.002 0.818 29.149 0.873
Female 0.413 0.493 0.586 0.493
Currently married 0.061 0.239 0.739 0.439
Christian 0.896 0.306 0.898 0.303
Muslim 0.080 0.271 0.085 0.279
Owns mobile phone 0.467 0.499 0.821 0.384
Accessed internet in past 4 weeks 0.237 0.426 0.198 0.399
FPE cohort 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Intensity 0.095 0.168 0.110 0.193
Intensity (female) 0.126 0.209 0.124 0.217
Intensity (male) 0.072 0.137 0.096 0.172
Potential years of primary 1.660 1.306 1.731 1.489
Free secondary education intensity 0.340 0.087 0.327 0.098
Unemployment rate (1999) 0.189 0.081 0.203 0.092
Poverty rate (1997) 0.527 0.123 0.521 0.133
Mean attendance of age cohort in 2014 DHS 0.774 0.112 N/A N/A
Observations 688 931
Notes: Education level takes on a value from 1-7, where 1=None, 2=Some primary, 3=Completed
primary, 4=Some secondary, 5=Completed secondary, 6=Technical training after secondary, and
7=University degree. Years of education spans from 0-12, where 0=None, 4=Some primary,
8=Completed primary, 10=Some secondary, 12=Completed secondary, technical training after
secondary, or university degree. All statistics are calculated using sampling weights, the weighted
sample is nationally representative at the subregion level. FPE indicates the cohort that was
younger than primary schooling age when the Free Primary Education program began. Intensity,
Intensity (female), Intensity (male), Potential years of primary, and Unemployment rate (1999)
calculated using 1999 Kenyan Census. Free secondary education intensity calculated using 2009
Kenyan Census. Poverty rate calculated using 1997 Welfare Monitoring Survey. Mean attendance
of age cohort in 2014 DHS calculated from the 2014 Kenyan Demographic and Health Surveys
which did not record school attendance for those aged 25 and older. Data source for all other
variables: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table 3.2: Financial and Economic Summary Statistics
Cohort FPE (16-18) Older (28-30)
Mean SD Mean SD
Ever banked (incl. Mpesa) 0.338 0.473 0.854 0.353
Ever banked through Mpesa 0.317 0.466 0.828 0.377
Ever banked through Mpesa only 0.276 0.447 0.377 0.485
Ever banked (excl. Mpesa) 0.062 0.241 0.477 0.500
Currently banked (incl. Mpesa) 0.093 0.291 0.470 0.499
Ever formal savings (incl. Mpesa) 0.121 0.326 0.527 0.500
Currently formal savings (incl. Mpesa) 0.089 0.284 0.456 0.498
Ever formal loan/credit (incl. Mpesa) 0.038 0.191 0.278 0.448
Currently formal loan/credit (incl. Mpesa) 0.011 0.102 0.145 0.352
Currently has an insurance product 0.046 0.210 0.301 0.459
Financial literacy 3.882 2.444 5.271 2.803
Effective numeracy 2.093 0.813 1.990 0.798
Any savings (formal or informal) 0.607 0.489 0.777 0.416
Member of informal savings group 0.148 0.355 0.539 0.499
Able to get money in case of emergency 0.246 0.431 0.412 0.492
Have a safe place to save money 0.804 0.397 0.927 0.260
Forward looking retirement 0.498 0.500 0.497 0.500
No retirement plans 0.242 0.429 0.171 0.377
Public/private safety net retirement 0.130 0.336 0.166 0.372
Earned any income 0.470 0.499 0.922 0.268
Monthly income 2502 6209 15542 29697
Primary money sources
Farming 0.125 0.331 0.251 0.434
Employed 0.026 0.160 0.156 0.363
Casual employment 0.203 0.403 0.206 0.404
Self-employed 0.033 0.180 0.251 0.434
Family/friends/spouse 0.578 0.494 0.121 0.326
Other sources 0.035 0.183 0.016 0.127
Financial access
Distance to nearest bank branch 2.558 1.021 2.442 1.296
Distance to nearest mobile money agent 1.832 0.949 1.726 1.168
Distance to nearest bank agent 2.326 0.992 2.080 1.282
Don’t know distance to bank branch 0.057 0.232 0.037 0.190
Don’t know distance to mobile money agent 0.015 0.120 0.017 0.130
Don’t know distance to bank agent 0.157 0.364 0.072 0.259
Note: Distance to nearest is a discrete variable from 1-9 where 1 is “Under 10 minutes,” 2 “About
10 to 30 minutes,” 3 “Over 30 mins to 1 hour,” 4 “About 2 hours,” 5 “About 3 hours,” 6 “About 4
hours,” 7 “about 5 hours,” 8 “About 6 hours,” 9 “7 hours or more.” FPE indicates the cohort that
was younger than primary schooling age when the Free Primary Education program began. Data
source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table 3.3: Years of Education (Censored at 12)
(1) (2) (3)
Mean Dep. Var. [SD] 7.933 [3.561]
FPE × Intensity 4.514** 4.697** 4.351**
(1.199) (1.059) (1.134)
[0.048] [0.041] [0.048]
FPE -0.260
(0.431)
[0.491]
Intensity -9.757** -9.729**
(1.134) (1.048)
[0.013] [0.012]
Observations 1619 1619 1619
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.191 0.225
FPE×Intensity F-stat 14.17 19.68 14.72
Cohort FE X X
Subregion FE X
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13 subregions.
Wild bootstrap clustered p-values in brackets with 999 replications. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for more conservative of clustered
standard errors and wild bootstrap clustered p-values. Dependent vari-
able is imputed years of education censored at 12 years, where 0=None,
4=Some primary, 8=Completed primary, 10=Some secondary, 12=Com-
pleted secondary. Columns 2 and 3 additionally control for gender. FPE
is an indicator for being in the age cohort eligible for Free Primary Edu-
cation. Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table 3.5: Reduced-Form Results for Specific Outcomes
Panel A: Formal Financial Inclusion
Dependent Variable Ever Banked Currently Banked Ever Formal Savings
(1) (2) (3)
FPE × Intensity 0.354** 0.249* 0.310**
(0.144) (0.138) (0.131)
[0.009] [0.029] [0.009]
Observations 1619 1619 1619
Adjusted R2 0.400 0.255 0.271
Control Group Mean 0.898 0.519 0.577
Panel B: Financial Capability
Dependent Variable Financial Literacy Numeracy Any Savings
(1) (2) (3)
FPE × Intensity 2.063*** 0.210 -0.037
(0.606) (0.171) (0.166)
[0.001] [0.374] [0.948]
Observations 1619 1619 1619
Adjusted R2 0.218 0.073 0.125
Control Group Mean 5.775 2.017 0.840
Panel C: Economic Self-Sufficiency
Earned IHST Not Reliant on
Dependent Variable Any Income Monthly Income Friends/Family/Spouse
(1) (2) (3)
FPE × Intensity 0.403*** 4.870*** 0.362***
(0.096) (0.986) (0.088)
[0.001] [0.001] [0.003]
Observations 1617 1617 1619
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.383 0.311
Control Group Mean 0.934 9.112 0.864
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13 subregions. Wild bootstrap clus-
tered p-values in brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for more
conservative of clustered standard errors and wild bootstrap clustered p-values. All specifications
include subregion and cohort fixed effects and controls for gender. Each cell presents the coeffi-
cient on FPE×Intensity from reduced-form estimations of equation 3.2. FPE is an indicator for
being in the age cohort eligible for Free Primary Education. We calculate control group means
using the non-FPE cohort in subregions with below-median intensity (i.e., 28-30 year olds in Cen-
tral, Nairobi, Lower Eastern, Nyanza, and Western subregions, which had the highest pre-FPE
enrollment rates of 96-99 percent). The difference in intensity for the highest and lowest FPE
subregions is 0.743. IHST stands for inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Data source: 2015
Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table 3.7: OLS and 2SLS Results
OLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
Formal Financial Inclusion 0.095*** 0.175***
(0.008) (0.052)
[0.000]
Financial Capability 0.072*** 0.073***
(0.004) (0.017)
[0.000]
Economic Self-Sufficiency -0.002 0.253***
(0.007) (0.066)
[0.724]
Observations 1619 1619
1st Stage F-Stat 14.84
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13
subregions. Wild bootstrap clustered p-values in brackets with
999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for
more conservative of clustered standard errors and wild boot-
strap clustered p-values. All specifications include subregion
and cohort fixed effects and controls for gender. Each column
presents the coefficient on years of education, censored at 12
years, from estimates of equation 3.3. Column 1 presents simple
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results while column 2 presents
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates with FPE×Intensity
as the excluded instrument. FPE is an indicator for being in
the age cohort eligible for Free Primary Education. Dependent
variable is a summary index using Kling et al. (2007) method.
Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table 3.8: Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable Years of Formal Fin. Financial Econ. Self-
Education Inclusion Capability Sufficiency
Robustness Check (1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline (N = 1619) 4.351** 0.764** 0.318** 1.099***
(1.134) (0.275) (0.125) (0.240)
[0.048] [0.008] [0.016] [0.006]
1999 Subregion unemployment (N = 1619) 4.524* 0.735** 0.321** 1.148***
(1.160) (0.253) (0.128) (0.242)
[0.071] [0.006] [0.032] [0.008]
1997 Poverty rate (N = 1619) 4.045* 0.693* 0.194 0.871*
(1.627) (0.313) (0.096) (0.342)
[0.074] [0.087] [0.119] [0.091]
Alternative intensities (N = 1619) 4.251** 0.805*** 0.350** 1.051***
(1.021) (0.232) (0.132) (0.216)
[0.048] [0.000] [0.024] [0.002]
Completed primary intensity (N = 1619) 4.457* 0.627* 0.227 1.441**
(1.324) (0.324) (0.143) (0.320)
[0.054] [0.076] [0.164] [0.016]
Potential years of primary intensity (N = 1619) 0.566* 0.090** 0.035* 0.163**
(0.161) (0.038) (0.017) (0.039)
[0.056] [0.026] [0.066] [0.012]
Free secondary education intensity (N = 1619) 4.578* 0.731** 0.307 1.227**
(1.124) (0.259) (0.125) (0.201)
[0.070] [0.033] [0.101] [0.040]
Likelihood still in school (N = 1619) 5.016** 0.746** 0.363** 1.408***
(1.201) (0.270) (0.137) (0.346)
[0.048] [0.006] [0.044] [0.000]
Exclude Nairobi and Mombasa (N = 1446) 3.873 0.811** 0.328** 0.929***
(1.114) (0.277) (0.133) (0.193)
[0.114] [0.008] [0.030] [0.006]
Exclude migrants (N = 1495) 4.618* 0.811*** 0.322** 1.125***
(0.996) (0.242) (0.122) (0.229)
[0.062] [0.004] [0.029] [0.002]
Mobile phone ownership (N = 1619) 4.381** 0.775** 0.324** 1.101***
(1.078) (0.257) (0.112) (0.243)
[0.015] [0.000] [0.006] [0.004]
Internet usage (N = 1619) 4.590** 0.828*** 0.357** 1.098***
(1.177) (0.263) (0.124) (0.238)
[0.042] [0.006] [0.012] [0.004]
Donald-Lang two step estimation (N = 26) 5.011*** 0.837** 0.430* 0.907***
(1.403) (0.340) (0.223) (0.241)
Placebo for 28-30 vs. 40-42 (N = 1486) -0.435 0.314 0.059 -0.334
(1.071) (0.161) (0.129) (0.201)
[0.697] [0.260] [0.809] [0.216]
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13 subregions. Wild bootstrap clustered
p-values in brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for more
conservative of clustered standard errors and wild bootstrap clustered p-values. All specifications
include subregion and cohort fixed effects and controls for gender. Each cell reports the coefficient
on FPE × Intensity for a separate regression. FPE is an indicator for being in the age cohort
eligible for Free Primary Education. Each row focuses on a different robustness check. Data
source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Appendix A
Appendix: Ancestral Roots of Locus of
Control
A.1 Supplementary Figures and Tables
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Figure A·1: Bin Scatter Plot of Caloric Potential for Agriculture
and Rainfall Risk on Share of Subsistence from Agriculture - Ethnicity
Matches in WVS
(a) Pre-1500 Caloric Potential - Full EA Sample
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(b) Rainfall Risk - Full EA Sample
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Notes: Each figure presents a bin scatter plot with 100 bins. Total sample size is 152. Share of
subsistence from agriculture taken from the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock, 1967) and is relative to
hunting, gathering, fishing, and animal husbandry. Caloric potential in millions of kilo-calories per
hectare per day. Both panels have continent fixed effects partialled out. Panel (b) additionally
partials out average precipitation.
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Figure A·2: Distribution of Responses to Locus of Control Question
in WVS
Notes: Distribution of responses to “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control
over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to
them. Please use this scale where 1 means ‘no choice at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal of choice’
to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns
out.”
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Figure A·3: Average Locus of Control by Country in World Values
Survey
Notes: Presents mean response to “Some people feel they have completely free choice and control
over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to
them. Please use this scale where 1 means ‘no choice at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal of choice’
to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns
out.”
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Figure A·4: Share of Subsistence from Agriculture by Ethnicity at
Ancestral Population Centroid
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Figure A·5: Pre-1500 Caloric Potential of Agriculture by Ethnicity
at Ancestral Population Centroid
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Figure A·6: Average Rainfall Risk by Ethnicity at Ancestral Popula-
tion Centroid
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Figure A·7: Average Rainfall Risk, Residual of Mean Precipitation,
by Ethnicity at Ancestral Population Centroid
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Figure A·8: Potential Caloric Rate of Return to Maize by Ethnicity
at Ancestral Population Centroid
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Figure A·9: Potential Caloric Rate of Return to Maize, Residual
of Pre-1500 Caloric Potential, by Ethnicity at Ancestral Population
Centroid
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Figure A·10: Correlation Between Locus of Control and Other Cul-
tural Traits
Notes: Presents results of a regression with locus of control as the dependent variable and a series of
other cultural traits as the independent variable. 95% confidence interval bars presented for standard
errors clustered by ethnicity. Green/triangles indicates statistical significance at the 95% level. All
variables standardized into z-scores.
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Figure A·11: Respondent and Parent Country of Birth in EVS 2nd
Generation Sample
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Figure A·12: Respondent and Parent Country of Birth in PISA 2nd
Generation Sample
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Table A.30: Differences in LoC within Ethnicities by Movers
(1) (2) (3)
Mover -0.007
(0.028)
Moved out of country -0.011 -0.012
(0.038) (0.038)
Moved within country -0.006
(0.034)
Ethnicity fixed effects, individual controls, survey fixed effects Y Y Y
Observations 73013 73013 73013
Societies 98 98 98
R2 0.098 0.098 0.098
Notes: Presents results from an OLS specification. Robust standard errors clustered by ethnicity
in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable is ordinal locus of
control on a 10 point scale converted to a z-score.
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Table A.37: Math Locus of Control Principal Component Factor
Loadings
Question Factor Loading
ST43Q01 0.269
ST43Q02 0.247
ST43Q03 0.195
ST43Q04 0.303
ST43Q05 0.213
ST43Q06 0.349
ST44Q03 0.353
ST44Q04 0.332
ST44Q05 0.347
ST44Q07 0.383
ST44Q08 0.261
Table A.38: Math Schooling Effort Principal Component Factor
Loadings
Question Factor Loading
ST46Q01 0.329
ST46Q02 0.375
ST46Q03 0.345
ST46Q04 0.354
ST46Q05 0.359
ST46Q06 0.368
ST46Q07 0.361
ST46Q08 0.336
177
Table A.39: Math Schooling Effort Internal/External LoC Factor
Loadings
Math LoC Factor
Question Internal External Uniqueness
ST43Q01 0.058 0.690 0.521
ST43Q02 0.054 0.613 0.621
ST43Q03 0.297 -0.033 0.911
ST43Q04 0.466 -0.003 0.782
ST43Q05 -0.015 0.640 0.590
ST43Q06 0.373 0.279 0.783
ST44Q03 0.557 0.021 0.690
ST44Q04 0.455 0.073 0.788
ST44Q05 0.465 0.101 0.774
ST44Q07 0.603 0.035 0.635
ST44Q08 0.341 0.060 0.880
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A.2 Accounting for Potential Intermediate Variable Bias of
Mechanism Regressions
There are several possible channels through which the variation in preindustrial con-
trol over experience is associated with locus of control. In this section I investigate
possible mediating variables and implement a method devised by Acharya et al. (2016)
in order to overcome the possibility of intermediate variable bias - that is, bias in-
duced by controlling for variables that are determined post-treatment and prior to
the outcome of interest. These include variables such as the level of post-industrial
development in their homeland as well as any individual outcomes such as income
and education. For specifications exploiting the caloric potential in the ancestral
homeland, in principal all non-geographic characteristics are potential intermediate
variables - including all characteristics recorded in the Ethnographic Atlas - and by
extension, are potential mediating variables.
The method by Acharya et al. (2016) allows for the identification of the controlled
direct effect of treatment on an outcome, defined as “the direct effect of the treat-
ment when a mediator is the same fixed value for all units.” (Acharya et al., 2016,
p4). The method they propose can do two things: (1) rule out potential mechanisms
and (2) provide support for a preferred mechanism. I apply this method to potential
mediating variables that in the economics and psychology literature have been asso-
ciated with locus of control at the individual level: education, income, employment
status, and savings behavior.1 Additionally, I include population density in 1500 and
GDP per capita in 1990 to account for differential impacts that ancestral control over
subsistence may have had on the economic development in the society’s homeland.
Acharya et al. (2016)’s method proceeds in three steps. First, regress the outcome
on the proposed mechanism, treatment, pretreatment covariates, and intermediate
1Ancestral control over subsistence, when proxied by the reliance on agriculture from the Ethno-
graphic Atlas, is associated with each of these outcomes.
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covariates. That is, estimate
Yiert = βTiert + αMiert + φZiert + γXiert + εiert (A.1)
where Tiert is the “treatment”, i.e. ancestral control over subsistence, consisting of
Ve×Ae, Ae, and Ve from equation 1, Miert is the potential mechanism. Ziert are other
post-treatment variables which will include all candidates for Miert as well as religion,
marital status, and number of children. Xiert are pre-treatment controls (i.e., fixed
effects and geographic and individual controls from equation 1). Second, demediate
the outcome of the proposed mechanism using the results of the first stage. That
is, calculate Y˜iert = Yiert − αˆMiert using the αˆ estimated from equation A.1. Third,
regress the demediated outcome on the treatment and pretreatment covariates by
estimating
Y˜iert = βTiert + γXiert + εiert. (A.2)
I can then compare the magnitude of β in equation A.2 with the magnitude of
the same coefficient in my baseline specification. If the magnitude in the specification
using the demediated outcome is significantly closer to zero, or is not statistically
different from zero, then I can conclude that the variable I used to demediate is a
mechanism through which my baseline result is operating through. Conversely, if the
magnitude is unchanged, then I can rule out that variable as a potential mechanism.
This method relies on three assumptions to be valid: (1) no confounders for the
effect of the treatment on the outcome, conditional on baseline characteristics, (2)
no confounders for the effect of the mediator on the outcome, conditional on the
treatment, baseline characteristics, and intermediate variables (i.e., variables that are
affected by the treatment and impact both the mediator and the outcome), and (3)
the effect of the mediator on the outcome is independent of intermediate variables.
I present results in Table A.41 using the reliance on agriculture from the Ethno-
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graphic Atlas. I do not include characteristics from the Ethnographic Atlas as poten-
tial mediators as it is unclear if they were determined in a society before or after the
society determined its share of subsistence from agriculture. I allow for education,
income, employment status, and household saving to be potential mediators. Each of
these has been shown to be associated with locus of control in the literature, and each
of these is shown to be significantly associated with ancestral control over subsistence.
Demediating locus of control of the respondent’s education level in column 2 reduces
the magnitude of the relationship with ancestral control by 10% and column 3 shows
that demediating by income reduces the magnitude by 32%. However, both are still
statistically significant. Demediating by employment status, household saving, and
measures of economic development do not meaningfully alter the magnitude of the
relationship. Overall, this suggests that the relationship between ancestral control
over subsistence and contemporary income levels is part of the mechanism, there is
still a strong direct effect of ancestral control over subsistence and contemporary locus
of control once this relationship with income is taken into account. The results are
also similar to the “bad control” regressions in the main appendix.
Table A.42 repeats this for the reduced form results, and does include charac-
teristics in the Ethnographic Atlas as potential mediators. The results suggest that
the reliance on agriculture is the most priminent mediator, consistent with the “bad
control” results in the main appendix.
Overall, the results suggest that ancestral control over subsistence has a direct
association with contemporary locus of control independent of a host of other po-
tentially endogenous individual and ethnographic characteristics as well as levels of
economic development.
Table A.43 applies this method for the PISA results. The additional intermediate
outcomes included in Z are the grade level of the student, the academic track (e.g.,
182
vocational or academic), and if the parent country of birth was a former European
colony. The results show evidence that math locus of control is a mechanism. Again,
these results are consistent with the “bad control” results in the main appendix.
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A.3 Variable Definitions and Sources
A.3.1 World Values Survey/European Values Study
• Locus of Control (A173): “Some people feel they have completely free choice
and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no
real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means ‘no
choice at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal of choice’ to indicate how much freedom
of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.”
• Preferences for redistribution. Constructed from a principal component
analysis of variables representing preferences for redistribution used in Giuliano
and Spilimbergo (2014). Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014) investigate responses
to two additional questions on the importance of an egalitarian over competitive
society and the tradeoff between lower taxes and welfare in a society. However,
these two additional questions were not asked in all waves or countries, and were
only asked of about 5% of my sample, and are thus omitted from the principal
component.
– Income equality (E035): “Now I’d like you to tell me your views on var-
ious issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you
agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree com-
pletely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere
in between, you can choose any number in between. “Incomes should be
made more equal” vs. “We need larger income differences as incentives for
individual effort”
– Private vs. state ownership of business (E036): “Now I’d like you to tell me
your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?
1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you
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agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall
somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. “Private
ownership of business and industry should be increased” vs. “Government
ownership of business and industry should be increased”
– Government responsibility (E037): “Now I’d like you to tell me your views
on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree
completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall some-
where in between, you can choose any number in between. “Government
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”
vs. “People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves”
– Work-luck (E040): “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better
life” (1), “Hard work does not generally bring successit is more a matter
of luck and connections” (10)
• Collectivism. Constructed from a principal component analysis of variables
representing collectivism or individualism used in Olsson and Paik (2016) and
Buggle (2017). Buggle also uses an additional question, good manners as an
important child trait (A027), however this was only asked of a third of those
in my sample and I do not include it. Results are similar when this trait is
included, but the sample size is much smaller. Additionally, this variable has
the lowest weight in the principal component analysis when compared to the
four other traits.
– Important child traits: indicators for listing independence (A029), imagi-
nation (A034), tolerance (A035) or obedience (A042)
– Private vs. state ownership of business (E036): “Now I’d like you to tell me
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your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?
1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you
agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall
somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. “Private
ownership of business and industry should be increased” vs. “Government
ownership of business and industry should be increased”
• Religiosity. Constructed from a principal component analysis of the four vari-
ables below representing religiosity used in Bentzen (2017). Bentzen investigates
responses to two additional questions, “Do you believe in a life after death?”
(F051) and “Do you get comfort and strength from religion?” (F064). However,
these were asked of only a quarter of my sample and I do not include them.
Results are similar when these traits are included in the index, but the sample
size is much smaller.
– How often do you attend religious services? (F028) More than once a week;
Once a week; Once a month; Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter
days; Other specific holy days; Once a year; Less often; Never or practically
never
– Are you a religious person? (F034) Yes or no
– Do you believe in God? (F050) Yes or no
– How important is God in your life? (F063) 1 = “not at all important” to
10 = “very important”
• Gender Attitudes. Constructed from a principal component analysis of two
variables used in Alesina et al. (2013).
– Scarce jobs to men (C001): Agree with “When jobs are scarce, men should
have more right to a job than women.”
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– Men make better political leaders (D059): “On the whole, men make better
political leaders than women do.” strongly disagree, disagree, agree, agree
strongly.
• Risk (A195): I use the response to the following question that is found highly
correlated with the willingness to take risks by Falk et al. (2018). “Would you
please indicate for each description whether that person is very much like you,
like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? Adventure and
taking risks are important to this person; to have an exciting life.”
• Trust (A165): “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”
• Tradition (A198): “Would you please indicate for each description whether
that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or
not at all like you? Tradition is important to this person; to follow the customs
handed down by ones religion or family.” Used by Giuliano and Nunn (2017).
• Loss aversion (C009). I use the following question that Galor and Savitskiy
(2017) use to proxy for loss aversion: First choice if looking for a job is “A safe
job with no risk.” Other options were “A good income”, “Working with people
you like”, “Doing an important job” or “Do something for community”
• Long term orientation (A038). I use responding with “Thrift, saving money
and things” as a quality that it is important a child learns at home following
Galor and O¨zak (2016).
• Employment status (X028): Full-time, Part-time, Self-employed, Retired,
Housewife, Students, Unemployed, Other
• Income (X047): Income decile within each country
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• Education (X025): What is the highest educational level that you have at-
tained? 0= No formal education; Inadequately completed elementary education;
Completed (compulsory) elementary education; Incomplete secondary school:
technical/vocational type; Complete secondary school: technical/vocational
type; Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type; Complete secondary:
university-preparatory type; Some university without degree; University with
degree/Higher education
• Marital status (X007): Married, Living together as married, Divorced, Sepa-
rated, Widowed, Single/Never married, Divorced, Separated or Widow, Living
apart but steady relation (married,cohabitation)
• Family savings during past year (X044): =1 if saved money, =0 if just got
by, spent some savings and borrowed money, or spent savings and borrowed
money.
A.3.2 Ethnographic Atlas
To match individuals with information on their ancestors I match individual’s self-
reported ethnicity or language spoken at home in the WVS with ethnicities that
appear in prominent ethnographic records. I primarily rely on the Ethnographic At-
las (Murdock, 1967). This data set is one of the most comprehensive datasets in
cross-cultural anthropology recording the preindustrial cultural, political, and eco-
nomic characteristics of 1,265 major ethnic groups around the world. Characteristics
are recorded for the earliest period for which there are written records. For soci-
eties outside of Europe, this often means that societies are recorded once they come
into contact with Europeans. However, the data explicitly attempts to capture the
characteristics of societies prior to European influence.
I make use of a version of the Ethnographic Atlas that has been updated, expanded,
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and linked with other cultural, linguistic, and geographic information in the Database
of Places, Language, Culture, and Environment (D-PLACE) (Kirby et al., 2016). D-
PLACE expands the number of societies recorded from 1,265 to 1,291 by making use of
the following sources: Barry (1980); Gray (1999); Korotayev et al. (2004); Bondarenko
et al. (2005). I follow Giuliano and Nunn (2018) and supplement this data with 17
additional societies that appear in the World Ethnographic Sample (Murdock, 1957).
I am able to match the ethnicity of 87,162 individuals in the WVS with 157 distinct
societies appearing in these records. The number of individuals matched to each
ethnicity is presented in table A.44
The location of these societies is displayed in Figure A·13. I map these locations
using three sources following Fenske (2013): Murdock (1959)’s map of the location
of ethnic groups in Africa prior to European colonization, Global Mapping Interna-
tional’s World Language Mapping System and the Geo-Referencing Ethnic Groups
(GREG) (Weidmann et al., 2010) map.
Variables from the Ethnographic Atlas
• Share of subsistence from agriculture (V5): Takes on the following ordinal
values: 0 = 0-5%, 1 = 6-15%, 2 = 16-25%, 3 = 26-35%, 4 = 36-45%, 5 = 46-
55%, 6 = 56-65%, 7 = 66-75%, 8 = 76-85%, 9 = 86-100%. Set each value to
the midpoint of the range of values and divide by 10. That is, 0 = 0.025, 1 =
0.10, 2 = 0.20, 3 = 0.30, 4 = 0.40, 5 = 0.50, 6 = 0.60 7 = 0.70, 8 = 0.80, 9 =
0.925.
• Absolute latitude: Absolute value of latitude associated with the population
centroid of the ethnic group, as recorded in D-PLACE (Kirby et al., 2016).
• Year ethnicity sampled: from main focal year, year for the primary source
of the ethnographic record for that ethnicity.
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(c) Geo-Reference Ethnic Groups (GREG)
Figure A·13: Societal Reliance on Agriculture for Subsistence of WVS
and EA Matches by Sources of Homeland Location
Notes: Presents reliance on agriculture for each ethnic group taken from the Ethnographic Atlas
(Murdock, 1967). Variable is ordinal where 0 = 0-5% of subsistence from agriculture, 1 = 6-15%,
2 = 16-25%, 3 = 26-35%, 4 = 36-45%, 5 = 46-55%, 6 = 56-65%, 7 = 66-75%, 8 = 76-85%, 9 =
86-100%. Values relative to hunting, gathering, fishing, and animal husbandry.
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Table A.44: Number of Observations by Ethnic Group
Society Obs. Society Obs. Society Obs. Society Obs.
Adangme 17 Ekoi 2 Kazan tatar 291 Sidama 150
Algerians 264 Erzya Mordvins 24 Kerala 34 Sindhi 306
Amhara 691 Estonians 543 Khmer 2 Soga 77
Ancient Egyptians 1038 Ewe 392 Konkomba 2 Somali 3
Anfillo 1 Fante 201 Konso 6 Songhai 31
Annamese 2283 French 390 Koreans 13 Soninke 26
Armenians 3013 Fulani 44 Kurd 1596 Sotho 930
Ashanti 1473 Ga 293 Latvians 661 Spaniards 3
Awuna 16 Gagauz 56 Lithuanians 842 Spanish Basques 102
Aymara 31 Ganda 260 Lozi 142 Sugbuanon 314
Bachama 1 Gbagyi 1 Magyar 1314 Sumbawanese 46
Bambara 1006 Georgians 1754 Malays 2351 Swazi 126
Barabra 76 Germans 2571 Malinke 211 Syrians 13
Basa 2 Gheg 2289 Manchu 25 Tagalog 779
Bemba 519 Ghilzai 1 Manobo 6 Tajik 60
Bengali 1156 Gisu 36 Manprusi 2 Tamil 419
Beraber 15 Greeks 45 Miao 10 Tem 5
Bihari 29 Gujarati 14 Moldovans 2188 Teso 69
Bilaan 13 Gurage 46 Moroccans 3 Thai 1721
Bisa 9 Hausa 864 Mossi (Yatenga) 692 Tigre 180
Bisayan 1144 Hebrews 18 Muong 8 Tigrinya 6
Boers 2601 Iban 38 Maori 125 Tiv 79
Boki 1 Ibibio 115 Ndebele 279 Toro 265
Bulgarians 898 Igbo 1345 Ndembu 7 Tsonga 262
Byelorussians 2915 Ijaw 3 Nupe 13 Tswana 954
Cantonese 13 Inca 361 Nyanja 240 Tumbuka 26
Chamba 3 Iranians 833 Oyo Yoruba 1461 Turkmen 23
Chechen 2 Isoko 1 Pedi 829 Turks 980
Chewa 12 Italians 199 Plateau Tonga 193 Udmurt 1
Chuvash 1 Japanese 5 Portuguese 50 Ukranians 3121
Czechs 2 Javanese 1674 Punjabi 1066 Uttar Pradesh 18
Dagara 25 Jordanians 1338 Rade 2 Uzbek 1717
Dagomba 318 Kabyle 220 Romanians 1118 Venda 139
Dogon 46 Kadazan-Dusun 43 Russians 5862 Xhosa 1708
Druze 2 Kalmyk 6 Sagada 5 Yemeni 18
Dutch 3 Kanuri 2 Senufo 21 Yungur 1
Edo 55 Kaonde 60 Serbs 2574 Yusufzai 248
Efik 35 Kashmiri 5 Shawiya 135 Zulu 2369
Egyptians 1391 Kazakh 829 Shona 1203
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• Bride price (V6): Indicator for bride price (Bride-wealth; Bride-service; Woman
exchange), Symbolic or none (Token bride-wealth; Gift exchange; Insignificant),
or Dowry
• Permanency of settlements (V30): 1=Nomadic, 2=Seminomadic, 3=Semiseden-
tary, 4=Impermanent, 5=Dispersed homesteads, 6=Hamlets, 7=Villages/towns,
8=Complex permanent
• Political hierarchies (V33): The number of jurisdictional levels beyond the
local community (0-4).
• Polygyny: from Marital composition: monogamy and polygamy (V9). =1 if
any polygyny.
• Kinship Tightness Index: compiled following Enke (2018) from the following
variables in the Ethnographic Atlas.
– Domestic or familial organization (V8): One, if domestic organization is
“Independent nuclear family”
– Post-marital residence (V11): One, if Wife to husband’s group or Husband
to wife’s group
– Community marriage organization (V15): One, if segmented or clan com-
munities
– Lineages (V43): One, if descent is bilateral
• Type of high god (V34): Four categories of a high god belief: Absent; otiose;
active, but not supporting morality; active, supporting morality.
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A.3.3 Geographic Characteristics
Ethnicity and country-level
• Precipitation and temperature: data from Terrestrial Precipitation: 1900-
2014 Gridded Monthly Time Series from the Department of Geography at the
University of Delaware. Version 4.01. Used to calculate average precipitation
and temperature, rainfall risk, and coefficient of variation of precipitation.
• Pre-1500 caloric potential from agriculture: calculated as the average of
the maximum number of calories in each grid cell within an ethnic homeland, ex-
cluding grid cells with 0 potential calories. Data obtained from (Galor and O¨zak,
2015)’s Caloric Suitability Index downloaded from https://ozak.github.io/Caloric-
Suitability-Index/.
• Malaria transmission index: Taken from Kiszewski et al. (2004).
• Ruggedness: Taken from Nunn and Puga (2012).
• Harbor on homeland: Presence of a harbor within the homeland. Taken
from Henderson et al. (2018).
• Major river within boundary: Presence of a river of scale 1-6 within the
ethnic homeland boundaries. River locations and scales obtained from Natural
Earth: https://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-physical-vectors/10m-
rivers-lake-centerlines/
• 1500 population density: Calculated using History Database of the Global
Environment (HYDE) version 3.2.1 released September 12th 2017 (Klein Gold-
ewijk et al., 2017). Measure in inhabitants per km2.
• Irrigation suitability: Share of grid cells in homeland or country that is class
5 irrigation suitability from Bentzen et al. (2017).
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• Length of growing season: from FAO/GAEZ.
• Cereal advantage: Difference between potential calories from cereals (maize,
rice, wheat, barley, sorghum, millet, oat, rye) and roots and tubers (cassava,
potatoes, yams). Follows definition used by Mayshar et al. (2018).
Ethnicity-level only
• Precipitation predictability: calculated for the grid cell at the centroid of
the ethnic group in the Ethnographic Atlas by D-PLACE (Kirby et al., 2016).
• Distance to the coast: Distance to the nearest coast from the population
centroid of the ethnicity. Calculated by D-PLACE (Kirby et al., 2016).
• 1990 GDP per capita: Calculated for the population centroid of the ethnicity
using Yale University’s G-Econ project (Nordhaus et al., 2011).
Country-level only
• Share of ancestral subsistence from agriculture: Weighted average of
v5 grp1-v5 grp10 from Giuliano and Nunn (2018).
• Average year societies sampled: from Giuliano and Nunn (2018).
• Absolute latitude: absolute latitude associated with centroid of polygon for
that country, downloaded from Natural Earth:
https://www.naturalearthdata.com/downloads/10m-cultural-vectors/10m-admin-
0-countries/
• Distance to ice free coast: from Nunn and Puga (2012)
• 2000 GDP per capita: from the Maddison Project (Bolt et al., 2018).
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A.3.4 PISA
• Math locus of control: created from a principal component analysis of the
following questions.
Thinking about your mathematics lessons: to what extent do you agree with
the following statements?
– If I put in enough effort I can succeed in mathematics. (ST43Q01)
– Whether or not I do well in mathematics is completely up to me. (ST43Q02)
– Family demands or other problems prevent me from putting a lot of time
into my mathematics work. (ST43Q03)
– If I had different teachers, I would try harder in mathematics. (ST43Q04)
– If I wanted to, I could do well in mathematics. (ST43Q05)
– I do badly in mathematics whether or not I study for my exams. (ST43Q06)
Suppose that you are a student in the following situation: Each week, your
mathematics teacher gives a short quiz. Recently you have done badly on these
quizzes. Today you are trying to figure out why. How likely are you to have
these thoughts or feelings in this situation?
– My teacher did not explain the concepts well this week. (ST44Q03)
– This week I made bad guesses on the quiz. (ST44Q04)
– Sometimes the course material is too hard. (ST44Q05)
– The teacher did not get students interested in the material. (ST44Q07)
– Sometimes I am just unlucky. (ST44Q08)
• Math learning effort: created from a principal component analysis of the
following questions.
198
Thinking about the mathematics you do for school: to what extent do you agree
with the following statements?
– I finish my homework in time for mathematics class. (ST46Q01)
– I work hard on my mathematics homework. (ST46Q02)
– I am prepared for my mathematics exams. (ST46Q03)
– I study hard for mathematics quizzes. (ST46Q04)
– I keep studying until I understand mathematics material. (ST46Q05)
– I pay attention in mathematics class. (ST46Q06)
– I listen in mathematics class. (ST46Q07)
– I avoid distractions when I am studying mathematics. (ST46Q08)
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Appendix B
Appendix: Occupation Aspirations,
Education Investment, and Cognitive
Outcomes: Evidence from Indian
Adolescents
B.1 Data Appendix
B.1.1 Variable Details
Table B.1 summarizes the individual and household characteristics used as controls
in the main analysis. This includes the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices Test
(Raven, 2000), a non-verbal, multiple-choice measure of reasoning used to test in-
tellectual abilities. Table B.2 summarizes the investment, time use, and behavioral
outcomes used in the analysis. The caregiver was asked how much the household
had spent on school fees, donations, private tuition, school books and stationary, and
transportation to school. It then asks what proportion of this expense was for the
sample child. Additionally, the child was asked how they spent their time during a
typical weekday during the past week. They were asked to divide twenty-four stones
between eight categories. I aggregate these eight categories into five. The first, educa-
tion, is time spent at school and studying at home or extra tuition outside the home.
The second is work, which includes activities for pay outside of their household as
well as tasks on the family farm, animal herding, or other family business. The third
is chores, which includes domestic tasks such as fetching water, cleaning, cooking,
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shopping, and caring for other household members. Fourth is leisure, which includes
playing, seeing friends, using the internet, or watching television. The final category
is sleep.
Standard
Mean Median Deviation Minimum Maximum Obs.
Individual
Female 0.511 1.0 0.500 0 1 951
Birth Order 2.558 2.0 1.722 1 12 951
Eldest Son 0.282 0.0 0.450 0 1 951
First Born 0.279 0.0 0.449 0 1 951
Age in Months (Round 4) 227.9 228.0 4.141 219 238 951
Height-for-Age Z-Score -1.562 -1.570 1.065 -10.020 2.010 951
Weight-for-Age Z-Score -1.952 -1.940 1.033 -5.020 2.350 951
Household
Rural 0.763 1.0 0.425 0 1 951
Scheduled Caste 0.215 0.0 0.411 0 1 951
Scheduled Tribes 0.110 0.0 0.314 0 1 951
Backward Caste 0.462 0.0 0.499 0 1 951
Other Caste 0.213 0.0 0.410 0 1 951
Christian 0.050 0.0 0.219 0 1 951
Hindu 0.873 1.0 0.333 0 1 951
Muslim 0.067 0.0 0.251 0 1 951
Household Size 5.547 5.0 2.037 2 24 951
Caregiver Years of Educ. 2.305 0.0 3.827 0 14 951
Household Head Years of Educ. 3.385 0.0 4.582 0 14 950
Female Household Head 0.081 0.0 0.273 0 1 951
Wealth Index 0.406 0.393 0.205 0.007 0.898 951
Round 1 Education & Cognitive
Raw score on Raven’s Test 22.977 23.0 5.232 0 36 946
Currently enrolled in school 0.976 1.0 0.154 0 1 951
Child’s highest grade completed 1.932 2.0 0.753 0 4 951
Private School 0.230 0.0 0.421 0 1 951
Literate 0.371 0.0 0.483 0 1 949
Table B.1: Summary Statistics of control variables
Notes: Raven’s test out of a possible 36.
The Young Lives survey also measures the child’s attitudes and beliefs about their
current state and the future in round two and three. In round two they are asked
if they agreed or disagreed with several statements, and responses are recorded on
an ordinal scale where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=agree, and 4=strongly
agree. The two statements used in this paper are (1) “I like to make plans for my
future studies and work” and (2) “If I try hard, I can improve my situation in life.”
Additionally, they are asked which step on a 9 step ladder, where the ninth step is at
the very top, they though they would be four years from now.1 In round 3, the survey
1The full text for this question was “There are nine steps on this ladder. Suppose we say that the
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asks the same questions on making plans for the future and trying hard. However
responses are now coded 1-5 where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=more or less,
4=agree, and 5=strongly agree. They are not asked what rung they thought they
would be on in 4 years time, but are asked if they agreed with the statement “I have
opportunities to develop job skills.” Table B.2 summarizes the responses to these
questions.
Std.
Mean Median Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Education Expenditure (Rupees)
Round 2 1647.77 650.0 2721.13 0 23500 892
Round 3 2453.45 1025.0 4596.76 0 50925 948
Round 2 Time Use (Hours/Day)
Education 8.39 9.0 3.51 0 24 949
Work 0.66 0.0 2.19 0 13 948
Chores 1.14 1.0 1.37 0 12 948
Leisure 4.19 4.0 2.13 0 15 948
Sleep 9.61 9.4 1.41 0 19 948
Round 3 Time Use (Hours/Day)
Education 8.43 10.0 4.64 0 16 950
Work 1.50 0.0 3.13 0 12 950
Chores 1.72 2.0 1.68 0 14 950
Leisure 4.07 4.0 2.16 0 16 950
Sleep 8.28 8.0 0.97 4 17 950
Round 2 Attitudes and Beliefs
I like to make plans for my future studies & work 3.53 4.0 0.78 1 4 933
If I try hard, I can improve my situation in life 3.87 4.0 0.41 1 4 944
Position on ladder in 4 yrs time 5.07 5.0 1.94 1 9 846
Round 3 Attitudes and Beliefs
I like to make plans for my future studies & work 3.96 4.0 0.90 1 5 942
If I try hard, I can improve my situation in life 4.40 4.0 0.69 1 5 948
I have opportunities to develop job skills 4.14 4.0 0.76 1 5 947
Table B.2: Summary Statistics of Other Outcomes
Notes: Attitudes and beliefs questions are ordinal. Ladder questions ask their future position on
a 9 rung ladder, where the ninth rung represents the best possible life. Responses to the other
attitudes and beliefs statements are if they agreed, where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, and in
round 2, 3=agree and 4=strongly agree. In round 3, 3=more or less, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree.
B.1.2 Quantifying the Aspirations Gap
As discussed in the main text, I use both the education and occupation aspirations
to create the aspiration level. The frequency of occupation aspirations of the child
and caregiver are presented in table B.3 and the education aspirations in table B.4.
In order to quantify and combine these aspirations, I match them with NSS data.
ninth step, at the very top, represents the best possible life for you and the bottom represents the
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The occupation aspirations are matched with NSS data based on the descriptions
of National Classification of Occupation 1968 codes. Table B.5 details which NCO
codes are assigned to each occupation aspiration.2 One occupation, soldier, does
not have a specific NCO-1968 code that matched in the National Sample Survey
(NSS) of employment and unemployment. Thus, I match this occupation aspiration
with the National Industrial Classification (NIC) code for the military, 75220. Table
B.6 details the distribution of two-digit NIC categories that corresponded with the
primary economic activity of households used to quantify the initial status. This
code maps directly with NIC codes in the NSS data and is used to quantify the initial
status for the child’s aspirations gap.
Within the NSS data, I extract the median wage within occupation, educa-
tion, gender, and rural/urban bins, where education bins are either having a post-
secondary degree or not. I condition this on having at least 25 observations in order
to reduce noise for more uncommon occupations. For these occupation-education-
urban/rural-gender bins that do not have at least 25 observations in the NSS data, I
use occupation-education-gender bins. If there are still fewer than 25, I use occupation-
gender bins. For the remaining occupations, I use the median within the occupation
across all genders, locations, and education levels. Figure B·1 shows the distribution
of both aspiration gaps.
B.2 Correlates of Aspirations
The bulk of the analysis in this paper focuses on the role that aspirations play in
the human capital decisions of adolescents. Absent in this is how aspirations are
formed. While I do not have exogenous variations in aspirations, I can investigate
worst possible life for you. Where do you think you will be on the ladder in four years from now?”
2A document of more detail on NCO-1968 codes can be found in:
http://catalog.ihsn.org/index.php/catalog/2595/download/38821.
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Figure B·1: Density of the Round 2 Aspirations Gap
Notes: Kernel density plots for the aspirations gap, in 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees, defined as the
difference between the aspirations level and their initial status.
what observable characteristics at age 8 correlate with aspiration levels at age 12 in
order to shed some light on what may influence aspirations.
Several observable factors can influence an individual’s aspirations. In particular,
Bernard and Taffesse (2012) define aspirations as summarizing “a subset of an indi-
vidual’s beliefs, preferences and capacities that are specifically relevant to behavior
regarding the future.” Debraj Ray (2006) posits that an individual draws aspirations
from their “cognitive world” of “similar, attainable individuals.” This includes an
individual’s peers, or near-peers, or rather who an individual perceives as fitting into
that category.
From the definition of Bernard and Taffesse (2012), we then would expect that
an individual’s innate ability and access to resources, (i.e., their capacities) would
influence their aspirations. Thus, I investigate if performance on a Raven’s test at
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age 8 (a proxy for ability), as well as their household wealth, parent’s education, and
family size (a proxy for their family’s resources that can be used in pursuit of an
aspiration). The level of schooling at age 8, whether they are in private school, and
their height and weight could also serve as crude proxies for the level of investment
of the household in the child’s human capital by that stage. Households that have
a female head may allocate more resources to the child (Rubalcava et al., 2009),
which may influence the aspirations of the caregiver or the child. Additionally, as
aspirations are drawn from an individual’s perceived peers, caste and religion could
play a role as they are more likely to perceive the occupations of those within the same
caste or religion as part of their aspirations window. Moreover, the salience of these
characteristics have been shown to influence aspirations within India (Mukherjee,
2015). Additionally, within India it has been documented that first born sons, as well
as daughter’s birth order, play a significant role in how a household’s resources are
allocated (Jayachandran and Pande, 2017), which could affect their capacities as well
as their parent’s aspirations for them.
Beyond these observables that could potentially be correlated with aspirations,
Ray (2006)’s description that aspirations are drawn from an individual’s “cognitive
world” is vague. The best proxy I have for this is using a simple community fixed effect
to determine how much of the variation in aspirations is explained by an individual’s
immediate surroundings. I will also investigate if community observables, such as
distance to the nearest town and the community’s primary economic activity, also
are correlated with aspirations.
The first several tables (B.7, B.8, B.9, B.10, B.11, B.12) show which of the ob-
servables discussed above are correlated with aspiration levels at age 12 and how
much of the variation in this measure is explained by each one. The baseline measure
in column 1 of table B.7 is for an indicator for being rural and and indicator for
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female since these two variable, by construction, are determinants of the aspiration
level. These two variable alone explain .147 of the variation in the aspiration level
and serve as the benchmark for how much of the remaining variation is explained
by other observables. Since several of these measures consist of several outcomes, I
present F-stats to indicating the level of joint significance in the main results of these
tables.
Each of the remaining columns adds in additional controls. Household wealth,
parental education and owning a television raise the adjusted R2 by an additional
0.021 - 0.029, while all the other controls raise it by less than half this amount. The
final column shows that the household’s primary economic activity raises the adjusted
R2 by 0.027, and that controlling for gender, rural, and the household’s primary
economic activity accounts for 17.4% of the variation in the child’s aspirations. The
results are similar for the caregiver aspiration level in table B.8 , except that parent
education explains almost as much variation as the household’s primary economic
activity.
The next two tables (B.9, B.10) investigate how much variation in aspirations
individual characteristics explain. Interestingly, performance on the Raven’s test does
not explain very much of the variation, and neither does birth order, eldest son, or
weight and height. Whether or not an individual is enrolled in private school in round
1, a potential proxy for the level of investment by the household in intellectual human
capital, and the child’s round 1 aspiration explain about as much of the variation as
parental education and the household’s primary economic activity.
In tables B.11 and B.12 I look at community characteristics. None of the observ-
able community characteristics explain very much of the variation, however a com-
munity fixed effect explains more variation than any observable I have investigated
thus far. This is in line with Ray (2006)’s essay and the idea than an individual’s as-
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pirations are drawn from their “cognitive world,” which their local community would
make a large part of.
Finally, in table B.13 I include all of these observables in a single regression,
with the dependent variable the child aspiration level in columns 1 and 2 and the
caregiver aspiration level in columns 3 and 4. The odd columns include observable
community characteristics, while the even columns drop these in favor of community
fixed effects. The results show that females are negatively correlated with aspiration
levels and being enrolled in a private school at age 8 is positively correlated as is being
literate at age 8. Household wealth is positively correlated with child aspirations,
while parental education is positively correlated with caregiver aspirations. Being in
a scheduled caste or tribe is negatively correlated with aspiration levels. In sum, these
observables, paired with community fixed effects, explain 28% of the variation in child
aspirations in column 2 and 35% in caregiver aspirations in column 4. I exploit the
residual variation in my main specifications.
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All Rural Urban Female Male
Child CG Child CG Child CG Child CG Child CG
Accountant 0.4 2.7 0.1 2.5 1.3 3.0 0.2 2.4 0.6 2.9
Actor 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.6
Artist 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.6
Civil servant 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2
Computer operator 0.5 1.1 0.8 2.1 2.2 0.8 1.2 0.2 1.0
Conductor 0.4 0.8 0.5 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.3
Construction worker 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4
Cook 0.1 0.1 0.2
District collector 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.7 0.9 1.2 0.6 1.2 1.3
Doctor 17.9 9.2 16.6 7.5 21.8 14.7 17.0 8.9 18.7 9.6
Domestic worker 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Driver 0.8 1.4 1.1 1.1 2.6 0.2 0.4 1.4 2.5
Engineer 9.4 9.7 5.7 6.4 20.9 20.4 5.2 4.4 13.8 15.2
Farmer 2.8 3.0 3.7 3.9 1.8 0.6 3.9 5.4
Fireman/woman 0.1 0.1 0.2
Parent/housewife 6.9 13.9 8.4 15.9 2.1 7.4 12.9 26.2 0.6 1.3
Laborer 2.4 2.7 3.1 3.4 0.4 0.4 1.4 1.8 3.5 3.5
Lawyer 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.3 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.4
Lecturer 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4
Market trader 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.4
Mason 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.2 1.5
Mechanic 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.3 2.1 1.7 2.1 1.3
Nurse 1.2 2.3 1.1 2.3 1.7 2.2 2.4 4.4
Painter/decorator 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2
Pilot 0.5 3.0 0.3 2.1 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6
Policeman 6.9 3.0 5.9 2.4 10.0 4.8 2.0 0.6 11.9 5.4
Politician 0.1 0.1 0.2
Scientist 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4
Singer 0.1 0.1 0.2
Soldier 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.6
Tailor 1.2 0.9 1.6 1.2 2.2 1.4 0.2 0.4
Taxi driver 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2
Teacher 39.2 37.1 43.6 41.4 25.1 23.4 48.9 40.2 29.0 33.9
Trader 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.8 2.2 0.2 0.4 1.9 1.7
Traditional occ. 0.3 0.8 0.4 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.5
University stud. 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Other 2.3 5.6 2.1 3.9 2.9 11.3 1.4 4.0 3.3 7.3
Count 991 978 752 747 239 231 505 497 486 481
Table B.3: Age 12 Occupation Aspirations - (All values in percent-
ages)
Notes: Percent of responses for each column presented. For child, this was the response to the
question “What do you want to be when you grow up?” For caregivers (CG), this was the response
to the question “What job would you most like (child) to do in the future?” In 95% of cases, the
caregiver was the biological mother.
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Table B.4: Education Aspirations
Education Aspiration Level Child Caregiver
Middle or Less 0.011 0.056
Lower Secondary 0.148 0.244
Upper Secondary 0.078 0.085
Technical or Vocational 0.084 0.075
University 0.679 0.540
Notes: Aggregates share of responses to education aspi-
rations questions for the child and caregiver from round
2.
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Table B.5: NCO-1968 Codes Corresponding to Occupation Aspira-
tions
Occupation Aspiration Range of NCO-1968 3 digit codes
Accountant 120, 121, 129, 330, 340
Actor 182, 183
Artist 170, 171, 173, 179
Civil Servant 212, 213, 219
Computer Operator 103, 321, 340, 341, 349
Conductor 371, 379
Construction Worker 241, 811, 850, 851, 870-879, 931, 950-959, 979
Cook 520, 529, 774
District Collector 210, 211
Doctor 070-074, 078, 079, 087
Domestic Worker 510, 521, 530, 531, 539
Driver 983, 986-989
Engineer 020-039, 103
Farmer 600-652, 659
Fireman 570, 962, 984
Fisherman 680-689
Industrialist 220-259, 290-299, 400-429, 440-459, 490-499
Lawyer 140-149
Lecturer 150
Market Trader/Shop Assistant 430, 431, 439
Mason 820-829, 951
Mechanic 843-845, 852, 854-856
Nurse 080, 084, 085, 089
Painter/Decorator 171, 895, 930-939
Pilot 040-042, 049
Policeman/woman 571-574, 579
Politician 200-209
President 200, 201
Scientist 000-019, 050-069, 090-099, 100
Singer 180, 181
Social Activist 137
Soldier NIC Code = 75220
Sportsman/woman 193
Tailor 790-799
Taxi Driver 986
Teacher 151-156, 159
Trader/businessman/woman 220-259, 290-299, 400-429, 440-459, 490-499
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Table B.6: National Industrial Classifications of Primary Economic
Activity of Sample Households
NIC Category Freq. Percent
Agriculture & Hunting 528 55.5
Forestry & Logging services 10 1.1
Fishing & Fish hatcheries 1 0.1
Mining of coal 1 0.1
Extract crude petroleum & gas 2 0.2
Manufacture of food & beverages 5 0.5
Manufacture of tobacco products 1 0.1
Manufacture of textiles 22 2.3
Tanning & dressing of leather 3 0.3
Manufacture of wood & products of wood 14 1.5
Publishing & printing 1 0.1
Manufacture of chemicals & chemical products 1 0.1
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 9 0.9
Manufacture of basic metals 1 0.1
Manufacture of fabricated metal products 2 0.2
Manufacture of furniture & other unspecified items 6 0.6
Construction 56 5.9
Sale maintenance motor vehicles 10 1.1
Wholesalers trade & commission 1 0.1
Retail trade 32 3.4
Hotels & restaurants 3 0.3
Land transport 53 5.6
Post & telecommunications 3 0.3
Financial intermediation 4 0.4
Insurance & pension funding 1 0.1
Real estate activities 2 0.2
Renting machinery & equipment 10 1.1
Computer & related activities 2 0.2
Other business activity 47 4.9
Public administration 43 4.5
Education 22 2.3
Health & social work 7 0.7
Recreational cultural & sport 4 0.4
Other service activities 43 4.5
Private households with employed persons 1 0.1
Total 951
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Table B.7: Correlation between Child Aspiration Level and Household
Characteristics
Female +HHD +Caregiver +Head +HHD +Female +Initial
& Rural Wealth Educ Educ Size Head Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
F-Stat 43.28 44.91 32.90 51.23 0.98 0.02 4.27
Adj. R2 0.147 0.175 0.176 0.168 0.147 0.146 0.152
+Mobile +Landline +Primary HHD
+Radio +TV Phone Phone +Caste +Religion Econ. Activity
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
F-Stat 1.02 39.08 10.87 6.21 2.02 28.93 42.15
Adj. R2 0.147 0.174 0.149 0.154 0.156 0.148 0.174
Notes: Calculated using robust standard errors clustered by 20 mandals. Initial status and aspi-
ration level in Indian Rupees. Dependent variable is child aspiration level
Table B.8: Correlation between Caregiver Aspiration Level and
Household Characteristics
Female +HHD +Caregiver Head +HHD Female +Initial
& Rural Wealth Educ Educ Size Head Status
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
F-Stat 91.02 53.56 76.38 37.19 0.38 0.10 4.98
Adj. R2 0.237 0.265 0.282 0.274 0.236 0.236 0.240
+Mobile +Landline +Primary HHD
+Radio +TV Phone Phone +Caste +Religion Econ. Activity
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
F-Stat 8.51 34.94 2.34 20.79 6.33 111.69 124.52
Adj. R2 0.245 0.261 0.237 0.252 0.257 0.238 0.267
Notes: Calculated using robust standard errors clustered by 20 mandals. Initial status and aspi-
ration level in Indian Rupees. Dependent variable is caregiver aspiration level
Table B.9: Correlation between Child Aspiration Level and Individual
Characteristics
Raven Birth Eldest Weight & Grade In Private Round 1
Z-Score Order Son Height Level School School Literate Aspiration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
F-Stat 1.50 0.00 3.04 0.10 0.12 3.98 151.11 18.39 78.74
Adj. R2 0.146 0.146 0.148 0.145 0.146 0.149 0.199 0.168 0.191
Notes: Calculated using robust standard errors clustered by 20 mandals. Initial status and aspi-
ration level in Indian Rupees. Dependent variable is child aspiration level
Table B.10: Correlation between Caregiver Aspiration Level and In-
dividual Characteristics
Raven Birth Eldest Weight & Grade In Private Round 1
Z-Score Order Son Height Level School School Literate Aspiration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
F-Stat 8.04 0.15 8.15 0.55 0.63 2.41 57.63 26.38 6.07
Adj. R2 0.243 0.236 0.240 0.236 0.237 0.238 0.299 0.265 0.251
Notes: Calculated using robust standard errors clustered by 20 mandals. Initial status and aspi-
ration level in Indian Rupees. Dependent variable is caregiver aspiration level
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Table B.11: Correlation between Child Aspiration Level and Com-
munity Characteristics
Community Land Distance Primary Primary Largest
FE Area to Capital Population Econ. Act. Language Caste
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
F-Stat 829.33 5.59 4.28 0.17 5131.98 182.20 1.57
Adj. R2 0.196 0.154 0.155 0.154 0.153 0.155 0.148
Notes: Calculated using robust standard errors clustered by 20 mandals. Initial status and aspi-
ration level in Indian Rupees. Dependent variable is child aspiration level
Table B.12: Correlation between Caregiver Aspiration Level and
Community Characteristics
Community Land Distance Primary Primary Largest
FE Area to Capital Population Econ. Act. Language Caste
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
F-Stat 54.03 6.68 0.00 0.06 1.08 148.92 2.85
Adj. R2 0.263 0.240 0.236 0.245 0.236 0.241 0.240
Notes: Calculated using robust standard errors clustered by 20 mandals. Initial status and aspi-
ration level in Indian Rupees. Dependent variable is caregiver aspiration level
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Table B.13: Correlates with Aspiration Level
Child Asp. Level Caregiver Asp. Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Community FE N Y N Y
Individual Characteristics
Female -101.91*** -113.84*** -130.38*** -138.69***
(20.23) (21.98) (13.97) (13.79)
Ravens Z-Score -0.17 -0.94 2.02 1.23
(6.52) (7.81) (4.90) (6.53)
Weight-for-Age Z-Score -5.69 -2.47 -9.78 -9.12
(6.02) (7.91) (7.87) (9.53)
Height-for-Age Z-Score -1.18 -4.28 2.42 3.97
(6.78) (8.09) (7.14) (7.94)
In School (R1) 64.48 68.52 30.54 57.85
(48.89) (62.37) (41.53) (42.04)
Private School (R1) 73.69*** 69.54*** 77.42*** 76.42***
(15.24) (16.23) (21.49) (26.26)
Literate (R1) 27.10** 21.97* 35.87*** 32.55***
(12.72) (11.70) (9.42) (10.95)
Eldest Son 18.46 10.99 14.60 21.78
(20.35) (19.43) (14.69) (14.15)
Birth Order 4.28 5.19* 3.23 4.78
(3.03) (2.90) (3.50) (3.55)
Household Characteristics
Household Wealth Index 104.41* 104.37* 53.06 69.84
(50.61) (54.21) (38.61) (48.43)
Caregiver Years of Ed 0.10 0.24 3.48** 4.07**
(2.79) (2.73) (1.54) (1.59)
HHD Head Years of Ed 0.45 0.25 3.53* 3.06
(1.75) (1.88) (1.88) (1.90)
Household Size -1.58 -1.77 -1.01 -2.22
(1.95) (2.07) (3.35) (3.24)
Female Household Head -4.30 -19.07 12.19 4.10
(30.46) (29.62) (23.30) (21.34)
Initial Status 0.22 0.24 0.00 -0.02
(0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.21)
Scheduled Caste -24.36 -36.03 -31.35 -41.57*
(25.20) (30.74) (19.46) (22.08)
Scheduled Tribes -51.13* -49.93* -40.06 -49.63*
(25.93) (27.87) (23.74) (24.43)
Backward Caste -34.31 -34.95 -32.85* -34.67*
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Table B.13: Correlates with Aspiration Level (continued)
Child Asp. Level Caregiver Asp. Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Community FE N Y N Y
(20.22) (20.73) (17.25) (17.75)
Christian -19.53 -24.84 -8.52 -25.50
(13.97) (16.29) (25.08) (30.17)
Muslim -12.60 -0.39 -65.36*** -65.24**
(26.95) (37.41) (21.94) (23.81)
Buddhist 147.65*** 134.72** -18.08 -34.57
(47.26) (62.91) (20.66) (22.03)
Community Characteristics
Rural 42.82 -34.81
(41.81) (26.56)
Community Land Area 0.01 0.01*
(0.00) (0.00)
Distance to District Capital 0.37 -0.10
(0.27) (0.27)
Industry 83.24** -48.46*
(34.29) (26.57)
Handicrafts -48.20 82.50*
(67.61) (44.22)
Construction 70.36** 16.18
(31.14) (26.20)
Trade 24.74 -59.37***
(34.39) (19.45)
Other 33.58 -17.33
(23.89) (11.89)
Hindi 4.68 -53.36*
(18.78) (26.26)
Urdu -31.08** -40.41*
(13.13) (19.83)
Oriya 6.53 -7.65
(22.00) (22.58)
Kannada -17.42 -77.23**
(24.20) (29.04)
Marathi 2.08 10.12
(28.33) (21.72)
Scheduled Caste 24.24 41.03**
(21.64) (18.18)
Scheduled Tribes -21.50 -2.14
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Table B.13: Correlates with Aspiration Level (continued)
Child Asp. Level Caregiver Asp. Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Community FE N Y N Y
(24.71) (22.84)
Other Backward Caste -11.72 -6.53
(15.59) (15.54)
Observations 917 956 868 904
Adj. R2 0.269 0.275 0.348 0.354
HHD Primary Activity F-Stat 70.26 15.47 5.30 56.99
Round 1 Aspiration F-Stat 76.89 24.30 2.72 1.43
Community FE F-Stat 102.13 152.17
Notes: Results from OLS specification with robust standard errors clustered by Mandal in paren-
theses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
B.3 Robustness
B.3.1 Potential for omitted variable bias
Aspirations are not exogenously given in my sample and thus it is possible that the
relationship between aspirations and human capital in my sample is driven by omit-
ted variable bias. Tables B.14-B.17 show how my estimates change when including
different combinations of controls. In each table, column 1 includes only the aspi-
rations gap as a dependent variable. Columns 2-7 include community fixed effects.
Column 3 adds only individual (e.g., gender, birth order) controls to the specification
from column 2, column 4 adds household controls (e.g., parent’s education, household
wealth), column 5 age 8 education controls (e.g., Raven’s test performance, private
school enrollment), and column 6 the child’s round 1 aspiration. Column 7 includes
the full set of controls and repeats the results presented in the main text of the pa-
per. Overall, the results are relatively stable even with the inclusion of controls and
no single set of controls appears to move the coefficients significantly more than the
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others.
Table B.14: Sensitivity to the Inclusion of Controls - Highest Grade
Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CG Asp. Gap 1.175*** 0.994*** 1.014*** 1.067*** 0.909*** 1.005*** 0.980***
(0.170) (0.135) (0.142) (0.137) (0.117) (0.129) (0.125)
CG Asp. Gap2 -0.157*** -0.125*** -0.135*** -0.155*** -0.122*** -0.129*** -0.143***
(0.031) (0.024) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 860 860 860 860 860 860 860
Adj. R2 0.168 0.296 0.314 0.356 0.354 0.311 0.400
Child Asp. Gap 1.395*** 1.138*** 1.140*** 1.215*** 1.057*** 1.155*** 1.160***
(0.210) (0.233) (0.240) (0.219) (0.222) (0.241) (0.222)
Child Asp. Gap2 -0.194*** -0.157*** -0.160*** -0.180*** -0.150*** -0.161*** -0.173***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.043) (0.038) (0.040) (0.043) (0.038)
Observations 908 908 908 908 908 908 908
Adj. R2 0.197 0.301 0.320 0.357 0.355 0.314 0.394
Additional Controls
Community FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual N N Y N N N Y
Household N N N Y N N Y
R1 education N N N N Y N Y
R1 aspiration N N N N N Y Y
Notes: Reports coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by 20 Mandals presented in
parentheses from an OLS specification. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The aspiration
gaps are in 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees. All controls from round 1 (age 8). Individual controls
include gender, birth order, caste, religion, an indicator for if the child is the eldest son, height
and weight for age z-scores. R1 education controls include Ravens test Z-score, private school
enrollment, grade level, child literacy. Household controls include household size, household head
gender, wealth index, caregiver and household head education, the household’s primary economic
activity.
Figures B·2 and B·3 present raw scatter plots of each outcome variable against the
aspirations gap. In addition, a linear, quadratic, cubic, and local polynomial fit are
presented in each figure, as well as the associated coefficients and adjusted R2 for the
regressions associated with the linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomial specifications.
The results show that the local polynomial, cubic, and quadratic fits are similar for
all specifications. Moreover, the adjusted R2 does not change very much going from a
quadratic to a cubic specification, indicating that little additional explanatory power
is added when including that additional flexibility.
In order to quantify the potential for additional omitted variable bias, I use the
method devised by Oster (2016). Table B.18 provides results of the method described
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Table B.15: Sensitivity to the Inclusion of Controls - Math Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CG Asp. Gap 0.356*** 0.330*** 0.223*** 0.374*** 0.303*** 0.329*** 0.222***
(0.054) (0.049) (0.040) (0.067) (0.050) (0.053) (0.057)
CG Asp. Gap2 -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.020** -0.050*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.027**
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013)
Observations 818 818 818 818 818 818 818
Adj. R2 0.120 0.262 0.316 0.307 0.337 0.262 0.383
Child Asp. Gap 0.471*** 0.407*** 0.294*** 0.445*** 0.380*** 0.399*** 0.301***
(0.074) (0.090) (0.089) (0.073) (0.089) (0.087) (0.061)
Child Asp. Gap2 -0.067*** -0.060*** -0.041** -0.069*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.045***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
Observations 868 868 868 868 868 868 868
Adj. R2 0.114 0.248 0.304 0.301 0.339 0.251 0.388
Additional Controls
Community FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual N N Y N N N Y
Household N N N Y N N Y
R1 education N N N N Y N Y
R1 aspiration N N N N N Y Y
Notes: See table B.14 notes.
by Oster and uses the degree of selection on observables to estimate the degree of
selection on unobservables through the movement of coefficients and R-squared values
in regression specifications with and without controls. Columns 1 and 2 present the
coefficients on the aspiration gaps from a regression with no controls (β1 and β2 from
equation 2.1), and column 3 the R-squared value. Columns 4-6 duplicates the results
from Tables 2.2 and 2.3 with the full set of control variables. Using this information,
Oster suggests two methods to check for the possibility of omitted variable bias, which
are presented in Columns 7-8 and 9-10, respectively.
The first method is to calculate bias-adjusted β values with the assumption that
the degree of selection on observables is proportional to the degree of selection on
unobservables, and that the maximum R2 value is 1.3 times that of the R2 with all
controls in column 6. Columns 7 and 8 present these bias-adjusted values for β1 and
β2. These β values represent a lower-bound on my estimates and fall within 95%
confidence intervals of the values in columns 4 and 5. Thus, these bias-adjusted β
values would not change the conclusions of my main results.
The second method recommended by Oster is to calculate a δ value of the degree
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Table B.16: Sensitivity to the Inclusion of Controls - English Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CG Asp. Gap 0.348*** 0.307*** 0.254*** 0.340*** 0.286*** 0.326*** 0.256***
(0.066) (0.058) (0.054) (0.065) (0.055) (0.060) (0.067)
CG Asp. Gap2 -0.034** -0.033*** -0.026** -0.046*** -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.035**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 809 809 809 809 809 809 809
Adj. R2 0.121 0.248 0.285 0.312 0.305 0.250 0.370
Child Asp. Gap 0.483*** 0.418*** 0.358*** 0.442*** 0.396*** 0.431*** 0.354***
(0.071) (0.088) (0.088) (0.071) (0.087) (0.089) (0.068)
Child Asp. Gap2 -0.066*** -0.058*** -0.048*** -0.065*** -0.057*** -0.061*** -0.052***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013)
Observations 857 857 857 857 857 857 857
Adj. R2 0.128 0.245 0.283 0.315 0.317 0.247 0.370
Additional Controls
Community FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual N N Y N N N Y
Household N N N Y N N Y
R1 education N N N N Y N Y
R1 aspiration N N N N N Y Y
Notes: See table B.14 notes.
of selection on unobservables, relative to the observables, that would be needed to
achieve β = 0 under the assumption that the maximum R2 is equal to 1.3 The results
indicate that in column 9 the degree of selection on unobservables would need to be
3.1 to 6.1 times that of the degree of selection on observables for omitted variable
bias to move the value of β1 to zero. For β2, it would need to be 5.0 to 22.7 times
or, as indicated by the negative δ value, 78 times but in the opposite direction of
the bias. All of these values are outside the range of 0 to 1, the cutoff that Oster
recommends, providing evidence, under a set of assumptions, that the potential for
omitted variable bias to render my results statistically invalid is low.
Finally, it is possible that differential attrition could be driving the results. 5%
of the sample in round 2 is not interviewed in round 4. This would be a concern if
differences in aspirations led to difference sin attrition. Table B.19 presents results
where the dependent variable is an indicator for appearing in the fourth round (that
is, not attriting). The results indicate that aspirations do not predict if you appear
in the final round of the survey or not.
3This coefficient of proportional selection is similar to that devised by Altonji et al. (2005).
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Table B.17: Sensitivity to the Inclusion of Controls - Telugu Z-score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CG Asp. Gap 0.310*** 0.277*** 0.230*** 0.318*** 0.245*** 0.288*** 0.226***
(0.060) (0.057) (0.048) (0.070) (0.053) (0.057) (0.059)
CG Asp. Gap2 -0.034** -0.031** -0.026** -0.043*** -0.031** -0.034** -0.031**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 825 825 825 825 825 825 825
Adj. R2 0.085 0.184 0.218 0.236 0.259 0.192 0.314
Child Asp. Gap 0.413*** 0.345*** 0.280*** 0.363*** 0.332*** 0.358*** 0.285***
(0.061) (0.069) (0.068) (0.063) (0.069) (0.067) (0.065)
Child Asp. Gap2 -0.058*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.054*** -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.041***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Observations 870 870 870 870 870 870 870
Adj. R2 0.087 0.177 0.211 0.221 0.253 0.182 0.296
Additional Controls
Community FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual N N Y N N N Y
Household N N N Y N N Y
R1 education N N N N Y N Y
R1 aspiration N N N N N Y Y
Notes: See table B.14 notes.
B.3.2 Testing the structural assumption imposed by the gap
I have constructed the aspirations gap as a specific functional form of their aspiration
level and their initial status. More specifically, I am restricting the coefficient of the
aspiration level and the coefficient of the initial status to sum to zero for both the
linear and squared terms. This is a testable restriction. In tables B.20 and B.21 I
present results where I allow the aspiration level and the initial status to enter the
OLS model separately each as a quadratic polynomial and test for the restriction I
impose. I fail to reject the null that my restriction is valid in 15 of the 16 cases.
B.3.3 Two-lines alternative to a quadratic fit
As Simonsohn (2017) points out, the Lind and Mehlum (2010) method of testing
for the presence of a u-shaped relationship is only valid if the true functional form
is quadratic. The null of the Hardle and Mammen (1993) tests in tables 2.2 and
2.3 is that a nonparamtric and quadratic fit is not different. The results reject this
null for the English Z-score for both the child and caregiver aspiration gaps and for
highest grade level achieved for the child gap. Thus, the quadratic fit I impose is not
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Table B.18: Oster Check for Omitted Variable Bias - Education and
Cognitive Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Uncontrolled Controlled Bias-Adjusted Oster δ
Outcome β1 β2 R
2 β1 β2 R
2 β1 β2 δ1 δ2
Panel A: Caregiver Aspirations Gap
Grade Lvl 1.179 -0.157 0.172 0.983 -0.143 0.516 0.896 -0.137 6.12 22.76
Math Z 0.361 -0.039 0.123 0.228 -0.028 0.507 0.175 -0.024 3.48 6.58
English Z 0.349 -0.034 0.125 0.258 -0.036 0.499 0.222 -0.036 5.26 -78.30
Telugu Z 0.314 -0.034 0.089 0.232 -0.032 0.452 0.202 -0.031 5.77 33.98
Panel B: Child Aspirations Gap
Grade Lvl 1.429 -0.200 0.207 1.198 -0.179 0.510 1.081 -0.169 4.66 16.61
Math Z 0.480 -0.068 0.120 0.305 -0.045 0.506 0.236 -0.036 3.18 5.00
English Z 0.486 -0.066 0.132 0.358 -0.052 0.494 0.306 -0.047 4.18 9.09
Telugu Z 0.416 -0.058 0.090 0.288 -0.042 0.432 0.240 -0.036 4.08 6.71
Notes: Columns 1-3 and 4-6 present results from an OLS specification. β1 and β2 are from
equation 2.1. Columns 1-3 only control for the aspiration gaps measured at round two and are
in 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees. Columns 4-6 additionally control for the full set of controls from
round 1 (age 8) that includes gender, birth order, Ravens test Z-score, caste, religion, an indicator
for if the child is the eldest son, height and weight for age z-scores, household size, household head
gender, wealth index, caregiver and household head education, the household’s primary economic
activity, private school enrollment, grade level, child literacy, indicators for the child’s aspiration,
and village/community level fixed effects. Columns 7-10 present the checks for the presence of
omitted variable bias proposed by Oster (2016). Bias-Adjusted coefficients in columns 7 and 8
assume that the level of selection on unobservables is equal to the selection on observables (δ = 1)
and that the maximum R2 value is 1.3 times that of the R2 with the full set of controls in column
6. The Oster δ values in columns 9 and 10 are for a null of zero and for a maximum R2 equal to
1.3 times that of the R2 with the full set of controls in column 6.
the appropriate fit in these instances. Figures B·4 and B·5 present results using the
method suggested by Simonsohn (2017). These figures provide evidence that there is
a clear change in the slope at the inflection point, but I am underpowered to be able
to reject a slope of zero past the inflection point for all outcomes except for highest
education level for the caregiver gap.
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Table B.19: Aspirations and Attrition
Dependent variable: Surveyed in Round 4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Child Aspiration Level -0.000
(0.005)
Child Asp. Gap -0.007
(0.011)
Child Asp. Gap2 0.001
(0.002)
Caregiver Aspiration Level -0.002
(0.005)
Caregiver Asp. Gap -0.016
(0.011)
Caregiver Asp. Gap2 0.003
(0.003)
Initial Status 0.019
(0.014)
Observations 956 956 904 904 985
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.042 0.004 0.005 0.026
Dep. Var. Mean 0.959 0.959 0.960 0.960 0.957
Notes: Present results from an OLS specification. Dependent variable is an indicator for appear-
ing in round 4. β1 and β2 are from equation 2.1. Columns 2 and 4 control for the aspiration
gaps measured at round two and are in 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees. All columns additionally
control for the full set of controls from round 1 (age 8) that includes gender, birth order, Ravens
test Z-score, caste, religion, an indicator for if the child is the eldest son, height and weight for
age z-scores, household size, household head gender, wealth index, caregiver and household head
education, the household’s primary economic activity, private school enrollment, grade level, child
literacy, indicators for the child’s aspiration, and village/community level fixed effects.
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Figure B·2: Polynomial Fits for Unconditional Correlation Between
Outcomes and Caregiver Aspiration Gaps
Notes: Horizontal axis is in 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees.
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Figure B·3: Polynomial Fits for Unconditional Correlation Between
Outcomes and Child Aspiration Gaps
Notes: See figure B·2 notes.
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Table B.20: Caregiver Aspiration Level, Initial Status and Age 19
Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest Math English Telugu
Grade Lvl Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
Caregiver Asp. Level 1.698*** 0.372*** 0.410*** 0.367***
(0.203) (0.073) (0.097) (0.085)
Caregiver Asp. Level2 -0.237*** -0.048*** -0.056*** -0.048***
(0.030) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
Initial Status -1.545** -0.579** -0.557** -0.468
(0.649) (0.244) (0.259) (0.314)
Initial Status2 0.354** 0.127** 0.164** 0.108
(0.167) (0.048) (0.058) (0.064)
Asp. Level = − Initial Status p 0.824 0.417 0.638 0.760
Asp. Level2 = − Initial Status2 p 0.507 0.130 0.114 0.374
Observations 860 818 809 825
Adj. R2 0.427 0.393 0.378 0.323
Dep. Var. Mean 10.427 0.019 -0.010 0.003
Notes: See Table 2.2 notes. Bottom panel reports p-values from a Wald test for if the coefficient
on the linear aspiration level is equal to the negative of the linear initial status and similarly for
the squared terms.
Table B.21: Child Aspiration Level, Initial Status and Age 19 Out-
comes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Highest Math English Telugu
Grade Lvl Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score
Child Asp. Level 2.093*** 0.490*** 0.607*** 0.417***
(0.353) (0.082) (0.115) (0.079)
Child Asp. Level2 -0.293*** -0.068*** -0.084*** -0.055***
(0.051) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013)
Initial Status -1.700** -0.666** -0.630** -0.648*
(0.623) (0.241) (0.228) (0.338)
Initial Status2 0.392** 0.158*** 0.196*** 0.150*
(0.170) (0.054) (0.050) (0.080)
Asp. Level = − Initial Status p 0.549 0.481 0.928 0.470
Asp. Level2 = − Initial Status2 p 0.571 0.105 0.048 0.222
Observations 908 868 857 870
Adj. R2 0.438 0.402 0.391 0.306
Dep. Var. Mean 10.471 0.019 0.012 0.016
Notes: See Table B.20.
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Figure B·4: Two-Line Regression Fits of Caregiver Aspirations Gap
Notes: Horizontal axis is in 100’s of 2006 Indian Rupees. Vertical axis is Robinson’s double residual
that purges the dependent variable of the portion explained by the controls and community fixed
effects. Controls include round 1 (age 8) gender, birth order, Ravens test Z-score, caste, religion, an
indicator for if the child is the eldest son or first born, height and weight for age z-scores, household
size, household head age and gender, wealth index, caregiver and household head education, the
household’s primary economic activity, private school enrollment, grade level, child literacy, indica-
tors for the child’s aspiration and village/community fixed effects. Break point determined using
Simonsohn (2017) Robin Hood method. Trims two observations with a gap < −170. Slopes pre-
sented are from an interrupted regression with standard errors clustered by mandal in parentheses.
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Figure B·5: Two-Line Regression Fits of Child Aspirations Gap
Notes: See figure B·4 notes.
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Appendix C
Appendix: The Effects of Education on
Financial Outcomes: Evidence from
Kenya
This appendix provides additional results cited in the main paper. Table C.1 estimates
the impact of free primary education on the highest education level achieved, as an
alternative to using the years of education completed. Tables C.2 and C.3 present
supplementary results on financial inclusion and financial capability.
Tables C.4 and C.5 present results on consumption smoothing. Since financial
inclusion potentially improves individuals’ ability to smooth consumption, we look at
responses to shocks as an outcome. 74 percent of 16-18 year olds and 83 percent of
28-30 year olds report experiencing a shock to household finances in the preceding
two years. Conditional on experiencing a shock, 54 percent of older respondents but
only 28 percent of younger respondents report using their savings to deal with their
main source of financial risk. Individuals exposed to FPE were more likely to report
having experienced a shock. Our estimated coefficient is 0.232 and is significant at
the 10 percent level. Because these responses are self-reported, there are multiple
ways to interpret the result – it could reflect increases in actual shocks, or it could
also be due to increased awareness about household finances or changes in perceptions
of what constitutes a shock. We examined changes in specific types of shocks and
find changes in factors that are associated with improvements in economic well-being
(i.e., property loss, loss of income of main wage earner, loss of crops, land, and
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savings). One interpretation could therefore be that as people get more educated,
they accumulate more assets but therefore also become subject to the loss of these
assets they wouldn’t otherwise have had to begin with. We reassuringly do not
find significant increases in shocks relating to natural disasters (i.e., floods, drought
or famine). Conditional on experiencing a shock, we find that FPE is associated
with increases in the likelihood of using savings to deal with a shock, relative to
other responses. We take this as suggestive evidence that FPE may have resulted
in improved ability to smooth consumption. Given that only a subset of the sample
provides information on responses to shocks, we do not include this outcome in our
summary index of financial capability.
Tables C.6 and C.7 present supplementary results on income and employment. As
an alternative to the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of monthly income, we
use the log of monthly income as the dependent variable and drop all of the zeros from
our sample. The magnitude of the impact on income earners is still very large, moving
from the lowest to the highest intensity subregion increased log monthly income by
1.27. We also investigate the impact of FPE on respondents’ primary source of money.
The survey asked the primary source of money in the last 12 months out of farming,
employment, casual work, self-employment, family/friends/spouse, or other sources
(including subletting of property, renting equipment, investments, and assistance from
government or NGOs). Our reduced-form estimates indicate that moving from the
lowest to highest intensity subregion is associated with being 27 percentage points less
likely to rely on family, friends, or a spouse as a primary source of money, compared
with a sample mean of 32 percent. Additionally, respondents were 23 percentage
points more likely to rely on self-employment and 11 percentage points more likely to
rely on employment. These estimates are large in magnitude compared to a sample
means of 15 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
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Table C.8 presents summary statistics by gender and Table C.9 presents our re-
gression results testing for heterogeneity, where panel A uses the average treatment
intensity from the pooled sample and panel B uses gender-specific intensities.
Table C.10 estimates the effects of FPE on demographic characteristics and indi-
cates that FPE did not significantly impact religion, the probability of being married,
migrating in the last 12 months, mobile phone ownership, or internet use.
Table C.11 presents results with economic-self sufficiency, income, and financial
inclusion as dependent variables and financial capability as an additional control on
the right hand side. For economic self-sufficiency and income, financial capability is a
significant correlate but the coefficient on FPE × Intensity barely changes, indicating
that the impact of FPE on income persists when we control for financial capability.
When financial inclusion is on the LHS, financial capability is strongly significant
and the FPE × Intensity coefficient is attenuated (from 0.764 to 0.564) but remains
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Overall, we view these results as being
consistent with the interpretation that FPE’s impact on financial inclusion may be
partly driven by labor market outcomes.
Table C.12 estimates effects on reported distance to banking products and Table
C.13 estimates heterogeneous effects by distance to the nearest mobile money agent.
We report results using an indicator for having an agent within 10 minutes, we get
similar results if we instead use an indicator for having an agent within 30 minutes.
As an additional robustness check, Table C.14 presents results separately for the
younger and older cohort. The specification in this table exploits only the geographic
variation and thus our main reduced form result is the difference between these two
cohort-specific coefficients for each outcome. The results show that for education,
financial inclusion, and financial capability, individuals in high intensity subregions
are still doing worse than those in low-intensity subregions, but are not as far behind
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as those in the older cohort. For economic self-sufficiency, the younger cohort in high-
intensity subregions is actually doing slightly better than in low-intensity sub-regions,
although the coefficient is not statistically significant.
Figures C·1 to C·5 present age-specific effects of Free Primary Education.
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Table C.1: Education Levels
At Least Exactly
Dependent Variable (1) (2)
Some primary 0.595 0.351**
(0.091) (0.121)
[0.129] [0.034]
Completed primary 0.244 0.149
(0.156) (0.133)
[0.312] [0.286]
Some secondary 0.095 -0.307**
(0.139) (0.108)
[0.639] [0.020]
Observations 1619 1619
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clus-
tered by 13 subregions. Wild bootstrap clustered p-
values in brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for more conserva-
tive of clustered standard errors and wild bootstrap
clustered p-values. All specifications include subre-
gion and cohort fixed effects and controls for gender.
Each cell is the coefficient on FPE × Intensity for a
separate regression. FPE is an indicator for being in
the age cohort eligible for Free Primary Education.
The dependent variable in column 1 is an indica-
tor for completing at least the education level for
that row. In column 2, the dependent variable is
for completing exactly the corresponding education
level. Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess house-
hold survey.
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Table C.2: Banking Products
RF OLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Ever banked (incl. Mpesa) 0.354** 0.028*** 0.081**
(0.144) (0.005) (0.036)
[0.009] [0.003]
Ever banked through Mpesa 0.441*** 0.028*** 0.101***
(0.114) (0.006) (0.036)
[0.001] [0.003]
Ever banked through Mpesa only 0.041 -0.018** 0.009
(0.193) (0.006) (0.044)
[0.835] [0.015]
Ever banked (excl. Mpesa) 0.313* 0.047*** 0.072***
(0.160) (0.004) (0.023)
[0.027] [0.001]
Currently banked (incl. Mpesa) 0.249* 0.048*** 0.057***
(0.138) (0.004) (0.021)
[0.029] [0.001]
Ever formal savings (incl. Mpesa) 0.310** 0.047*** 0.071***
(0.131) (0.004) (0.020)
[0.009] [0.001]
Currently formal savings (incl. Mpesa) 0.249* 0.047*** 0.057***
(0.139) (0.004) (0.021)
[0.043] [0.001]
Ever formal loan/credit (incl. Mpesa) 0.327*** 0.027*** 0.075***
(0.045) (0.003) (0.016)
[0.003] [0.001]
Currently formal loan/credit (incl. Mpesa) 0.157** 0.017*** 0.036***
(0.042) (0.004) (0.008)
[0.017] [0.001]
Currently has an insurance product 0.240 0.031*** 0.055**
(0.164) (0.003) (0.027)
[0.051] [0.001]
Observations 1619 1619 1619
F-Stat of Excluded Instrument 14.84
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13 subregions. Wild bootstrap
clustered p-values in brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01
for more conservative of clustered standard errors and wild bootstrap clustered p-values.
All specifications include subregion and cohort fixed effects and controls for gender. Col-
umn 1 presents the coefficient on FPE×Intensity from reduced form (RF) estimations of
equation 3.2. FPE is an indicator for being in the age cohort eligible for Free Primary Edu-
cation. Columns 2 and 3 presents the coefficient on Years of Education censored at 12 years
from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation 3.3 in column 2 and two-stage least
squares (2SLS) estimates in column 3 with FPE×Intensity as the excluded instrument. For-
mal savings product includes through a mobile banking service, postbank account, formal
bank account, checking account, and bank account for everyday needs without a checking
account. Formal credit/loan product includes personal/business loan through a traditional
or mobile bank, microfinance, government institution, hire purchase, loan to buy or mort-
gage through a bank, building society, SACCO, or government institution, or a credit card.
Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table C.3: Financial Security and Retirement
RF OLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Financial Security
Financial literacy 2.063*** 0.416*** 0.474***
(0.606) (0.020) (0.145)
[0.001] [0.001]
Effective numeracy 0.210 0.085*** 0.048*
(0.171) (0.004) (0.028)
[0.374] [0.001]
Any savings (formal or informal) -0.037 0.019*** -0.009
(0.166) (0.003) (0.038)
[0.948] [0.001]
Member of informal savings group 0.455*** 0.002 0.105***
(0.079) (0.006) (0.025)
[0.001] [0.746]
Able to get money in case of emergency 0.298** 0.027*** 0.068*
(0.126) (0.004) (0.041)
[0.017] [0.001]
Have a safe place to save money -0.012 0.012** -0.003
(0.097) (0.004) (0.022)
[0.968] [0.015]
Observations 1619 1619 1619
F-Stat of Excluded Instrument 14.84
Panel B: Retirement
Forward looking retirement -0.121 0.036*** -0.027
(0.114) (0.005) (0.030)
[0.435] [0.001]
No retirement plans 0.152 -0.017*** 0.034
(0.166) (0.004) (0.042)
[0.612] [0.003]
Public/private safety net retirement -0.211 -0.006 -0.047
(0.125) (0.003) (0.033)
[0.195] [0.101]
Observations 1606 1606 1606
F-Stat of Excluded Instrument 15.83
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13 subregions. Wild bootstrap
clustered p-values in brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗
p < 0.01 for more conservative of clustered standard errors and wild bootstrap clustered
p-values. All specifications include subregion and cohort fixed effects and controls for
gender. Column 1 presents the coefficient on FPE×Intensity from reduced form (RF)
estimations of equation 3.2. FPE is an indicator for being in the age cohort eligible for
Free Primary Education. Columns 2 and 3 presents the coefficient on Years of Education
censored at 12 years from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation 3.3 in column
2 and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates in column 3 with FPE×Intensity as the
excluded instrument. Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table C.4: Shocks Summary Statistics
Cohort FPE (16-18) Older (28-30)
Mean SD Mean SD
Shock to finances of household 0.740 0.439 0.825 0.380
Used savings 0.275 0.447 0.543 0.499
Borrowed from bank, moneylender, etc. 0.025 0.157 0.089 0.285
Sold assets 0.040 0.196 0.061 0.240
Help from family/church/mosque 0.284 0.451 0.198 0.399
Fundraising 0.092 0.289 0.077 0.267
Other 0.085 0.279 0.084 0.278
Did nothing 0.332 0.471 0.151 0.359
Observations 682 926
Notes: FPE is an indicator for being in the age cohort eligible for Free Primary
Education. Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table C.5: Dealing with Shocks
RF
Dependent Variable (1)
Shock to finances of household 0.232*
(0.116)
[0.054]
Observations 1608
How did you deal with the shock
Used savings 0.294***
(0.064)
[0.000]
Borrowed from bank, moneylender, etc. 0.005
(0.077)
[0.939]
Sold assets 0.003
(0.051)
[0.909]
Help from family/church/mosque -0.186
(0.160)
[0.178]
Fundraising -0.041
(0.058)
[0.555]
Other -0.039
(0.084)
[0.797]
Did nothing -0.065
(0.139)
[0.657]
Observations 1180
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13
subregions. Wild bootstrap clustered p-values in brackets with
999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for
more conservative of clustered standard errors and wild boot-
strap clustered p-values. All specifications include subregion
and cohort fixed effects and controls for gender. Each cell is
the coefficient on FPE × Intensity from reduced form (RF) es-
timations of equation 3.2. FPE is an indicator for being in the
age cohort eligible for Free Primary Education. Data source:
2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table C.6: Income
RF OLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Earned any income 0.403*** -0.006** 0.093***
(0.096) (0.003) (0.024)
[0.001] [0.007]
IHST of monthly income 4.870*** 0.027 1.120***
(0.986) (0.027) (0.274)
[0.001] [0.175]
Log (1 + monthly income) 4.591*** 0.031 1.056***
(0.920) (0.025) (0.258)
[0.001] [0.105]
Observations 1617 1617 1617
F-Stat of Excluded Instrument 14.83
Log (monthly income) 1.719*** 0.091*** 0.686**
(0.223) (0.012) (0.333)
[0.001] [0.001]
Observations 1129 1129 1129
F-Stat of Excluded Instrument 4.14
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13 subregions. Wild
bootstrap clustered p-values in brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for more conservative of clustered standard errors and
wild bootstrap clustered p-values. All specifications include subregion and
cohort fixed effects and controls for gender. Column 1 presents the coefficient
on FPE×Intensity from reduced form (RF) estimations of equation 3.2. FPE
is an indicator for being in the age cohort eligible for Free Primary Education.
Columns 2 and 3 presents the coefficient on Years of Education censored at 12
years from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation 3.3 in column 2
and two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates in column 3 with FPE×Intensity
as the excluded instrument. Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household
survey.
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Table C.7: Primary Source of Money
RF OLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable (1) (2) (3)
Farming 0.009 -0.010 0.002
(0.112) (0.006) (0.025)
[0.934] [0.135]
Employed 0.147* 0.012** 0.034***
(0.059) (0.004) (0.008)
[0.059] [0.003]
Casual employment -0.054 -0.013*** -0.012
(0.076) (0.003) (0.018)
[0.658] [0.005]
Self-employed 0.311*** 0.004 0.071***
(0.073) (0.004) (0.018)
[0.007] [0.234]
Family/friends/spouse -0.362*** 0.006** -0.083***
(0.088) (0.003) (0.022)
[0.005] [0.013]
Other sources -0.051 -0.000 -0.012
(0.043) (0.001) (0.010)
[0.403] [0.936]
Observations 1619 1619 1619
F-Stat of Excluded Instrument 14.84
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13 subregions. Wild
bootstrap clustered p-values in brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for more conservative of clustered standard errors and
wild bootstrap clustered p-values. All specifications include subregion and co-
hort fixed effects and controls for gender. Column 1 presents the coefficient on
FPE×Intensity from reduced form (RF) estimations of equation 3.2. FPE is an
indicator for being in the age cohort eligible for Free Primary Education. Columns
2 and 3 presents the coefficient on Years of Education censored at 12 years from
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation 3.3 in column 2 and two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimates in column 3 with FPE×Intensity as the excluded
instrument. Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table C.8: Summary Statistics by Gender
Cohort Female Male
Mean SD Mean SD
Years of education (censored) 7.590 3.655 8.287 3.427
Some primary 0.912 0.283 0.949 0.219
Completed primary 0.673 0.469 0.729 0.445
Some secondary 0.424 0.494 0.552 0.498
Age 24.677 5.967 22.653 6.078
FPE cohort 0.366 0.482 0.537 0.499
Intensity 0.110 0.193 0.096 0.171
Intensity (female) 0.125 0.214 N/A N/A
Intensity (male) N/A N/A 0.083 0.155
Financial inclusion index -0.642 0.981 -0.570 1.032
Financial capability index -0.299 0.633 -0.201 0.578
Economic self-sufficiency index -0.647 1.099 -0.454 1.100
Ever banked (incl. Mpesa) 0.624 0.485 0.619 0.486
Currently banked (incl. Mpesa) 0.273 0.446 0.328 0.470
Ever formal savings (incl. Mpesa) 0.314 0.464 0.375 0.484
Financial literacy 4.401 2.776 4.898 2.671
Effective numeracy 1.889 0.799 2.189 0.784
Forward looking retirement 0.451 0.498 0.544 0.498
Member of informal savings group 0.425 0.495 0.299 0.458
Able to get money in case of emergency 0.327 0.469 0.347 0.477
Have a safe place to save money 0.858 0.350 0.886 0.318
Any savings (formal or informal) 0.699 0.459 0.703 0.457
Earned any income 0.693 0.462 0.745 0.436
Monthly income 7115 20599 12311 25591
Money primarily from family/friends/spouse 0.361 0.481 0.290 0.454
Observations 1008 611
Notes: FPE cohort is an indicator for being in the age cohort eligible for Free Primary
Education. All statistics are calculated using sampling weights, the weighted sample is
nationally representative at the subregion level. Intensity, Intensity (female) and Intensity
(male) calculated using 1999 Kenyan Census. Data source for all other variables: 2015 Kenya
FinAccess household survey.
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Table C.10: Other Potential Outcomes
RF
Dependent Variable (1)
Currently married -0.041
(0.123)
[0.619]
Ever married 0.067
(0.085)
[0.238]
Christian -0.096
(0.088)
[0.318]
Muslim 0.081
(0.096)
[0.425]
Other religion 0.014
(0.027)
[0.583]
Owns mobile phone -0.014
(0.099)
[0.898]
Changed residence in last 12 months -0.040
(0.037)
[0.454]
Accessed internet in past 4 weeks -0.090
(0.084)
[0.420]
Observations 1617
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
by 13 subregions. Wild bootstrap clustered p-values in
brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for more conservative of clustered standard
errors and wild bootstrap clustered p-values. All spec-
ifications include subregion and cohort fixed effects and
controls for gender. Each cell is the coefficient on FPE
× Intensity from reduced form (RF) estimations of equa-
tion 3.2. FPE is an indicator for being in the age cohort
eligible for Free Primary Education. Data source: 2015
Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Table C.11: Financial Capability as a Potential Mechanism
Dependent Variable Econ. Self-Sufficiency Ln (1 + Income) Formal Fin. Inclusion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FPE × Intensity 1.099*** 1.066* 4.591*** 4.365* 0.764** 0.564**
(0.240) (0.246) (0.920) (0.952) (0.275) (0.247)
[0.006] [0.054] [0.001] [0.050] [0.008] [0.046]
Financial Capability 0.105** 0.709*** 0.627***
(0.040) (0.151) (0.049)
[0.013] [0.003] [0.000]
Observatons 1619 1619 1617 1617 1619 1619
Adjusted R2 0.350 0.352 0.388 0.397 0.420 0.530
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13 subregions. Wild bootstrap clustered
p-values in brackets with 1000 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All specifications
include subregion and cohort fixed effects and controls for gender. FPE is an indicator for being in
the age cohort eligible for Free Primary Education. Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household
survey.
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Table C.12: Distance to Banking Products
RF
Dependent Variable (1)
Panel A: Time to nearest
Bank branch -1.886**
(0.560)
[0.034]
Mobile money agent -1.034
(0.398)
[0.122]
Bank agent -1.486**
(0.477)
[0.012]
Financial service provider -0.692
(0.292)
[0.158]
Panel B: Don’t know time to nearest
Bank branch -0.054
(0.074)
[0.567]
Mobile money agent 0.054
(0.056)
[0.563]
Bank agent -0.143
(0.094)
[0.052]
Financial service provider -0.021
(0.047)
[0.693]
Observations 1619
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered
by 13 subregions. Wild bootstrap clustered p-values in
brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01 for more conservative of clustered standard
errors and wild bootstrap clustered p-values. All speci-
fications include subregion and cohort fixed effects and
controls for gender. Each cell is the coefficient on FPE ×
Intensity from reduced form (RF) estimations of equa-
tion 3.2. FPE is an indicator for being in the age cohort
eligible for Free Primary Education. Time to nearest is
a discrete variable from 1-9 where 1 is “Under 10 min-
utes,” 2 “About 10 to 30 minutes,” 3 “Over 30 mins to 1
hour,” 4 “About 2 hours,” 5 “About 3 hours,” 6 “About
4 hours,” 7 “about 5 hours,” 8 “About 6 hours,” 9 “7
hours or more.” Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess
household survey.
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Table C.13: Heterogeneity by Distance to Mobile Money Agent < 10
minutes
Dependent Formal Fin. Financial Economic
Variable Inclusion Capability Self-Sufficiency
(1) (2) (3)
FPE × Intensity × Mobile agent < 10 min. -0.459 0.077 0.642
(0.434) (0.290) (0.362)
[0.189] [0.675] [0.149]
FPE × Intensity 0.724* 0.219 0.741**
(0.335) (0.137) (0.236)
[0.020] [0.070] [0.016]
FPE × Mobile agent < 10 min. -0.224 -0.158 -0.519**
(0.172) (0.074) (0.147)
[0.226] [0.126] [0.012]
Intensity × Mobile agent < 10 min. 0.157 0.282* 0.069
(0.149) (0.112) (0.213)
[0.162] [0.050] [0.471]
Mobile money agent within 10 minutes 0.463*** 0.283*** 0.172**
(0.072) (0.055) (0.057)
[0.002] [0.006] [0.004]
Observations 1616 1616 1616
Adjusted R2 0.451 0.274 0.360
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 13 subregions. Wild bootstrap clustered
p-values in brackets with 999 replications. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01 for more
conservative of clustered standard errors and wild bootstrap clustered p-values. All specifications
include subregion and cohort fixed effects and controls for gender. 27 percent of respondents report
having a mobile money agent within 10 minutes, 41 percent report having an agent within 10-30
minutes, 20 percent report having an agent within 30-60 minutes away. FPE is an indicator for
being in the age cohort eligible for Free Primary Education. Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess
household survey.
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(a) Entire Sample
Figure C·1: Coefficients on Interactions of Age and FPE Intensity for
Education Level
Notes: Dependent variable takes an ordinal value from 1-7, where 1=None, 2=Some primary,
3=Completed primary, 4=Some secondary, 5=Completed secondary, 6=Technical training after sec-
ondary, 7=University degree. Figure plots coefficients on an interaction of age and Free Primary
Education (FPE) intensity, with the cohort aged 28 in 2003 as the excluded group. 95% confidence
intervals presented based on standard errors clustered at the subregion level. Data source: 2015
Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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(c) Some secondary
Figure C·2: Coefficients on Interactions of Age and FPE Intensity for
Educational Outcomes
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for a) ever attending primary, b) completing primary, d)
ever attending secondary, and d) completing secondary. Figure plots coefficients on an interaction
of age and Free Primary Education (FPE) intensity, with the cohort aged 28 in 2003 as the excluded
group. 95% confidence intervals presented based on standard errors clustered at the subregion level.
Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Figure C·3: Coefficients on Interactions of Age and FPE Intensity for
Banking Outcomes
Notes: Dependent variable is an indicator for a) ever having a bank account, b) currently having a
bank account, and c) ever having a formal savings account. Figure plots coefficients on an interaction
of age and Free Primary Education (FPE) intensity, with the cohort aged 28 in 2003 as the excluded
group. 95% confidence intervals presented based on standard errors clustered at the subregion level.
Data source: 2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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mal)
Figure C·4: Coefficients on Interactions of Age and FPE Intensity for
Financial Capability Outcomes
Notes: Dependent variable is a) financial literacy, b) effective numeracy, and c) an indicator for
having any savings (formal or informal). Figure plots coefficients on an interaction of age and Free
Primary Education (FPE) intensity, with the cohort aged 28 in 2003 as the excluded group. 95%
confidence intervals presented based on standard errors clustered at the subregion level. Data source:
2015 Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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Figure C·5: Coefficients on Interactions of Age and FPE Intensity for
Economic Outcomes
Notes: Dependent variable is a) an indicator for earning any income, b) inverse hyperbolic sine
transformation (IHST) of income earned, and c) an indicator for not relying on family/friends/spouse
as a main income source. Figure plots coefficients on an interaction of age and Free Primary
Education (FPE) intensity, with the cohort aged 28 in 2003 as the excluded group. 95% confidence
intervals presented based on standard errors clustered at the subregion level. Data source: 2015
Kenya FinAccess household survey.
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